



# THE QUAD AND ASEAN: PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA, JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ISAS-SPF Panel Discussion

The Quad and ASEAN: The Way Forward

4 March 2021

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# The Quad and ASEAN: Perceptions of India, Japan and Southeast Asia

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# CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>India’s Perspectives on ASEAN and the Quad</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Japan’s Perspectives on ASEAN and the Quad</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>ASEAN’s Perspectives on the Quad</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Conclusion: Synergies and Divergences</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Appendix 1: About the Authors</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Appendix 2: About the Panel Discussion</b>	<b>38</b>

## Executive Summary

With the end of the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as the fulcrum around which Indo-Pacific's economic, political and diplomatic interactions took shape. Its emergence as the node of Indo-Pacific's regional integration, however, depended upon three factors: the peaceful rise of China as the region's economic torchbearer; the continued American commitment to the region's security and stability; and a shared Sino-American understanding on the avoidance of any direct conflict between the two major powers in the region. In the last decade, all these assumptions have become problematic. For one, China's economic rise has fuelled its military and territorial assertiveness, most evident in the unilateral imposition of its maritime claims in the South China Sea. America's relative decline and its growing domestic polarisation, on the other hand, have raised questions over its commitment to the region's security and stability. However, what is most disturbing for ASEAN is the ongoing transition of power in the region and the threat of hegemonic wars between a rising China claiming primacy and a declining hegemon bent at preserving the status quo.

China's rise has also stoked apprehensions in the region's other major powers, such as India and Japan, which are now actively collaborating with the United States (US) to arrest China's territorial assertiveness and diplomatic coercion. The emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the Quad) as a new security institution in the region has grave consequences for ASEAN's otherwise central role in the region's geopolitics. Though both Japan and India constantly reaffirm ASEAN's central role in shaping the region's future, ASEAN's divided loyalties between China and the US pose significant challenges to its credibility. Its allies and partners quite reasonably question its commitment to the rule of law and its ability and sincerity in addressing the issues stoked by China's aggressive intent and actions given this predicament.

How do the Quad states perceive ASEAN's evolving role in managing the fallout of China's rise, America's decline and the ensuing contest of power and resolve between the major powers in the region? How can ASEAN ensure a stable Indo-Pacific when it is deeply embedded in the Chinese economy on the one hand and American security commitments on the other? How does ASEAN perceive the emergence of the Quad as a new security institution in the region? What are the complementarities and contradictions between the Quad and ASEAN?

By analysing the perceptions of India and Japan on ASEAN and the Quad as well as ASEAN's perception on the Quad, this Special Report will focus on the interaction between the two as regional institutions in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges that arise in their interaction.

## Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN emerged as the fulcrum around which the Indo-Pacific's economic, political and diplomatic interactions took shape. By 2010, all regional powers were deeply embedded in this evolving regional security architecture. 'ASEAN centrality' and the 'ASEAN way' emerged as key concepts around which this architecture functioned. Both India and Japan carefully paid heed to these concepts. Most regional actors hoped that institutional and economic interdependence created by this architecture could constrain the behaviour of powerful external actors, such as China and the US, and facilitate their peaceful rise.

However, as recent events have demonstrated, this is not the case. Using grey zone tactics, China has unilaterally altered the status quo in the South China Sea and is attempting the same on India's Himalayan frontier and in the East China Sea. Furthermore, it has been using its vast economic resources to increase its strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific. Economic interdependence, benign for long, has now been increasingly used by Beijing as an instrument to gain extensive concessions against smaller countries in the region. China's expanding economic footprint also undercuts the influence of regional powers like India and Japan. ASEAN-centred regional architecture has not been able to rein in China's assertive behaviour. The COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated ASEAN's dependence on the Chinese economy even when Beijing continues to rile regional sensitivities through the forceful imposition of its ever-expanding claims in the East China Sea, South China Sea and in the Himalayas. ASEAN's inability to constrain the negative externalities of China's rise has forced Indo-Pacific's regional powers to band together. India and Japan are now actively collaborating with the US to arrest China's territorial assertiveness and diplomatic coercion. The emergence of the Quad as a new security institution in the region is an outcome of this process. While ASEAN is still wedded to its approach based on norms, interdependence and institutionalism, the Quad members are



adopting one based on the balance of power and drawing from the US' containment strategy during the Cold War. These two approaches are not only highly incompatible but also incomplete.

The Quad may represent the region's military balance of power, but it does not enjoy the institutional legitimacy developed over the last three decades by ASEAN. ASEAN may have the institutional experience and the normative power on its side. However, without the confidence of the US and other regional powers such as India and Japan, it will render itself highly ineffectual as an honest intermediary in the unfolding great game in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, greater engagement between ASEAN and the Quad benefits both. Challenges to such engagement galore. First, the re-emergence of the Quad and the galloping pace of its institutionalisation have left ASEAN concerned about its importance and centrality in the regional power politics. As the Quad strengthens further, we may witness some serious institutional envy in play with ASEAN. Second, any engagement with the Quad will be a red herring for Beijing and, given ASEAN's risk-averseness vis-à-vis China, have a very remote likelihood of success. On the other hand, ASEAN's silence will only force the Quad countries to further take up the mantle of confronting China's assertiveness in the region. However, the Quad's reactions will isolate ASEAN as it may confirm its worst fears: that the Quad's balance of power strategies unfurl instability in Southeast Asia. The dilemma confronting ASEAN and the Quad oscillates between inefficacy on the one hand and provocation on the other.

To address the challenges of engagement between ASEAN and Quad, the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan hosted a panel discussion on 4 March 2021, which brought together scholars on Japanese, Indian and ASEAN foreign policy. The panellists discussed the evolution of India and Japan's relationship with ASEAN, ASEAN's interests and anxieties regarding the Quad and the potential for cooperation between the two institutions. This Special Report is the outcome of this wide-ranging discussion.

## India's Perspectives on ASEAN and the Quad

India's engagement with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era began with the Narasimha Rao administration's 'Look East' policy. Prime Minister Rao formulated this policy to help India develop links with emerging markets in East and Southeast Asia. The 'Look East' policy was intended to draw, as much as possible, investment and cooperation from the Asia-Pacific countries. While the initial engagement was designed to be economic, strategic dimensions for engagement also developed soon after. To this end, India stepped up institutional and defence links with ASEAN. In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the 'Act East' policy, adding more depth and breadth to India's engagements with Southeast Asian countries. However, in recent years, the Modi administration has seen the shortcomings of ASEAN-led institutions in curtailing China's coercive behaviour. Thus, India has approached the region through a more realist lens. Adopting a balance of power approach, it has now engaged the Quad coalition in the hopes of containing China's rise.

At the end of the Cold War, India's principal economic partner found itself in ruin. The Soviet Union was no longer able to provide the same level of developmental assistance that India had received during the Cold War. India's economic situation was also precarious, as the country was on the verge of default. The Narasimha Rao administration began economic reforms that liberalised the economy. During liberalisation, New Delhi sought new trade and investment partners. Southeast Asia's rising economic profile and ASEAN's growing credibility as an international institution offered New Delhi potential partners. Thus, India set out to develop economic and institutional links with Southeast Asia.<sup>1</sup> For many in New Delhi, India's economic liberalisation would foster economic opportunities with ASEAN. Speaking to a Southeast Asian business delegation in 1993, Indian Foreign Secretary J N Dixit stated, "Trade liberalisation and facilitation is central to the

1 Amitava Acharya, "India's 'Look East' Policy", in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. David M Malone, C Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Isabelle de Saint-Mézard, "India and Southeast Asia", in *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947*, ed. Summit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).

charter of ASEAN. We would like our dialogue to promote a mutually beneficial interface between that and India's own process of trade liberalisation."<sup>2</sup> India became a sectoral partner of ASEAN in 1992 and then a full dialogue partner in 1996. In 2002, India and the ASEAN members committed to forming a free trade agreement (FTA). This agreement aimed to "progressively liberalise and promote trade in goods and services as well as create a transparent, liberal and facilitative investment regime."<sup>3</sup> India and ASEAN also instituted annual summit-level meetings in November 2002.<sup>4</sup> In 2012, they upgraded their partnership to a strategic partnership.<sup>5</sup>

These economic links have benefitted both sides immensely. India-ASEAN trade and investment relations have been growing steadily, with ASEAN being India's fourth-largest trading partner. India's trade with ASEAN stands at US\$81.33 billion (S\$109.8 billion), which is approximately 10.6 per cent of India's overall trade. India's export to ASEAN stands at 11.28 per cent of total exports. Investment flows are also substantial. ASEAN accounts for approximately 18.28 per cent of investment flows into India since 2000. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows into India from ASEAN between April 2000 to March 2018 was about US\$68.91 billion (S\$93.06 billion), while FDI outflows from India to ASEAN countries, from April 2007 to March 2015, was about US\$38.672 billion (S\$52.23 billion).<sup>6</sup>

Despite the growing economic ties, India's security relationship with ASEAN took some time to mature. The transition from a purely economic relationship to that which focussed on security was driven

2 "Indian Foreign Affairs Records 1994", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Accessed on 18 May 2021, <https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2582?000>.

3 "Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Bali", Statements and Communiqués, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, <https://asean.org/framework-agreement-on-comprehensive-economic-cooperation-between-the-republic-of-india-and-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-bali/>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

4 "Joint Statement of the First ASEAN-India Summit", Association of Southeast Asian Nations, [https://asean.org/?static\\_post=joint-statement-of-the-first-asean-india-summit](https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-statement-of-the-first-asean-india-summit). Accessed on 18 May 2021.

5 "Vision Statement ASEAN India Commemorative Summit", Statements and Communiqués, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, <https://asean.org/vision-statement-asean-india-commemorative-summit/>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

6 "India- ASEAN Relations", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-ASEAN-Relations-August-2018.pdf>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

by two significant changes in India's security environment. First, as India grew economically, its dependence on maritime trade routes and open sea lines of communication became vital for its national interests. The Indian Maritime Doctrine released by the Indian Navy in 2009 attested to this growing reality. Southeast Asia's chokepoints, particularly the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits as well as Singapore, have become the Navy's primary area of operational interest. It also defines a secondary area of interest which includes "South-East Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral regions in the vicinity" and the "South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean, and their littoral regions."<sup>7</sup> Secondly, China's growing regional profile engendered severe anxieties in New Delhi. The border dispute between India and China was far from settled, and China continued to remain a staunch ally of Pakistan. The People's Liberation Army-Navy also made inroads into the Indian Ocean by constructing port facilities in Myanmar and Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

As its security environment changed, India stepped up institutional engagement with ASEAN. It recognised ASEAN's key role in forging a security architecture that could maintain stability in the region. In 1996, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a grouping of countries that focussed on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Since then, New Delhi has been part of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting-Plus. In 2003, India acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a key instrument governing the norms of behaviour in the Asia-Pacific. Indian Prime Ministers have also reaffirmed the importance of ASEAN centrality to the Asian security architecture.<sup>9</sup>

7 "Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009", Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2009, pp. 65-68. Accessed on 18 May 2021, <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf>.

8 Harsh V Pant, "India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China", *Asia-Pacific Review* 14, no.1 (2007), pp. 54-71.

9 Mely Caballero-Anthony, "ASEAN's Strategic Perspectives of India", in ed. Ajaya Kumar Das, *India-ASEAN Defence Relations* (Singapore: RSIS, 2013), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Monograph2813.pdf>. For an overview of India's approach to Asian multilateralism see C Raja Mohan, "India and the Asian Security Architecture", in ed. Michael J. Green and Bates Gill *Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 128-154.

For India, ASEAN centrality translated into two crucial policy positions. First, it accepted ASEAN as the only institutional platform around which to anchor its security relationships in the region. Second, ASEAN would lead the process of building any new security regimes in the region. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated in 2012, “It [ASEAN] has also emerged as the principal architect and driver of economic and security structures and institutions that are emerging in the region. ASEAN centrality and leadership are essential elements for the success of these forums [ARF, EAS] and India fully supports ASEAN as the lynchpin of these efforts.”<sup>10</sup> Despite this rhetoric, security engagement with ASEAN countries fell short of India’s optimistic expectations. As Professor Raja Mohan wrote in 2012, “In response to the calls from Vietnam and the Philippines for explicit support from India in their territorial disputes with China, India’s Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid signalled caution and ruled out New Delhi’s intervention in these disputes. This highlights the real gap between the expectations of [the] ASEAN states and India’s security role in the region”.<sup>11</sup>

In its first term in office, the Modi administration followed the previous administration’s approach, highlighting ASEAN centrality, when ASEAN was itself battling dissent within its ranks over China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Speaking at the India-ASEAN annual summit in 2015, Prime Minister Modi said, “ASEAN is providing both inspiration and leadership for regional cooperation and integration. And, from India’s perspective, ASEAN values and leadership will remain central to integration across Asia and [the] Pacific.”<sup>12</sup>

However, towards the end of Prime Minister Modi’s first term, the rhetoric began to change. Firstly, India began to underline the need for unity within ASEAN. Outlining India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific

10 “PM’s opening statement at Plenary Session of India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit”, Archive, Prime Minister’s Office, <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1259>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

11 C Raja Mohan, “An Uncertain Trumpet? India’s Role in Southeast Asian Security”, *India Review* 12, no.3 (2013), pp. 134-150.

12 “Text of PM’s opening statement at ASEAN-India Summit”, News Updates, Prime Minister’s Office, 21 November 2015, [https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news\\_updates/text-of-pms-opening-statement-at-the-asean-india-summit/](https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-opening-statement-at-the-asean-india-summit/).

in 2018, Prime Minister Modi stated plainly, “ASEAN unity is essential for a stable future for this [Indo-Pacific] region.”<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, there developed increasing doubtfulness over ASEAN’s lack of material and motivational strength to counter China’s power and influence in the region. India’s focus instead has shifted to the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. ASEAN still occupies an important role, but India does not see its security approach to the region exclusively through ASEAN’s lens. Indian officials no longer see ASEAN centrality to mean an institutional anchor or expect it to play a leadership role. For instance, the Indian press release on the External Affairs Minister’ (EAM) remarks at the EAS in 2020 stated, “EAM noted the growing interest in the Indo-Pacific as an integrated and organic maritime space, with ASEAN at its centre.”<sup>14</sup> While India’s previous Quad press statements reaffirmed the members’ “firm support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms in the regional architecture for the Indo-Pacific”,<sup>15</sup> the most recent Quad ministerial meeting emphasised only a “clear support for ASEAN cohesion and centrality.”<sup>16</sup> Thus, ASEAN remains an essential stakeholder in the emerging geopolitical transition in the region, but not a central actor and certainly not the only actor.

India’s actions also match this rhetoric. The Modi administration has chosen to move ahead by deepening bilateral relationships rather than engaging ASEAN as a whole. For example, India upgraded its dialogue with Vietnam to that of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016. Vietnam and India have developed a robust defence relationship. India has been considering exporting its advanced BrahMos cruise missile

13 “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, Speeches and Statements, Ministry of External Affairs, 1 June 2018, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>.

14 “15<sup>th</sup> East Asia Summit”, Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs, 14 November 2020, <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33194/15th+East+Asia+Summit>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

15 “India-Australia-Japan-United States Consultations”, Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs, 4 November 2019, <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32006/IndiaAustraliaJapan+United+States+Consultations>. Accessed on 18 May 2021.

16 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, Bilateral/Multilateral Documents, Ministry of External Affairs, 12 March 2021, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/Quad+Leaders+Joint+Statement+The+Spirit+of+the+Quad>. See also a similarly diluted reference in “2nd India-Australia-Japan-USA Ministerial Meeting”, Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs, 6 October 2020, [https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33098/IndiaAustraliaJapanUSA\\_Consultations](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33098/IndiaAustraliaJapanUSA_Consultations). Accessed on 18 May 2021.

and Akash air defence missile to Vietnam.<sup>17</sup> During Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen's visit to India in 2017, the India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation was finalised. Among other initiatives, the agreement gave Singaporean and Indian navies the ability to temporarily deploy "from each other's naval facilities" and provide "mutual logistics support".<sup>18</sup> During Prime Minister Modi's visit to Indonesia in 2018, India agreed to develop the Sabang port situated close to the strategically important Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean.<sup>19</sup>

India's changing position on ASEAN is most likely due to the latter's inability to curtail China's belligerence or uphold international law in the South China Sea. Given China's growing military strength and its ability to divide the ASEAN grouping using a mix of economic incentives and sanctions, ASEAN's ability to manage or temper China's actions is increasingly being called into question. As David Brewster has argued, "a significant reduction in the relevance of ASEAN-centred institutions could ultimately lead India to opt to transcend existing regional organizations and deal directly with other major powers of the Asia-Pacific."<sup>20</sup>

The above logic has inspired India's embrace of the Quad. The Quadrilateral grouping offers India the ability to increase its national power by integrating its strengths and coordinating its actions with the approaches of the Indo-Pacific's principal powers – Japan, Australia, and the US. India's acceptance of the Quad is driven by its need to balance China's growing material power, which not only threatens the delicate balance of military power on the Himalayan frontier but also upsets India's primacy in South Asia and the northern Indian Ocean.

17 Sanjeev Miglani, "India says in talks with Vietnam for first missile sale", *Livemint*, 15 February 2017, <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/5z21IsiOkn7fepYeWEgAML/India-says-in-talks-with-Vietnam-for-first-missile-sale.html>.

18 Nirmala Ganapathy, "India and Singapore deepen defence ties with naval agreement", *The Straits Times*, 29 November 2017, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/india-and-singapore-deepen-defence-ties-with-naval-agreement>.

19 Agustinus Beo Da Costa, "Indonesia, India to develop strategic Indian Ocean port", *Reuters*, 30 May 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-india-idUSL3N1T11XL>.

20 David Brewster, "India's Defence Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship", *India Review* 12, no.3 (2013), pp. 151-164.

Since its inception, the Quad has acted as a platform to coordinate actions and foster deeper bilateral relationships between its members. Militarily, this has resulted in India's ability to streamline its coordination with other major military powers in the region. India has concluded Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements with Japan and the United States. It has also signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement with the US, which facilitates the flow of information between the two militaries.<sup>21</sup> Apart from these, India regularly exercises with both the American and Japanese militaries. The Malabar naval exercises, which started as a bilateral exercise between India and the US, witnessed the participation of Japan in 2007. Australia joined the exercise for the first time in October 2020.<sup>22</sup> Speaking at the Raisina Dialogue in April 2021, Indian Naval Chief Admiral Karambir Singh stated that the Quad navies enjoy a high degree of interoperability and have the capability and capacity to come together in an almost plug and play mechanism if the opportunity arises.<sup>23</sup> All these developments amount to a greater ability for the Indian military to project power in its extended neighbourhood. Economically, India is also poised to benefit from a reordering of supply chains in the post COVID-19 era. India, Japan, and Australia announced the Resilient Supply Initiative in September 2020.<sup>24</sup> The objective of the initiative is to financially incentivise supply chains to relocate from China to other destinations.<sup>25</sup>

21 Snehes Alex Philip, "The 3 foundational agreements with U.S. and what they mean for India's military growth", *The Print*, 27 October 2020, <https://theprint.in/defence/the-3-foundational-agreements-with-us-and-what-they-mean-for-indias-military-growth/531795/>.

22 Snehes Alex Philip, "Quad countries come together for complex second phase of Malabar naval Exercise", *The Print*, 16 November 2020. <https://theprint.in/defence/quad-countries-come-together-for-complex-second-phase-of-malabar-naval-exercise/545548/>.

23 Snehes Alex Philips, "Quad navies can come together if needed in almost 'plug and play' manner, Navy chief says", *The Print*, 14 April 2021, <https://theprint.in/defence/quad-navies-can-come-together-if-needed-in-almost-plug-and-play-manner-navy-chief-says/639988/>.

24 "Australia-India-Japan Ministers' meeting on Supply Chains Resilience held", Press Release, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Press Information Bureau, 1 September 2020, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1650328>.

25 Amitendu Palit, "Resilient Supply Chain Initiative: A Political Driver to Revive Asian Regional Growth", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 30 January 2021, <https://gja.georgetown.edu/2021/01/30/resilient-supply-chain-initiative-a-political-driver-to-revive-asian-regional-growth/#:~:text=Resilient%20Supply%20Chain%20Initiative%3A%20A%20Political%20Driver%20to%20Revive%20Asian%20Regional%20Growth,-Amitendu%20Palit&text=COVID%2D19%20has%20unleashed%20geopolitical,the%20effort%20by%20incentivizing%20relocation>.



The Quad also allows India to pool its resources with other members to compete with China for influence in South and Southeast Asia. For now, its most substantive cooperation on connectivity and infrastructure development has been with Japan. During Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to India in 2017, the two countries decided to make the delivery of quality infrastructure a substantive part of their relationship. India and Japan are jointly developing the West Container Terminal at Colombo Port in Sri Lanka.<sup>26</sup> Under the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor scheme launched in 2017, the two nations have also embarked on efforts to develop infrastructure in Africa.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, Japanese investments are especially pronounced in India's north-eastern region. Through these investments, New Delhi is looking to integrate and connect India's Northeast, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh with Southeast Asia.<sup>28</sup>

26 Meera Srinivasan, "India, Japan back in another Sri Lanka port project", *The Hindu*, 2 March 2021, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lanka-now-clears-indian-investment-at-another-colombo-port-terminal/article33969407.ece>.

27 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "India, Japan come up with AAGC to counter China's OBOR", *The Economic Times*, 26 May 2017. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-japan-come-up-with-aagc-to-counter-chinas-obor/articleshow/58846673.cms>.

28 Elizabeth Roche, "India, Japan see Assam as hub to link SE Asia: Jaishankar", *Livemint*, 15 February 2021, <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-japan-see-assam-as-hub-to-link-se-asia-jaishankar-11613401010703.html>; and Rupakjyoti Borah, "Japan in the Infrastructure Sector of Northeast India", *ISAS Insights* 556, 29 March 2019, <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ISAS-Insights-No.-556.pdf>.

## Japan's Perspectives on ASEAN and the Quad

In the immediate aftermath of World War 2, Japan receded from international affairs and adopted a pacifist constitution. The new constitution strictly prohibited the use of force, and post-war Japan adopted the Yoshida doctrine which emphasised economic revitalisation over rearmament. At this time, Japan saw Southeast Asia, the region it had left military scars during the war, as a critical area that could provide resources, labour, and markets. So, Japan engaged Southeast Asia to rebuild its relations, often through the means of war reparation and economic assistance and expanded commercial interaction. However, by the late 1970s, Japanese policymakers assessed that the security environment was unfavourable and therefore necessitated a policy reorientation. Two factors drove this view. First, the end of the Vietnam War in 1973 and America's retrenchment from the region signalled a weakening of US commitment to Asia. Tokyo believed that such a withdrawal would leave a vacuum of power in the region, allowing further infiltration of Communism. Second, regional perceptions over Japan's commercial engagements in the region were largely negative. This came into full view after the Malari incident, a widespread political protests and violence when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Indonesia in 1974. One of the causes of the riot is said to be the "prevailing perception of Japan as an 'economic animal' that was exploiting Southeast Asian states."<sup>29</sup> In light of these developments, the Fukuda Doctrine was introduced in 1977 to envisage a greater political role for Japan rather than simply an economic one.<sup>30</sup> To this end, Japan began to step up engagement with the ASEAN forum on politico-security issues such as criticising Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and engaged in the manner what Fukuda described as "heart-to-heart" dialogues and seeking equal partnerships.<sup>31</sup> This fundamental attitude remains in the current Japanese foreign policy towards Southeast Asia.

29 Bhubhindar Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia", *The Round Table*, 99, no.409 (2010), 394.

30 Ibid., pp. 391-402.

31 Ibid., p. 394.

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, Japan again found itself in an uncertain security environment. At the time when the international community celebrated the end of global hostility and oriented its attention to the European re-integration and the emerging security threats in the Middle East and elsewhere, Japan saw a continuation of the Cold War in Asia. Japan also felt that US security interest and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region began to wane, and China was on the rise with uncertain directions. This condition provided Japan the necessary impetus to take a greater role in global affairs and opened a way to contribute to international peace operations. Likewise, in Asia-Pacific, Japan saw the necessity to broaden its political engagement with the ASEAN mechanism, alongside securing the alliance with the US adopting a multilateral approach to security was a significant shift from Japan's traditional bilateral economic relations in the region. Japan had already taken part to set up the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1989, but the policy to shift to multilateral security arrangements was first proposed by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in July 1991.<sup>32</sup> While his endorsement did not gain immediate currency, it did set the stage for the subsequent consultation among the stakeholder countries. To this end, Japan supported the development of ARF which was formed in 1994. Japan was also closely involved in developing the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum, which included the 10 ASEAN members and South Korea, Japan and China. It also lobbied for the development of the EAS, incorporating Australia, New Zealand and India into the APT. Through these forums, Japan aimed to build a regional security regime that assures continuous dialogue among political leaders and urges policy transparency and normative commitments. Such initiatives, in effect, had worked to develop the practice of confidence-building in Asia-Pacific. The first ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was held in Tokyo in 1996. Japan co-chaired the meeting with Indonesia and explored the possibility of adopting advanced and practical military CBMs, such as a regional arms register as well as the notification and observation of

<sup>32</sup> Paul Midford, "Japan's leadership role in East Asian security multilateralism: the Nakayama proposal and the logic of reassurance", *The Pacific Review* 13, No. 3, 2000, pp. 367-397.

military exercises.<sup>33</sup> Japan also co-chaired the ISG on CBMs for 1999-2000 with Singapore that looked to present concrete proposals to enhance preventive diplomacy measures that could be implemented in the region.<sup>34</sup> It led efforts within these forums to condemn nuclear testing by China, India, Pakistan and North Korea.

In addition to its engagement in such ASEAN-led forums, Japan stepped up its security presence in Southeast Asia through bilateral channels. This was done mainly under the auspice of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and piracy. In August 2001, the Japan Coast Guard sent a patrol aircraft to Thailand and the Philippines for a four-day mission to combat piracy in the region. In 2001, the coast guards of Japan and the Philippines conducted a joint anti-piracy exercise off Manila Bay.<sup>35</sup>

Japan and ASEAN were also important economic partners. For a long time, the ASEAN countries have been recipients of Japanese Official Developmental Assistance (ODA). It also paid a crucial leadership role in helping the Southeast Asian countries overcome the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. In the mid-2000s, Japan-ASEAN ties grew with the conclusion of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP). Trade between Japan and ASEAN totalled US\$161.8 billion (S\$225.8 billion) in 2006 or roughly 13 per cent of Japan's total trade and 11.5 per cent of ASEAN's total trade. The two sides prepared the basic accord in August 2007 and the AJCEP was signed and became effective from December 2008. As Japan's first FTA with a regional bloc, it was a significant milestone in Japan-ASEAN relations.<sup>36</sup>

Up until the mid-2000s, Japan's conception of ASEAN centrality meant that ASEAN would be the primary institution anchoring the Asia-Pacific's regional security architecture. ASEAN's centrality, in

33 Takeshi Yuzawa, "Japan's changing conception of ASEAN Regional Forum: from an optimistic liberal to a pessimistic realist perspective", *The Pacific Review* 18, No. 4, 2005, p. 471.

34 Ibid., p. 473.

35 Singh, "The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia", p. 399.

36 Gregory P Corning, "Between bilateralism and regionalism in East Asia: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership", *The Pacific Review* 22, No. 5, 2009, p. 640.

Tokyo's calculations, served several purposes. First, it underlined Japan's commitment to evolving institutional regimes in the region. Insofar, ASEAN was able to narrow down regional differences and embed China and other countries into a web of economic, legal and normative dependencies, it served the purpose of Japanese foreign policy and economic interests. Second, it allowed Tokyo to strengthen its own economic and security relationships with the region as a whole rather than in the form of bilateral relationships which may frail under the weight of Japan's economic power or the historical memory of its engagement with the region. Third, it also helped Tokyo focus on security regimes and institutional restraints as a supplement to security obtained from rigid alliances under the Cold War system. All these factors spawned Japan's leadership role in crafting the ARF and EAS, and participating in the APT.

However, this attitude began to change in the mid to late 2000s. During this period, Japan began to approach security through a more realist lens. As one scholar notes, "Japan's optimistic liberal conceptions of regional security multilateralism began to give way [in the late 1990s] to a more pessimistic realist perspective from which the ARF could, at best, be seen to contribute only to a minimal level of confidence-building among regional countries."<sup>37</sup>

Hence, Japan needed once again to look at security through a balance of power lens. As stated in the Japanese diplomatic bluebook in 2008, "regional stability has been maintained primarily through the building up of bilateral security arrangements, with the United States at its core."<sup>38</sup> It goes on to add that "Japan's stance is that it is practical and appropriate to develop and strengthen a multi-layered framework for bilateral and multilateral dialogues while securing the presence and engagement of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region to realize a stable

37 Takeshi Yuzawa, "Japan's changing conception of ASEAN Regional Forum: from an optimistic liberal to a pessimistic realist perspective", *The Pacific Review* 18, No. 4, (2005), p. 486. For more such viewpoints, see also Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Between realism and idealism in Japanese security policy: The case of ASEAN regional forum", *The Pacific Review* 10, No. 4, 1997, pp. 480-503.; Takeshi Yuzawa, "From a decentering to recentering imperative: Japan's approach to Asian security multilateralism", *The Pacific Review* 31, No. 4, 2018, pp. 460-479.

38 "Diplomatic Bluebook 2008", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, p. 21, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2008/index.html>.

security environment surrounding Japan as well as to ensure peace and stability in the region.”<sup>39</sup>

To this end, Japan has strengthened the regional security architecture by lobbying for India, Australia and New Zealand in the EAS. Later, in 2010, it lobbied for the inclusion of the US into the same forum. It also looked to reinvigorate the US-Japan bilateral security alliance. But perhaps most importantly, Prime Minister Abe laid the foundations for what would later go on to become the Quad, which was indeed the intellectual precursor of the concept of the larger Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). This concept would later be adopted in one form or another by most of the Quad members.

In his speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007, Abe appealed to uphold the international liberal order by an arc of fellow democracies in the Indo-Pacific, both by developing normative constraints on revisionist behaviour but also by maintaining a favourable balance of power in favour of the region’s democratic forces. The initiative looked to bring four of the largest democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific region into a grouping that could uphold the international rules-based order in the wake of China’s rise.<sup>40</sup> While there were reservations during the initial years of its operationalisation, its acceptability accelerated under the threat of China’s growing revisionism.

By 2012, Japan had seen its security environment deteriorate significantly. It had entered an open confrontation with Beijing over the Senkaku islands. Employing grey zone tactics, China unilaterally undermined the status quo on Senkaku. It frequently entered Japanese territorial waters and airspace around the islands.<sup>41</sup> In 2013, China declared an air defence identification zone that covered

39 Ibid., p. 21.

40 For comprehensive background, see Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, *Asia-Pacific Review* 26, No.1, 2019, pp. 18-28. Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?”, *International Affairs* 96, No. 1, 2020 pp. 49-73; and Kei Koga, “Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, No. 2, August 2019, pp. 286-313.

41 Alessio Patalano, “What is China’s strategy in the Senkaku islands?”, *War on the Rocks*, 10 September 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/what-is-chinas-strategy-in-the-senkaku-islands/>.

airspace over the Senkaku island.<sup>42</sup> Apart from the direct territorial contest in the East China Sea, Japan watched with trepidation as China went around colonising the South China Sea. Furthermore, China was rapidly scaling its economic and foreign policy influence through the infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under the Xi Jinping administration. The opaque nature of the BRI raised eyebrows. Chinese investments came at the cost of Japanese (and Indian) planned investments on some occasions. They raised security concerns as they appear to have created unsustainable debt burdens for small economies in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>43</sup> Japanese officials saw these actions as challenges to the post-World War 2 international regime, undermining the rules-based order and negatively affecting the free and open maritime passage and global economic systems.

In light of this deteriorating security environment, Abe launched the FOIP in 2016, which aims to uphold the rules-based order that has worked in Japan's favour in the post-World War era. It does this by putting the Quad as the key institutional framework of the Indo-Pacific. The Quad serves two major purposes in Japan's evolving approach to the region.

First, as noted by Abe in his very initial expression at the time when he returned to the Office of Prime Minister in December 2012, "(t)he ongoing disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea mean that Japan's top foreign policy priority must be to expand the country's strategic horizons."<sup>44</sup> The expansion of Japan's strategic horizons has seen it foster deeper relations with India apart from its traditional security partner, the US, and the recently upgraded partnership with Australia. While Japan maintains a robust dialogue with Australia and the US, it had also deepened institutional engagement and

42 "China establishes 'air-defence zone' over East China Sea", *BBC*, 23 November 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25062525>.

43 Mitsuru Obe, "Japan Says China Wins Indonesia High-Speed Rail Contract", *Wall Street Journal*, 29 September 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-says-china-wins-indonesia-rail-contract-1443537614>; and Daniel Bosley, "Maldives gives airport contract to Chinese firm during Xi's visit", *Reuters*, 16 September 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/china-maldives-idINKBNOHA1TS20140915>.

44 Shinzo Abe, "Asia's Security Diamond", *Livemint*, 31 December 2012, <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/viqg2XC8fhRfjTUlctk0M/Asias-democratic-security-diamond.html>.

defence ties with India. Japan and India have begun to hold “Two-Plus-Two” dialogues between their foreign and defence ministers in 2019. Following that, the two countries signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement. This allows their respective militaries for reciprocal access to services and supplies.<sup>45</sup> The Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force and Air Self Defence Force held their first bilateral exercise with the Indian Army and Air Force respectively in 2018.<sup>46</sup> Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force and the Indian Navy also regularly conduct naval exercises.<sup>47</sup>

Secondly, the Quad allows Japan to increase the resources it has in order to compete with China by allowing coordination amongst the resident powers in Asia. As noted in the discussion on India’s perceptions of the Quad, Japan and India have already embarked on an extensive economic engagement. Japanese economic engagement with India is based on not only a strategy of diversification of its economic dependence over China but also to support India’s rise, paving the way for a more multipolar Asia.<sup>48</sup> Not without reason, India has been one of the biggest recipients of Japan’s ODA in the last two decades. However, Japan is also working with Australia and the US to make funding available for connectivity, infrastructure and governance challenges in the region. Individually each country is already making finances available for infrastructure investment. In 2018, the US passed the BUILD Act, which commits nearly US\$60 billion (S\$81.60 billion) for overseas investments.<sup>49</sup> It also passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which commits “US\$1.5 billion (S\$2

45 Rezaul Lasker, “India, Japan ink pact to bolster defence forces”, *Hindustan Times*, 10 September 2020, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-japan-ink-pact-to-bolster-defence-forces/story-xOCacyTP5OIAOqruteQBI.html>.

46 “India, Japan to begin joint Air Force exercise ‘Shinyuu Maitri’ from Oct 17 in W.B.”, *Business Standard*, 15 October 2019, [https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/india-japan-to-begin-joint-air-force-exercise-shinyuu-maitri-from-oct-17-in-wb-119101501218\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/india-japan-to-begin-joint-air-force-exercise-shinyuu-maitri-from-oct-17-in-wb-119101501218_1.html); and Ankit Panda, “India, Japan Conclude First Dharma Guardian Military Exercise”, *The Diplomat*, 15 November 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/india-japan-conclude-first-dharma-guardian-military-exercise/>.

47 “India, Japan naval exercise JIMEX-2020 begins in Arabian Sea”, *The Times of India*, 27 September 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-japan-naval-exercise-jimex-2020-begins-in-arabian-sea/articleshow/78346597.cms>.

48 Yogesh Joshi and Harsh V Pant, “Indo-Japanese Strategic Partnership and Power Transition in Asia”, *India Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, October 2015, pp. 312-329.

49 Daniel Runde and Romina Bandura, “BUILD Act has passed: What’s Next?”, *CSIS*, 12 October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next>.



billion)...every year for the next five years to fund the activities... including military, diplomatic and economic engagement".<sup>50</sup> Australia has also made available US\$3 billion (S\$4.08 billion) worth of investment for infrastructure development in the Pacific.<sup>51</sup> Several trilateral initiatives are also currently underway. The developmental finance corporations of the three countries launched the Blue Dot Network in November 2019. The network looks to promote ethical standards for infrastructure development in third countries. The three countries have also been funding projects in the South Pacific. They are looking to invest US\$1 billion (S\$1.34 billion) into a liquefied natural gas project in Papua New Guinea.<sup>52</sup> They will also finance the development of a submarine internet cable to the Pacific island nation of Palau.<sup>53</sup>

50 Nirmal Ghosh, "Asia Reassurance Initiative Act passed by U.S. Senate will beef up engagement across Indo-Pacific", *The Straits Times*, 13 December 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/news-analysis-asia-reassurance-initiative-act-passed-by-us-senate-will-beef-up>.

51 David Wroe, "Scott Morrison splashes cash in the Pacific as China fears loom", *The Sydney Herald*, 8 November 2018, <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/scott-morrison-splashes-cash-in-the-pacific-as-china-fears-loom-20181107-p50emv.html>.

52 Hisao Kodachi, "Japan, U.S. and Australia begin own 'Belt and Road' in South Pacific", *Nikkei Asian Review*, 25 June 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-US-and-Australia-begin-own-Belt-and-Road-in-South-Pacific>.

53 Yohei Hirose, "Japan, U.S. and Australia to finance undersea cable for Palau", *Nikkei Asian Review*, 28 October 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-US-and-Australia-to-finance-undersea-cable-for-Palau>.

## ASEAN's Perspectives on the Quad

Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong struck a balanced note. While he lauded Chinese investments through the BRI, Prime Minister Lee also welcomed initiatives under other rubrics such as the Indo-Pacific. Speaking on both the BRI and Indo-Pacific, he said, "We support regional cooperation initiatives which are open and inclusive platforms for countries to cooperate constructively, and deepen regional integration."<sup>54</sup> However, he added that "[t]hese initiatives should strengthen existing cooperation arrangements centred on ASEAN. They should not undermine them, create rival blocs, deepen fault lines, or force countries to take sides."<sup>55</sup> The perennial fear of the Southeast Asian nations is that the Indo-Pacific concept and the Quad would undermine the ASEAN institution and its centrality in the regional security architecture. This will, in turn, force the region's countries to either balance or bandwagon with the US or China.

The desire to preserve ASEAN centrality is closely connected to Southeast Asia's desire to maintain its autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre. The Southeast Asian countries have shown a propensity to hedge in foreign policy and avoid overt alignments with major powers. Maintaining ASEAN's centrality allows them to stay on good terms with both China and the US and exert influence over the emerging geopolitical rivalry in the region. It will also help the countries avoid making the difficult choice between balancing and band-wagoning while deriving benefits from all powers.

Currently, there is no precise theoretical formulation on hedging in the international relations scholarship.<sup>56</sup> However, most scholars agree that hedging is a mixed policy. Evan Medeiros notes that hedging is a policy of contradictory actions where engagements with perceived

54 "In full: PM Lee Hsien Loong's speech at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue", *Channel News Asia*, 31 May 2019, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/lee-hsien-loong-speech-2019-shangri-la-dialogue-11585954>.

55 Ibid.

56 John D Ciorciari and Jürgen Haacke, "Hedging in international relations: an introduction", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 19, No. 3, September 2019, pp. 367-374.

adversaries are undertaken to gain benefits while developing contingency options to ensure security if such engagement fails.<sup>57</sup> He has analysed this approach to hedging in the US-China relationship during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Others conceptualise hedging as an approach to managing risks associated with particular alignment choices vis-à-vis one or more major powers. Such a characterisation of hedging is primarily associated with security risks and how best to mitigate them. Ciorciari applies this approach of hedging to Southeast Asia.<sup>58</sup> In a study of Malaysian and Singaporean foreign policy, Kuik proposes a framework to analyse hedging strategy and policy options it entails. He breaks down hedging strategies into two types – risk contingency and returns maximising. As Kuik explains, “Return Maximizing – consisting of economic pragmatism, binding engagement, and limited-band-wagoning – allows the hedger to reap as much economic, diplomatic and foreign policy profits as possible from the Great Power when all is well. It is counteracted by the risk-contingency set, which, through dominance-denial and indirect-balancing, aims at reducing the hedger’s loss if things go awry.”<sup>59</sup>

This approach to foreign policy can be seen throughout Southeast Asia. Most countries engage the resident Asian hegemon – China – primarily for economic benefits. However, these countries have also been diversifying their relationships to engage several other external actors. The primary external actor is the US. However, India, Japan and Australia have also maintained crucial bilateral relationships with Southeast Asia.

China’s engagement with Southeast Asia began in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1996-97. The two moved to enhance economic cooperation by creating the ASEAN-China FTA in November 2002. As of 2018, China accounted for 17.1 per cent of ASEAN’s total merchandise

57 Evan Medeiros, “Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability”, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, No. 1, 2005, pp. 145-167.

58 J D Ciorciari, “The balance of great-power influence in contemporary Southeast Asia”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, No. 1, 2009, pp. 157-196.

59 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30, No. 2, August 2008) pp. 159-185.

trade.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, China also maintains bilateral agreements that deepen its economic engagement across countries. It has also instituted currency swaps with Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines to reduce the sway held by the US dollar in currency transactions.<sup>61</sup>

In recent years, China and Southeast Asia have looked to deepen economic engagement. Through the BRI, the former has invested significantly in infrastructure development across the region. According to one report, “Amongst ASEAN member countries, Indonesia (US\$171 billion [S\$232.63 billion]), Vietnam (US\$152 billion [S\$206.79 billion]), Cambodia (US\$104 billion [S\$141.48 billion]), Malaysia (US\$98 billion [S\$133.32 billion]) and Singapore (US\$70 billion [S\$95.23 billion]) are the countries seeing the largest BRI related capital flow.”<sup>62</sup> The BRI has found takers across Southeast Asia despite the region’s tense security relations with China. China and Vietnam began economic cooperation under the ‘Two Corridors, One Belt’ initiative launched in 2004.<sup>63</sup> This initiative covered several areas, including commerce, tourism and infrastructure development. During President Xi’s visit to Vietnam in November 2017, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to explore infrastructure development cooperation under China’s BRI.<sup>64</sup> By 2019, China had become the second-largest source of FDI in Vietnam, accounting for 15.5 per cent of total FDI in 2019.<sup>65</sup> Despite the Philippines’ hard-line approach against China’s island-building project in the South China Sea, President Rodrigo Duterte did begin reaching out to China to maximise economic benefits. Even when

60 “China, ASEAN to further strengthen trade, economic relations”, *Xinhua*, 9 September 2019, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/10/c\\_138378979.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/10/c_138378979.htm).

61 Figure quoted from David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Peaceful Coexistence?”, *International Security* 42, No. 4, Spring 2018, p. 121.

62 Michael Cox et al., *China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: CIMB ASEAN Research Institute) 2018, p. 6, <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-China-SEA-BRI.pdf>.

63 Vu Anh, “Vietnam PM to attend Belt and Road Forum in Beijing”, *V. N. Express*, 23 April 2019, <https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-pm-to-attend-belt-and-road-forum-in-beijing-3913440.html>.

64 Mengjie, “China, Vietnam sign MOU on cooperation of development initiatives”, *Xinhua*, 12 November 2017, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/12/c\\_136746803.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/12/c_136746803.htm).

65 Minh Son and Hung Le, “Chinese investment in Vietnam surges”, *V. N. Express*, 3 December 2019, <https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/economy/chinese-investment-in-vietnam-surges-4021060.html>.

the International Court of Justice ruled against China's occupation of Southeast Asia, Manila's rhetoric against Beijing has been overly restrained. Under his leadership, the Philippines has attempted to de-escalate tensions in the South China Sea and institutionalised a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism in 2016. The two countries have also been exploring joint exploration and development in the South China Sea.<sup>66</sup> In his 'pivot to China', President Duterte also looked to leverage Chinese economic growth and bring Chinese investments into the Philippines. In 2016, after a visit to China, President Duterte claimed to return with pledges of up to US\$24 billion (S\$32.65 billion). However, to date, very little has materialised.<sup>67</sup> In Malaysia, China has invested nearly US\$35 billion (S\$47.61 billion) worth of construction projects between 2010 and 2016.<sup>68</sup> According to the Malaysian Investment Development Authority, China brought in nearly US\$4.4 billion (S\$5.99 billion) worth of investments in 2020.<sup>69</sup> The two countries also launched a Digital Free Trade Zone Initiative in March 2017.<sup>70</sup> A similar story exists in Indonesia. Chinese investments emerged as the second-largest investment in the country and stood at US\$8.4 billion (S\$11.43 billion) in 2020.<sup>71</sup>

Despite such growing economic engagement, the Southeast Asian countries are acutely aware of worsening security competition between China and the countries of the region. For this reason, several key states in Southeast Asia have sought to engage the US and other regional actors to mitigate the risks of engaging China.

66 Prashanth Parameswaran, "Beware the Illusion of China-Philippines South China Sea Breakthroughs", *The Diplomat*, 15 February 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/beware-the-illusion-of-china-philippines-south-china-sea-breakthroughs/>.

67 Cliff Vinzon, "Duterte struggles to sell his China pivot at home", *Nikkei Asian Review*, 9 October 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Duterte-struggles-to-sell-his-China-pivot-at-home>.

68 As quoted in Shambaugh, "U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia", p. 124.

69 Azanis Shahila Aman, "Malaysia approves RM164bil investments in 2020, China top investor", *New Strait Times*, 2 March 2021, <https://www.nst.com.my/business/2021/03/670357/malaysia-approves-rm164bil-investments-2020-china-top-investor>.

70 Hugh Harsono, "The China-Malaysia Digital Free Trade Zone: National Security Considerations", *The Diplomat*, 25 July 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-china-malaysia-digital-free-trade-zone-national-security-considerations/>.

71 Koya Jibiki, "Indonesia's investment race shaken up by China as Japan fades", *Nikkei Asian Review*, 16 February 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Indonesia-s-investment-race-shaken-up-by-China-as-Japan-fades>.

For instance, Vietnam has attempted to improve relations with the US, particularly in the security domain. In 2013, US President Barak Obama and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang signed the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership agreement elevating the level of ties between the two countries. In June 2015, they signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Relations, with the two states committing to deepen their defence relationship. It was also announced that Washington would provide US\$18 million (S\$24.49 million) to help Vietnam improve its maritime defence capabilities. In 2016, President Obama lifted all restrictions on the sale of weaponry to Vietnam.<sup>72</sup> Vietnam also maintains a strategic partnership with Japan and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with India and Russia (apart from China). Russia is Vietnam's primary supplier of arms and has significant stakes in its energy sector.<sup>73</sup> Vietnam has also been acquiring area denial capabilities, for example, Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2 fighters and anti-access missiles. Through these acquisitions, it hopes to convince China of the challenges it would face in a military conflict with Vietnam.<sup>74</sup>

Similar behaviour exists in the Philippines. Although President Duterte has invested significant capital into boosting relations with China, his administration has not abandoned the US. Given the growing frustration with China, the administration began to reengage the United States and quietly expand defence relations. The annual BALIKATAN Exercise saw an increase from 5,000 personnel in 2017 to 8,000 in 2018 and 7,500 in 2019.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, the Philippines is expected to be the largest beneficiary of the US\$300 million (S\$408.10 million) in Foreign Military Financing for the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>76</sup> Under the Indo-Pacific

72 Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnam's Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence", *Asian Security* 13, No. 3, 2017, pp. 184-186. For recent overview, see Nguyen Cong Tung, "Uneasy embrace: Vietnam's responses to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy amid U.S.-China rivalry", *The Pacific Review*, 2 March 2021.

73 Thayer, "Vietnam's Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-US Competition", pp. 186-188.

74 Derek Grossman, "Can Vietnam's Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?", *Asia Policy* 13, No. 1, 2018, pp.113-134.

75 Prashanth Parameswaran, "What Does the 2019 Balikatan Exercise Tell Us About the US-Philippines Alliance?", *The Diplomat*, 1 April 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/what-does-the-2019-balikatan-exercise-tell-us-about-the-us-philippines-alliance/>.

76 Richard Javad Heydarian, "Manila Quietly Pivots Back to the United States", *Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative CSIS*, 9 November 2018, <https://amti.csis.org/manila-quietly-pivots-back-to-the-united-states/>.

framework, the US has also scaled up economic assistance. Through its Infrastructure Transaction Assistance Network, implemented through the United States Agency for International Development, the US is attempting to materialise US\$5 billion (S\$6.8 billion) worth of investment in the Philippines.<sup>77</sup> Despite earlier calls to abrogate the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US, President Duterte has decided to extend the same in November 2020 till it could be renegotiated.<sup>78</sup>

The Philippines has also attempted to diversify its partners by reaching out to South Korea, Japan and India. South Korea and the Philippines' defence cooperation has increased significantly in recent years. Most recently, both countries signed an MoU on a new corvette deal for its navy.<sup>79</sup> Through the Armed Forces Modernisation Act, the Philippines is also looking to procure the FA-50 aircraft from South Korea, apart from the Gripen or the F-16.<sup>80</sup> The country has also signed a strategic partnership agreement with Japan in 2011 and is now Manila's largest developmental aid provider. Its defence cooperation with Japan is also increasing with the transfer of maritime surveillance aircraft and patrol vessels.<sup>81</sup> Finally, India and the Philippines have been looking for ways to enhance their bilateral relationship. Political and defence dialogues have gained momentum<sup>82</sup> and India is in talks to export the Brahmos cruise missile to the country.<sup>83</sup> On the economic front,

77 Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat and Ahmad Turdmuzi, "Australia, the U.S., and the Race for ASEAN's Infrastructure", *The Diplomat*, 18 December 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/australia-the-us-and-the-race-for-aseans-infrastructure/>.

78 Cliff Venzon, "Duterte extends Philippines' military deal with U.S.", *Nikkei Asian Review*, 11 November 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/Duterte-extends-Philippines-military-deal-with-US>.

79 Prashanth Parameswaran, "What's in the New South Korea-Philippines Shipbuilding Pact?", *The Diplomat*, 20 November 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/whats-in-the-new-south-korea-philippines-shipbuilding-pact/>.

80 Prashanth Parameswaran, "What's Next for the Philippines Multirole Fighter Program?", *The Diplomat*, 30 December 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/whats-next-for-the-philippines-multirole-fighter-program/>.

81 Prashanth Parameswaran, "What's Next for Japan-Philippines Defence Relations Under Duterte?", *The Diplomat*, 16 February 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/whats-next-for-japan-philippines-defense-relations-under-duterte/>.

82 "India, Philippines vow to strengthen defence engagement, maritime cooperation", *The Economic Times*, 6 November 2020, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-philippines-vow-to-strengthen-defence-engagement-maritime-cooperation/articleshow/79084332.cms?utm\\_source=contentofinterest&utm\\_medium=text&utm\\_campaign=cppst](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-philippines-vow-to-strengthen-defence-engagement-maritime-cooperation/articleshow/79084332.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst).

83 Nayanima Basu, "India considers long-term economic ties with the Philippines, to boost Indo-Pacific initiative", *The Print*, 1 March 2021, <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-considers-long-term-economic-ties-with-the-philippines-to-boost-indo-pacific-initiative/613360/>.

the two countries are in talks to advance a new bilateral investment treaty. Indian companies, Wipro and GMR, have already undertaken significant investments in the Philippines.<sup>84</sup>

The fact that the emergence of the Quad can undermine ASEAN's role and centrality in the region is a concern shared by all its members. Most countries have maintained a studied silence on the Indo-Pacific concept. Two countries that have engaged with the Indo-Pacific concept and used the term in official policy discourse are Vietnam and Indonesia. However, both these countries are cognisant of the possibility that ASEAN may lose its centrality in the regional security architecture. Hence, their engagement has been balanced – aiming to preserve ASEAN's centrality while also avoiding any major moves that could upset their relationship with China.

Indonesia has engaged with the Indo-Pacific concept, but only to try and mould it to ASEAN's advantage. Jakarta strongly lobbied other ASEAN nations to adopt its approach as ASEAN's official position.<sup>85</sup> Its proposed approach was adopted during the 34<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Summit on 23 June 2019 as the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific' (AOIP) document. As noted by Hoang Thi Ha, the AOIP is "anchored in the principle of ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms, based on dialogue and cooperation, and aimed at the pursuit of an open and inclusive regional order. It seeks to re-assert ASEAN centrality amidst competing narratives of the major powers regarding the emerging Indo-Pacific architecture."<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, Ha also notes that "the AOIP diverts attention from strategic competition to economic-functional cooperation."<sup>87</sup> Thus, the Indonesia-backed AOIP has looked to reaffirm ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN way as the primary means of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific arena.

84 "India and Philippines commence negotiations on investment treaty", *The Economic Times*, 25 October 2020, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-and-philippines-commence-negotiations-on-investment-treaty/articleshow/78861677.cms?utm\\_source=contentofinterest&utm\\_medium=text&utm\\_campaign=cppst](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-and-philippines-commence-negotiations-on-investment-treaty/articleshow/78861677.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst).

85 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific", *International Affairs* 96, No. 1, 2020, pp.111-129.

86 Hoang Thi Ha, "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle?", *ISEAS Perspective* 51, June 2019, p.1.

87 *Ibid.*, p.4.



In its engagement with the Quad members, Indonesia highlighted the need for synergy between the Indo-Pacific concept and ASEAN's fundamental principles. The joint press release of India and Indonesia in 2018 stated that "The development of the Indo-Pacific concept, must also be done in an open, transparent, and inclusive manner, respect for the international law and uphold ASEAN centrality."<sup>88</sup> Similarly, the Indonesia-Japan 2+2 dialogue released a statement: "four Ministers shared the view that the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific shares many relevant fundamental principles with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific."<sup>89</sup>

In a speech in March 2018 in India, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang referred to the region as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. President Quang highlighted the importance of India's engagement with ASEAN and maintaining ASEAN centrality through its 'Act East' policy.<sup>90</sup> In 2019, the term Indo-Pacific officially entered the Vietnamese lexicon when it appeared in Vietnam's Defence White Paper. While the paper itself was seen as a warning to China, it was measured in its approach to the Indo-Pacific. It reinforced ASEAN centrality by stating, "Vietnam is ready to participate in security and defence cooperation mechanisms suitable to its capabilities and interests, including security and defence mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region...Vietnam advocates expanding cooperation between ASEAN with external partners within the ASEAN-led multilateral security mechanisms based on respect for fundamental principles, standards, and norms of ASEAN."<sup>91</sup>

88 "India-Indonesia Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister to Indonesia", Bilateral/ Multilateral Documents, Media Centre, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 30 May 2018, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29932/IndiaIndonesia+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Indonesia+May+30+2018>.

89 "Second Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2")", Press Releases, News, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 30 March 2021, [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e\\_000279.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_000279.html).

90 "Full speech of Vietnam President Tran Dai Quang at Nehru Museum Library", *The Economic Times*, 10 March 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/full-speech-of-vietnam-president-tran-dai-quang-at-nehru-museum-library/articleshow/63212961.cms?from=mdr>.

91 "2019 Vietnam national Defence White Paper", Ministry of Defence, Government of Vietnam, 2019, pp.29, <http://www.mod.gov.vn/wps/wcm/connect/08963129-c9cf-4c86-9b5c-81a9e2b14455/2019VietnamNationalDefence.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=08963129-c9cf-4c86-9b5c-81a9e2b14455>.

Thus, ASEAN's approach to the Quad has been to find ways to preserve its centrality in the emerging security architecture. This is done by highlighting the need to synergise the various conceptions and approaches on Indo-Pacific with concepts like 'ASEAN centrality' and the 'ASEAN way'. This, in turn will allow Southeast Asian states to carry on hedging in their foreign policies and avoid taking any sides in the emerging geopolitical rivalry.

## Conclusion: Synergies and Divergences

The members of both ASEAN and the Quad share anxieties about China's rise. These anxieties stem from China's increasingly belligerent behaviour and flouting of international rules and norms. Despite their shared concerns, ASEAN and the Quad are likely to face challenges as they attempt to engage each other in a common regional space. This is because the two institutions have vastly different approaches to managing China's rise. The Quad's approach is based on the balance of power and draws from the US containment strategy during the Cold War, whereas ASEAN has relied on creating institutional and economic interdependence amongst its members and regional partners to mitigate conflict. Its approach has generally encompassed channels of dialogues and norms of appropriate behaviour to diffuse conflicts. While some Quad countries, notably Japan, continue economic engagement with China, these two approaches are highly incompatible in principle. Without substantial engagement between ASEAN and the Quad, ASEAN will most likely feel relegated to secondary importance in the evolving security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, while the Quad will remain ineffective. Members of both groupings will need to develop institutional links and dialogue mechanisms to synergise their respective approaches. This will help build trust and reassure states that one group's actions don't undermine the interests of the other.

Put simply, the Quad's approach looks to contain the spread of China's growing strategic influence through Asia and beyond.<sup>92</sup> With China set to continue growing into the new decade, the democratic powers of Asia look at the Quad as a coalition to balance against Asia's emerging hegemon. As noted earlier, both India and Japan see the Quad as a mechanism to engage and coordinate security relations among regional powers. The Quad partners have witnessed increasing military integration in recent years and the evolution of a robust and institutionalised dialogue mechanism. All of them have signed military logistics pacts, potentially allowing them to project power

<sup>92</sup> For a comprehensive overview of Cold War containment strategy see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press) 2005, pp. 24-87.

further from their shores. Regular military exercises, as well as sharing similar military equipment in the future, will also engender greater interoperability. Furthermore, the aggregate economic resources available to the Quad grouping also increases as its members coordinate their policies on economic and military assistance to third countries. By extending such assistance, the Quad countries believe that they can create capacities within third countries to become more resilient and capable of mitigating challenges posed by China's intrusion. Hence, all the Quad countries have been attempting to transfer military and coast-guard equipment to littoral states of the South China Sea. The induction of security capabilities into the region may serve as a step to build deterrence capabilities to China's ability to coerce its smaller neighbours. Furthermore, the Quad countries have also been coordinating the economic aid delivered to other Indo-Pacific countries, who may otherwise be highly susceptible to China's debt-trap economic diplomacy. China has launched an ambitious \$1 trillion (S\$1.36 trillion) BRI to develop infrastructure connecting the Eurasian Landmass.<sup>93</sup> However, many fear that this could give rise to unserviceable debt in smaller economies. China could then leverage this to gain undue strategic influence. The Quad is looking to use its combined economic weight to counter such Chinese activities by providing alternative sources of investments. Finally, the Quad hopes that this engagement with third countries will ultimately lead to a more durable regional order. Most leaders of the Quad members have already been attempting to highlight China's belligerent behaviour at regional forums.<sup>94</sup> This includes the need to follow free and open economic practices and respect laws governing the maritime commons. Furthermore, as noted above, Japan (along with the US and Australia) is looking to implement guidelines on investments in the region. Such actions can later translate into generic norms that govern state behaviour, whether it is in the case of territorial disputes

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93 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative", Council on Foreign Relations, 28 January 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

94 Charissa Yong, "PENCE: 'Beware China's debt diplomacy'", *The Strait Times*, 18 November 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/beware-chinas-debt-diplomacy>.

or economic investments. As these norms begin to gain currency in the region, it is hoped that this order can deter China's belligerence and shape its behaviour.

ASEAN's approach to managing with China's assertiveness has been to rely on normative power and a web of institutional engagements.<sup>95</sup> ASEAN itself grew as an institution out of a process of incremental change where both an identity and norms of behaviour were socialised. These norms were both legal-rational and socio-cultural. The norms bound ASEAN members together and have been transposed to sub-regional bodies. As alluded to earlier, most ASEAN institutions are driven by two concepts – ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN way. ASEAN centrality refers to the concept where ASEAN is the institutional anchor for all extra-regional institutions, that is, they are built around ASEAN and are predominantly ASEAN-led. The ASEAN way refers to mechanisms in which these institutions function, a high degree of informality and consensus-building. It is a “process of regional interactions based on discreetness, informality, consensus building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles.”<sup>96</sup> Most ASEAN-led institutions such as the ARF and EAS adopt these two characteristics as well. The EAS, when formed, offered ASEAN several advantages to manage pressures of great power competition. It offered ASEAN the ability to bind China to norms and adopt a posture of restraint while balancing hegemonic tendencies of external power, in this case, the US.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, ASEAN believes that growing economic interdependence will constrain belligerent powers such as China. It used the logic of economic interdependence to foster growth and hope that this would mitigate conflict. Hence it went on to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992. Similarly, ASEAN has looked to enhance economic relations with China setting up the ASEAN-China FTA, which came into force in 2010.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>95</sup> This section is a summary from Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge) 2014, pp. 14-79.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>98</sup> Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: genesis and implications”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, No. 2, 2004, pp. 257-277; and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Problems of the Liberal Peace in Asia”, *Survival* 56, No. 2, 2014, pp. 129-158.

As noted in earlier sections, both India and Japan no longer see ASEAN as the requisite vehicle to curtail China's revisionist tendencies. Despite early enthusiasm for ASEAN-led mechanisms, India and Japan now adopt a more balance of power approach through the Quad. This effort tends to be exclusionary and may not profoundly account for ASEAN's interests as great powers bargain amongst themselves. Thus, the ASEAN countries have attempted to wed the Indo-Pacific concept to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN institutions. However, contradictory approaches create several challenges for the Quad to engage ASEAN.

First, with the undermining of ASEAN centrality also comes the relegation of its interests. The Quad's military dimension is already raising fears that the region is becoming increasingly securitised, and the security dilemma is set to intensify. A significant theatre of likely conflict will be the South China Sea which is at the heart of Southeast Asia. All the Quad members are increasing their military presence in the region. With China's provocative behaviour on ample display, the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation is quite high.

Second, the Quad's initial image as a coalition of democracies creates fears that human rights and democracy promotion issues may gain traction. This will dilute the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty that most Southeast Asian countries value. Even when both the Quad and ASEAN have reiterated their commitment to a 'rules-based order', both defer on how it should and can be achieved. ASEAN's method centres around informal dialogue mechanisms and consensus-building among the members; the Quad, however, also aims to enforce these rules by challenging violations and asserting order through military force. Freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea by the US and its allies' military operations in the region are not strictly compatible with ASEAN's approach. But they do serve an essential purpose: of signalling resolve to deter China's expansionism and assertiveness.

Finally, ASEAN fears that the emergence of the Quad may force it to choose sides in the emerging geopolitical conflict. This would, in effect, split ASEAN between China and the US-led coalition. ASEAN

members have a propensity for multi-directional engagement to gather maximum benefits. China has already emerged as an essential economic partner in goods, services and investments. However, the Quad members are also important economic partners and the traditional providers of political and security support to ASEAN members. Choosing between the two sides can either leave ASEAN members in economic peril or open to political instability in the region.

Despite these challenges, there are some synergies between ASEAN and the QUAD. First, if the Quad can accommodate ASEAN's hedging strategies into its approach, then there will likely be significant common ground between ASEAN and the Quad. The Quad countries have already made it a focus to deliver infrastructure and connectivity projects to the region. This fact was noted above in the several initiatives currently underway by its members. ASEAN members will likely welcome such initiatives. This is reflected in the AOIP. Second, the focus on soft security issues such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, piracy and terrorism can create greater synergies in the military-to-military engagement between the Quad and ASEAN members. This may open a way to institutionalised talk, such as setting up an expert working group on non-traditional security agenda, between the two.

Currently, the relationship between the Quad and ASEAN is far from certain. There are more challenges than there are areas of convergence. However, the Quad members who have vociferously endorsed the Indo-Pacific concept are still developing their strategies to manage China. Given this evolving dynamic, ASEAN has adopted a cautious wait and see approach. However, the institutional shadowboxing between the Quad and ASEAN is already underway. Much will depend on how the balance of power game in the Indo-Pacific unfolds. If China succeeds in puncturing the American-led order in the region, it will be futile for the Quad to expect ASEAN to stand up to Beijing. If the Quad succeeds in resolving its internal differences and checking China's military assertiveness, it will be difficult for ASEAN to ignore the former. The Indo-Pacific is only getting ready for some severe battle of institutions.

## Appendix 1

### About the Authors

**Dr Yogesh Joshi** is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore. Before joining ISAS, Dr Joshi was a MacArthur and Stanton Nuclear Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, United States. He is also an alumnus of the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy, Columbia University and the International Nuclear History Boot Camp, Woodrow Wilson Centre. He has a doctorate in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Dr Joshi is the co-author of three books: *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrines and Dangers* (Georgetown University Press, 2018); *Asia's Emerging Balance of Power: The U.S. 'Pivot' and Indian Foreign Policy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); and *India's Nuclear Policy: A Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2018). His research has been published in *Survival*, *Asian Security*, *India Review*, *U.S. Naval War College Review*, *International Affairs*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, *Asia Policy*, *International History Review* and *Harvard Asia Quarterly*.

Dr Joshi's research focuses on contemporary Indian foreign and national security policy, with an emphasis on Indo-Pacific's balance of power, the evolution of India's military power and its approach to the use of force in international relations.

**Mr Ippeita Nishida** is a Senior Research Fellow of the International Peace and Security Department at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF). In this position, he conducts research on Japan's foreign engagement policies and tools, in particular, foreign aid and security cooperation (defence diplomacy). Additionally, he manages and oversees the mutual visitation exchange program for senior field officers between the Japan Self-Defence Forces and the Vietnamese People's Army, a flagship initiative of SPF on defence cooperation. Currently, he serves as an expert panel member of the Development Assistance Accountability Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and he teaches at the Hosei University and the Aoyama Gakuin University as an adjunct lecturer.

Prior to joining SPF in October 2016, he held the position of research fellow at the Tokyo Foundation where he worked on several key policy research projects and published reports such as *The Quad Plus: Towards a Shared Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific* (co-editor, Wisdom Tree Publisher, 2015), *Rethinking Japan's Foreign Aid: Widening the Scope of Assistance from a*



*Security Perspective* (co-author and editor, the Tokyo Foundation, 2014) and *Maritime Security and the Right of Self-Défense in Peacetime* (co-author and editor, the Tokyo Foundation, 2013). He earned his Master of Science in Development Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

**Mr Nishant Rajeev** is a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore. Before joining ISAS, Nishant worked in a public affairs firm in New Delhi where he focused on the Indian government's cyber, drone and automotive policies, as well as projects on police reform and child rights. His articles have been published on the websites of *The Diplomat*, *National Interest* and *Pragati*.

Mr Rajeev earned his Master of Science (Strategic Studies) from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He holds a Bachelor of Engineering degree from the RNS Institute of Technology and a Graduate Certificate in Public Policy from the Takshashila Institution, both based in Bangalore, India.

## Appendix 2

### About the Panel Discussion

ISAS-SPF PANEL DISCUSSION (WEBINAR)  
The Quad and ASEAN: The Way Forward  
4 March 2021

#### Programme

2.00pm

#### **Panel Discussion**

##### Chairperson

**Dr Yogesh Joshi**

Research Fellow

Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS

##### Panellists

**Professor Shankari Sundaraman**

Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

**Associate Professor Saya Kiba**

Faculty of Intercultural Communication

Komatsu University, Japan

**Ms Jane Chan Git Yin**

Senior Fellow & Coordinator

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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

2.45pm

#### **Discussion Session**

3.30pm

#### **End of Session**



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