

中国の海洋進出と日米同盟

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- III 「インド太平洋」の概念について
- IV 中国の「シャープパワー」への対応について

I はじめに — 日米同盟の今日的課題

東アジアの地理的環境



核兵器

- ・ ロシア
- ・ 中国
- ・ (北朝鮮)

軍事的対峙

- ・ 朝鮮半島
- ・ 台湾海峡

日米同盟の重要性

- 1 脅威認識の共有
- 2 日本による安定的な米軍駐留環境の提供
- 3 日米は、ともに先進民主国家であり、海洋国家

Regional Depot of F-35s



Maintenance Facility for MV-22s



海洋国家

日本の

構想

高坂正堯

中央公論社



The Law of the Sea


**United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea**

**with Index and Final Act
of the Third
United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea**




United Nations

日本周辺の海底ケーブル



<https://www.esri.com/news/details/102418/>



“The British navy, which dominated the world’s oceans for so many year, truly and deeply understood the interconnected character of the global waterways. **“The sea is one” is an expression you will hear from a Brit.” (p. 2.)**

“Yet **the twenty-first century will be more about the Indian Ocean than either of the other two (Note: the Pacific and the Atlantic) - and the sooner we fully realize that in the United States, the better.” (p. 119.)**

China's Military Strategy

“In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection,”

...

“Traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”

(The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy*, Foreign Languages Press, 2015, pp. 13-15.)

China's Military Strategy

“To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will uphold the following principles:

...

- **To strike a balance between rights protection and stability maintenance, and make overall planning for both, safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and maintain security and stability along China's periphery;**

...”

(The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy*, Foreign Languages Press, 2015, pp. 11.)

日米同盟関係と中国の海洋進出

- 1 グレーゾーン事態への対応
- 2 「インド太平洋」の概念と日米同盟のスコープ
- 3 中国の「シャープ・パワー」への対応

2016年8月の中国公船と中国漁船による領海侵入事案



(尖閣諸島沖に現れた中国漁船の状況)



(中国公船と漁船の状況)

(海上保安庁『平成28年8月上旬の中国公船及び中国漁船の活動状況について』
2016年10月18日、<http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/1608-senkaku.pdf>。)

日本とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約

第5条第1項

各締約国は、日本国の施政の下にある領域における、いずれか一方に対する**武力攻撃**が、自国の平和及び安全を危うくするものであることを認め、自国の憲法上の規定及び手続きに従って共通の危険に対処するように行動することを宣言する。

第6条第1項

日本国の安全に寄与し、並びに極東における国際の平和及び安全の維持に寄与するため、アメリカ合衆国は、その陸軍、空軍及び海軍が日本国において施設及び区域を使用することを許される。

The Indo-Pacific Region



<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoyvizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Indo-Pacific.html>

中国、南アジアで浸透＝港を99年租借、インド包囲



スリランカのハンバントタ港＝2015年2月(AFP＝時事)

スリランカは今年7月、南部**ハンバントタ港**を中国国営企業に11億ドル(約1200億円)で**99年間貸し出す契約**を結んだ。港は親中派のラジャパクサ前政権が建設したが、約13億ドル(約1500億円)とされる建設費の大半は中国からの融資だ。

ただ、財政が苦しいスリランカは「悪夢のような返済」(地元紙デーリー・ミラー)のめどを立てられず、その代替措置として港を貸し出したとみられる。

パキスタンでは、中国西部の新疆ウイグル自治区からインド洋に面するパキスタン南西部の**グワダル港**に至る「中パ経済回廊」の建設が進む。グワダルで港湾整備に携わってきた中国は2015年、パキスタン側と**港の43年間の租借**で合意した。

(<https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2017123000321&g=pol>)

Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*



<https://www.rsc.org.uk/the-merchant-of-venice/about-the-play/key-moments>

II 「グレーゾーン事態」への対応について

Andrew Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia – Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,” September 21, 2016

“Serious Chinese sources have subsequently discussed a “**Huangyan [Scarborough Shoal] Model**” and concurrent transformation of China’s maritime strategy. In an article framed around this very theme, researcher Zhang Jie of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences writes, “This model...sees non-military conflict as the bottom line to attain effective control over the disputed shoal and its surrounding waters by means of...civilian maritime force, etc. This model suggests that China’s maritime policy has shifted fundamentally from keeping a low profile to becoming more proactive.” As “the first official use of” the phrase “**Huangyan [Scarborough Shoal] Model**,” Dr. Zhang cites an article in the overseas edition of People’s Daily, implying that this term has the endorsement of China’s government for communication with external audiences, including perhaps for signaling and coercion. “As China’s strength increases,” she projects, “China will be able to effectively wield more types of non-military instruments to resolve South China Sea disputes.” Disturbingly, Zhang emphasizes that the “**Huangyan [Scarborough Shoal] Model**” has also been “explored by China” vis-à-vis the “Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands dispute” — with the subsequently augmented presence of China Coast Guard ships (together with many “fishing boats”) in the islands’ vicinity already a tangible result.”

(<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20160921/105309/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-EricksonPhDA-20160921.pdf>)


Lyle Morris, “China Welcomes Its Newest Armed Force: The Coast Guard”

“On **New Year’s Day**, with little fanfare, the Chinese government announced **major changes to the structure of the People’s Armed Police, transferring command to the Central Military Commission** and Chinese Communist Party and removing the State Council’s and Ministry of Public Security’s oversight powers. The move greatly enhanced the “military” component of the “paramilitary” nature of the People’s Armed Police, with the Central Military Commission exerting more direct control over the group’s personnel and operations.

Then on **March 21**, the government published a follow-on document announcing that **the People’s Armed Police was to take full control over the China Coast Guard** and divest of most non-military functions, such as Mining, Forestry, Hydropower, Firefighting, and Security Protection. The changes amount to a China Coast Guard placed under a newly reformed, more “militarized” incarnation of a People’s Armed Police, controlled by the Central Military Commission.”

<https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its-newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/>

◎ 中国公船の勢力増強



(海上保安庁「海上保安体制強化の取り組み状況(平成29年12月18日)」、
<https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaihotaisei/dai2/siryou.pdf> .)

中国の1万トン級の巡視船 海警2901



“海警2901”船有巨大的直升机甲板，与之前的海上执法船相比，获得了巨大的提升。

http://www.xinhuanet.com/science/2016-03/29/c_135219714.htm

The Japan Coast Guard protects the Senkaku Islands to the last
Sato Yuji



“The most frequent pattern was illegal operations by Chinese fishing boats. Exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are guaranteed national sovereign rights to fishing, but Chinese fishing boats carried out illegal operations in other countries’ EEZ or territorial waters.

In this way, China gradually invaded other countries’ sovereign rights and created an accumulation of *faits accomplis* as if they were Chinese territory, territorial waters and EEZ before anyone noticed. Such non-military means was a new tactic invented by China.”

(<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/diplomacy/pt20161018235004.html>)

The Japan Coast Guard protects the Senkaku Islands to the last

Sato Yuji

“In fact, many of these fishing boats have the Chinese version of a Global Positioning System (GPS) called “Hokuto,” which was provided by their government. This is equipped with a mailing function, which enables every single boat to notify the mainland of its position or to receive email messages sent to all boats. Even private fishing boats are connected to the Chinese government, and there is the possibility of crew members who can be referred to as maritime militia being aboard the ships. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between them and the other crew members at the scene, and we need to approach these fishing boats with a great deal of caution.”

(<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/diplomacy/pt20161018235004.html>)

海上におけるグレーゾーン事態への対処について

- 1 除籍予定の海上自衛隊の艦船を海上保安庁で活用
- 2 尖閣周辺に海保の勢力を集中できるように、海自が
 - ① 他の海域で海保の業務を代替
 - ② 補給等で海上保安庁を支援
- 3 中国の海上民兵の実態を把握して明らかにする
- 4 日中間、多国間で、海上法執行機関と海軍に共通の危機管理システムをつくる
- 5 ロシアのハイブリッド戦への対応と中国の仕掛けるグレーゾーン事態への対応について、日NATO間で意見交換

(徳地秀士「「グレーゾーン事態」備え急げ」『読売新聞』2018年5月3日、11頁。)



NPI

公益財団法人 中曽根康弘世界平和研究所
Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute


海と空のグレーゾーン事態への対処 — その問題と対策 —



中曽根康弘世界平和研究所
グレーゾーン事態研究委員会

2018年6月26日

III 「インド太平洋」の概念について



“While that absence of global impact is about to change as India rises in its global ambition and reach, it is still relatively **a tabula rasa** in geopolitical terms.” (p. 91.)

“... the Indian Ocean’s most salient characteristic is that unlike its massive cousins the Atlantic and Pacific, and as particularly distinct from the perpetual battlefield of the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean has been primarily **a zone of trade.**” (p. 93.)



Admiral R. K. Dhowan, Chairman, National Maritime Foundation, Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy and Dr. Jayanath Colombage with participants.

(<http://www.dailynews.lk/2018/03/14/business/145438/indian-maritime-foundation-conducts-%E2%80%98indo-%E2%80%93-pacific-regional-dialogue%E2%80%99>)

**Prime Minister Modi's Keynote Address at Shangri La
Dialogue
June 1, 2018**

“The Indo-Pacific is a natural region. It is also home to a vast array of global opportunities and challenges.
... India's vision for the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore, a positive one. And, it has many elements.

One,

Two, Southeast Asia is at its centre. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India, as we seek to cooperate for an architecture for peace and security in this region. ...”

胡波『中国はなぜ「海洋大国」を目指すのか』

「インドは中国のシーレーンの脆弱性につけこんで、揉め事を起こそうとするだろうか。インドはそうした行動を起こす条件と能力を備えている。中国の西方進出ルートを押さえ、シーレーンに対していつでも脅威を与えることができるインドのシーパワーは軽視できない。」

「中国の海外における利益や軍事力の増強に伴い、軍事力の大規模な対外進出はすでに大勢の赴くところとなっており、インド洋はその最重要地域のひとつである。近い将来、中国はインド洋に海軍力を常態化させ、できれば複数の補給基地の確保を望んでいる。」

(胡波『中国はなぜ「海洋大国」を目指すのか “新常态”時代の海洋戦略』濱口城訳、日本僑報社、2016年、155～157頁。)

The Indo-Pacific Region



<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoyvizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Indo-Pacific.html>

IV 中国の「シャープパワー」への対応について



https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2017/07/06/10/36/rambutan-2477584__340.jpg

“If someone puts a gun to your head and demands your wallet, it does not matter what you want or think. That is hard power. If that person is trying to persuade you to freely give up your wallet, everything depends on what you want or think. That is soft power. Sharp power, the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes, is a type of hard power. The manipulation of ideas, political perceptions, and electoral processes has a long history. ... What’s new is not the basic model; it’s the speed with which such disinformation can spread and the low cost of spreading it.”

Joseph Nye, Jr., “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2018, www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1121771.

“Soft power is not good or bad in itself. It is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms.

Osama bin Laden neither threatened nor paid the men who flew aircraft into the World Trade Center – he had attracted them with his ideas. But although soft power can be used to evil ends, its means depend on voluntarism, which is preferable from the point of view of human autonomy.”

Joseph Nye, Jr., “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2018, www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1121771

シャープパワーへの対応

1. Analyze and disclose the truth about what they are doing in our societies. (実態の解明と公表)
2. Equip the public of liberal democracies with the ability to discern the distinction between truth and fake. (国民の啓蒙)
3. Resolve economic overdependence on China. (中国経済への過剰依存の解消)
4. Be proud of liberal democratic values and institutions, and work together to defend them. (民主的な価値と制度の擁護)
5. Intensify our public diplomacy to promote liberal democratic values and to strengthen democratic governance of weak countries. (脆弱な国家の統治能力の強化)

Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

“Chinese Influence Activities with U.S. Allies and Partners in Southeast Asia”

Dr. Amy E. Searight, CSIS

April 5, 2018

“Recent studies on Australia and New Zealand have demonstrated the extensive and centrally coordinated efforts through CCP-led mechanisms to influence public debates and policy outcomes in these countries. John Garnaut and Anne-Marie Brady have described these countries as **“canaries in the coal mine” of Chinese political influence efforts. If countries with strong democratic institutions like Australia and New Zealand are vulnerable to Chinese influence and domestic political interference, one can imagine that countries in Southeast Asia that have weaker governance, less transparency and higher levels of corruption will be even more susceptible.”**

(https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180406_Hearing_Amy%20Searight_Written_Statement_April%205%202018.pdf?u6.PMk9Xjxi7ojAhLXIimnv_OciYnjHE3)

Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

“Chinese Influence Activities with U.S. Allies and Partners in Southeast Asia”

Dr. Amy E. Searight, CSIS

April 5, 2018

“If Australia and New Zealand are “canaries in the coal mine**” of Chinese interference operations, we should be concerned about Southeast Asia, a region with weaker institutions of governance.”**

Joseph Nye, Jr. “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power”

“In international politics, soft power ... is the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than through the hard power of coercion and payment. Soft power is rarely sufficient on its own. But when coupled with hard power, it is a force multiplier. That combination, though hardly new (the Roman empire rested on both the strength of Rome’s legions and the attractions of Rome’s civilization), has been particularly central to U.S. leadership. Power depends on whose army wins, but it also depends on whose story wins. A strong narrative is a source of power.”

Joseph Nye, “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2018, <https://foreignaffairs.com/print/1121771>.

Prime Minister Modi's Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue

June 1, 2018

“Connectivity is vital. ... There are many connectivity initiatives in the region. If these have to succeed, we must not only build infrastructure, we must also build bridges of trust. And for that, these initiatives must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consultation, good governance, transparency, viability and sustainability. **They must empower nations, not place them under impossible debt burden.”**

(<http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.>)

ご清聴ありがとうございました！