

2013/09/30

Japan-UK Maritime Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific Region

Yoji KODA

Former Commander in Chief, Self Defence Fleet

Introduction

When we think about Japan-UK Maritime Cooperation -- the first thing which comes to our mind could be the more-than-a-century long close relationship between Japan and UK. Historically, the maritime power of Japan, especially its modernized Navy (Imperial Navy), was built up and strengthened through the precise and valuable support of the Royal Navy of UK (Royal Navy). Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), which is the practical successor of the Imperial Navy, still proudly preserves many spiritual and cultural heritages received from the Royal Navy.

In my presentation, the relations between the Imperial Navy, as well as JMSDF, and the Royal Navy will first be covered. Then, the Maritime Strategy of Japan and the characteristics of international cooperation among maritime nations -- which will mainly focus on Japan's position regarding Alliances and Coalitions -- will be discussed. After these two introductory subjects, I will examine Japan's recent experience of support operations for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and, possible future areas of cooperation between Japan and UK. As a concluding recommendation, some ideas on a "coalition built on the well-respected naval Kingdom of UK and the Royal Navy" will be proposed.

1. Japan and United Kingdom: Influence of the Royal Navy on JMSDF

Before entering the main subject, it is better to take some time here to review the relations between the maritime powers in Japan and the Royal Navy. First, it is important to understand the historical fact that the Imperial Navy looked up to the Royal Navy as a mentor in its early days. At the same time, the Royal Navy is respected for providing a formative influence for modern navies around the world,

and it still preserves strong capability of influence over various navies in the world today, - including JMSDF.

Since its foundation in 1869, the Imperial Navy had received substantial influence and support from the Royal Navy for many years. Looking back on its development, it is true that Imperial Navy -- from its birth to the end of the nineteenth century -- practically brought almost all elements of being a modern navy from the Royal Navy. It is needless to say that the most important characteristic of a modern navy is its personnel, especially the quality of its officers and sailors. The Imperial Navy accurately recognized this, and made every possible effort to quickly improve this element. The Imperial Navy wisely merged the fundamental Samurai/Bushido ethos of Japan, which was almost equivalent with chivalry of European community, with the good spiritual traditions of the Royal Navy. These officers, because of their eagerness to learn, capacity to adapt, discipline, and frugality, had quickly adopted various tenets and teachings of the Royal Navy in a short time. In addition to this, most of its main equipment, such as ships and weapons were ordered for the then world-leading manufacturers in the UK, and imported to Japan. In every area of modern naval construction and technology, Japan and the UK cooperated so well. In this manner, along with its invaluable experience in Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895, the Imperial Navy grew into one of the leading maritime powers of the world by the early-twentieth century.

At the same time, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and 1905 really played an important role for Japan`s victory. This is another noteworthy example of Japan-UK cooperation, and the Imperial Navy was the largest beneficiary of the alliance in that war. Since then, the two decades-long Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1902 to 1921 played the role of a center piece of regional security for Japan and UK. Additionally, for Japan and the Imperial Navy, this special relationship with the UK and the Royal Navy, had been one of the most important catalysts in maintaining good relationships with other leading nations, as well as their navies in Europe and America, during this period.

As a result of Washington Treaty of 1922, the two nations lost their bilateral alliance. Indeed, the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty at that time was a critical turning point in history, which ultimately left modern Japan in hopeless international isolation. Then, the development of the bitter days in the second half of the 1930`s led to the tragic result where the Imperial Japan went into the war against USA, UK, and other allied nations in December 1941. In spite of many courageous and brave battles fought by the Imperial Navy during World War Two

in the Pacific, it was decimated and totally disappeared from history after three year and eight month-long war. In this way, despite its 75 years of glorious history, the Imperial Navy faded away completely, with nothing left except good traditions and culture. These naval traditions were, in some sense, the only positive psychological legacies of the defeated Imperial Navy.

For seven years after the war, there was no maritime military power except Japan's Coast Guard, which was established in 1948 as a law enforcement agency of the Japanese government. However, the quick outbreak and development of the Cold War in the early years following World War II spurred Japan to establish a "Maritime Guard Force" in 1952. The Maritime Guard Forces was subsequently expanded into JMSDF in 1954, which thereafter has served as the maritime security force of Japan.

At the time of its formation, the senior leadership of JMSDF had set a clear goal to make their new maritime force into a true Navy -- not just an enlarged Coast-Guard. All those senior leaders of JMSDF, who included many combat-experienced ex-Imperial Navy officers and enlisted personnel, had a hidden but determined belief that they were destined to build-up JMSDF into the new Navy of Japan. Even so, however, because of some still-lingering and strong negative Japanese public feelings from World War II, and also due to the influence of the new "pacifist" Constitution of Japan (enacted in November 1946), it was physically impossible to name this new maritime force a "Navy" -- and this was the political reality of Japan, only nine years after the end of the war. ¹

At the same time, the senior leaders of the early JMSDF naturally set-up a basic policy of keeping the best possible operational and tactical continuity from Imperial Navy, as well as retaining the culture and traditions of Imperial Navy. In this manner, the newly born JMSDF made the Imperial Navy a spiritual model for its reestablishment. Therefore, in the initial years of its existence, there was a strong sense of JMSDF being a blood-connected-son of the Imperial Navy, and this understanding has been inherited from generation to generation within JMSDF, for over 60 years.

The good naval traditions of the Imperial Navy, received or even transplanted from Royal Navy, had become a spiritual pillar of the JMSDF. And, of course, in the growing JMSDF, they were not to be denied, but rather were transferred with encouragement to the younger generations of JMSDF personnel. The founders of JMSDF really believed in passing along those traditions, and had done so for years. Today, in addition to strong ties with USN, all sailors of JMSDF are very proud of

the legacies of the two legendary Imperial and Royal Navies, and have strong trust and confidence in them. These legacies include a strong sense of duty, war-fighters' spirit, seamanship, tactical mind-set, and training concepts.

Today, at the 60 years point following its foundation, JMSDF personnel still surely understand the fact that the origins of our good Navy heritage was based on the indirect products and treasures of the Royal Navy -- and they are very proud of them. This is the relationship between JMSDF and the Royal Navy, which should be conveyed to the British people, especially our fellow sailors of the Royal Navy.

2. Maritime Strategy of Japan: Alliance -- JMSDF and the U.S. Navy

Since its independence after post war occupation ended in 1952, Japan made its alliance with the USA a cornerstone of its national security policy and defense strategy.² This alliance partnership has lasted for more than 60 years since the signing of the original mutual security treaty in 1951. The current alliance mechanism, which is based on the revised Japan-USA mutual security treaty concluded in 1960, marked its 50-year anniversary in 2010.

For the first 30 year period, the Japan-USA Alliance acted as a key security and stability mechanism for Japan and the Western Pacific region. At the same time, along with the NATO Alliance, the Japan-USA Alliance also played a core role in the Western Pacific theatre to deter and to suppress the Eastern Block powers, in this case the ex-Soviet Union in the Far-East. During the next 30 years -- after the end of cold war -- the Japan-USA Alliance continued to play a key security role in the Asian region, where various factors of instability still remain. In addition to this fundamental regional-stabilizer role, the Japan-USA Alliance has been re-evaluated as an important means to assure the security of the widely-spread area of strategic importance, starting from South East Asia, through Indian Ocean via the Middle East, and then to the East Coast of Africa. This alliance has also been an indirect but indispensable element of the security of the Korean peninsula, where an intense military confrontation between South and North still exists.

Under these security circumstances, JMSDF has planned and built its entire operational force, based on the scope and functions of the Japan-USA Alliance. In particular, the maintenance of a close and good relationship with USN has always been given the highest priority. At the same time, JMSDF has received a tremendous amount of assistance and support from U.S. Navy, both materially and mentally. However, from its beginnings to the mid-1980's, the operational power of

JMSDF still remained in the infant stage, and the capability gap between JMSDF and U.S. Navy was so large, that it was difficult for JMSDF to catch-up quickly to U.S. Navy. In other words, the gap was something like the one between a strong father and a small child.

But, through the concentration of all possible efforts for force construction that JMSDF traded for everything else during its first 30 years, JMSDF gradually became a more powerful force. New capabilities of JMSDF covered the full spectrum of functions, such as: operations, force building, logistics, training and education, as well as research and development. As a result of these all-out measures to build JMSDF up, JMSDF became real operationally-capable naval force, supporting a reasonable partnership with the U.S. Navy in mid-1980s.

3. Characteristics of International Cooperation among Maritime Nations:

(Japan's Perspectives under Japanese Pacifist Constitution)

As it is commonly understood in maritime communities around the world, many forms of at-sea cooperation will become focal points of current and future efforts in varied security situations involving naval powers. Furthermore, it is relatively simple to point out and recognize the fact that a coalition has now become the most common form of international cooperation at sea.

*** Alliance**

An alliance has long been a mechanism to bring several nations together to establish mutual goals common to participating nations. An alliance in general, is tailored for a specific purpose, so it is firm and good enough to establish fixed and heavy objectives, but less flexible to react to unpredictable and rapidly changing situations which fall outside of its original objectives. Moreover, the reality of today's world has so changed that unexpected incidents or crises are observed very often in international community. In order to quickly respond to the abovementioned dynamically changing situations by bringing all possible nations together, an alliance sometimes exposes its limitations, and other forms of cooperation -- typically represented by a coalition -- are regarded to have some advantages over an alliance; not fully, but just to make up for the limitations of the alliance.

*** Coalition**

A coalition is a relatively new concept which will test the limits of many existing alliances in the complicated and difficult international situation of today. An advantage of a coalition over an alliance is that, depending on each case of international incident, one nation is able to count its national interest first, and next decide about its participation in an international effort to settle the incident, by fully reflecting on its internal circumstances. A coalition provides a good amount of political flexibility for participating nations. For a free and independent nation, this flexibility may not make a big difference, however if one nation is a member of alliance with other nations, this flexibility really eases the nation in its difficult decision-making process from the strict responsibilities imposed by its alliance.

*** Balance between Alliance and Coalition**

Of course, what has been said above is not to deny the value of an alliance. Any military in the world should be ready for all types of military operations at any time -- especially, a full scale head-on military collision among major powers, which would be the most serious threat, as well as the worst scenario. So, international communities should maintain good and effective deterrence capabilities, and there is no other international security mechanism besides an alliance which can materialize these capabilities. In the case of war breaking-out, we should also be strong enough to achieve final victory. What makes this posture true and viable for Japan, is our alliance with USA. So, the general security posture required for most of the nations in the world today is to maintain adequate security mechanisms, ready for both alliance and coalition operations.

4. Japan's Recent Experience: Operation Enduring Freedom

In the case of today's international cooperation, which, in general, is different from a direct security crisis envisioned by the Japan-USA Alliance, it is natural and practical for Japan to participate in this new type of cooperation through the form of joining a coalition. In reality, Japan has participated in support operations for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), after September 11 2001, under a coalition framework. JMSDF has been supporting multinational naval forces from December 2001 to January 2010 under this framework, and the increasing number and frequent changes of customer navies whose ships had received fuel and water really represent the real nature of the coalition. This flexibility is one of the advantages of a coalition that many participating navies appreciate.

However, even when JMSDF participates in this type of post-Cold War international cooperation in the form of a coalition, the fundamental basis of Japan's over-seas coalition operations is still the Japan-USA Alliance. There are several reasons for this reality.

The first is accumulation of historic precedents and facts on the international operations by JMSDF, which is now, for all practical purposes, the second most capable navy in the world in terms of conventional maritime operations. Namely, JMSDF, since its foundation, has conducted its operations and exercises with friendly navies, as well as non-allied navies, under the assistance from U.S. Navy. In particular, in its early days, the newly-born JMSDF had little experience with this type of international naval cooperation, so several sets of information provided by U.S. Navy became a central part of its success. At the same time, the U.S. Navy acted as an honest supervisor of the JMSDF, which was a growing son of the ex-Imperial Navy. This gentlemen's understanding type of unspoken cooperation and conduct is still in-effect today, and this has really been a strong bonding agent between JMSDF and U.S. Navy. This invisible and quiet professional bond has really been one of the most important factors that promotes and maintains the strong mutual trust and understanding between JMSDF and U.S. Navy.

The second reason is JMSDF's receipt and understanding of the Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) for coalition operations. The standard tactical procedures for allied navies in the Cold War period, which was developed by USA-led NATO, has been provided to JMSDF by U.S. Navy for more than half a century as allied operational publications. These types of publications have also served as the real reference and basis for today's international and multinational naval operations under a coalition framework. In other words, these common tactical procedures have naturally become SOP for international naval cooperation. So, for JMSDF, it is still important to consult with the U.S. Navy for various subjects when JMSDF units engage in other navy units than U.S. Navy. JMSDF, by its upbringing and nature, has basically been a bilateral force in the Western-Pacific (West-Pac) for many years. The overwhelming presence of U.S. Naval forces in the region, typically represented by its 7th Fleet, provides JMSDF with a very rich and sophisticated fleet training and operations experience with the U.S. Navy. These are probably the best in the world. On the other hand, experience of JMSDF working with other navies still remains relatively short, and the occasions too few -- so, there are many areas JMSDF needs to learn about, and U.S. Navy really becomes a good mentor and middleman for that purpose. For example, there are too

many unknowns about operations in the Arabian Gulf, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Horn of Africa which are located so far-away from Japanese waters.

The third reason why the Japan-USA Alliance has been a basis for JMSDF's increased participation in international coalition operations is the overall U.S. Navy's capability of influence. The United States is a country that has largest and second-to-none type of influence on global security matters. So, for Japan, it is wise and reasonable to understand the implications and potential effects of this capability of the USA. Especially when Government of Japan (GOJ) makes its decision to participate in a coalition during an international security crisis, Japan or GOJ should take USA's influence into consideration.

5. Possible Areas of Future Cooperation between Japan and UK

In order to develop an idea for future cooperation between Japan and the UK, it is worth considering the situation in today's widely ranging hot-spots, spreading from South East Asia including the South China Sea (SCS), via the Indian Ocean, and to waters off of Eastern Africa. The reason why this area is selected as a model is that it is not only of great current military and geopolitical interest, but also because the area offers a future potential for our two nations to cooperate. There are three specific characteristics common to Japan and UK.

First, the vast maritime area, occupying one-third of the Earth's surface in terms of longitude (030°E-150°E), has provided a certain physical and diplomatic distance between our two countries. This "not too close, but not too far" nature provides common advantages and disadvantages for us.

Next, this maritime area is the one where the significant interests of our two nations lie, in other words, they are essential for seafaring trade and transportation of raw materials. For Japan, seafaring trade with Asia and the European countries must pass through this area. Similarly, for the UK, most of its at-sea trade routes with Asian countries, including Australia and New Zealand, also run through this area. So, for our two nations, the oceans and seas in this longitudinal ark possess a vital importance from various aspects, if any form of security instability emerges.

Last but not least, the oceans have a strategic importance for not only the security and prosperity of various regions and countries, but also for global stability as a whole. It is easy to point out several reasons for this. First this area contains oil-rich middle-east nations and their sea-routes. Second there are two big emerging

nations, i.e. China and India, which international community must count on. Third, both political and economic presences of regional nations, typically represented by ASEAN, have become more and more influential. At the same time, there remain several elements of instability in some specific nations as well as regions. Based on these reasons, our two maritime nations, which are responsible for regional and global stability, are obligated to have serious interest and concern for worldwide security.

Then, taking these all three of these factors into consideration, the future courses of action for Japan and the UK, and their navies -- which have different capabilities from that of U.S. Navy whose areas of combat focus are on Strategic Strike and Power Projection -- should be carefully sorted out. In most of the possible future security incidents occurring at and around seas mentioned above, it is quite certain that both Japan and the UK would participate in international efforts to control the situation. In this process, each of our two nations may deploy its naval forces to the affected area based on its national policy, domestic situation, international commitment and naval capability at the time. Then, our on-scene deployed forces would start cooperation with each other and also with the U.S. Navy, which is a common alliance partner.

An actual example of this is JMSDF's OEF support force, which had been continuously deployed to Arabian Gulf and Northern Indian Ocean for more than eight years. Unfortunately, due to the reluctant policy of the last Japanese Government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, which held power from September 2009 to December 2012, the OEF support operations were terminated in January 2010. During the eight years of those OEF logistic support operations, JMSDF forces in the Indian Ocean had cooperated with more than ten navies, under close coordination with the 5th Fleet of U.S. Navy and USCENTCOM. At the same time, JMSDF support forces in the Indian Ocean thoroughly enjoyed our opportunities to work with Royal Navy ships, and JMSDF sailors were impressed by good sense of seamanship shown by British sailors. ³

Even though there have been limited opportunities for two navies to work together in the same waters in Gulf of Aden, both navies appreciate the various benefits and operational experience gained through anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. One noteworthy episode is that P-3C patrol aircraft of JMSDF deployed to Djibouti provide daily ocean surveillance intelligence to participating navies, including Royal Navy. According to various mass-media reports, this information has been indispensable for anti-piracy operations in the area. Like this, even despite an absence of a written bilateral agreement, a cooperative posture

between JMSDF and Royal Navy units on- scene at any crisis would naturally be formed in future international operations.

Any cooperation like the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation conducted off-of Northern Sumatra Island of Indonesia where large scale earthquake and tsunami hit in December 2004 would also provide a great opportunity for both navies to cooperate in the future.

For our two nations and militaries, these types of cooperation in distant waters from our home countries, either military or non-military in nature, will surely be conducted or supported mainly by naval forces. So, if we take into consideration the nature of operations which would be conducted in areas and waters very distant from our countries, this type of Japan-and-UK cooperation would be designated as an "Expeditionary Cooperation" by our Naval Forces. It is important that the political leadership of our two nations should understand this concept, and should also create more opportunities and a more favorable environment than in past years, and allow JMSDF and the Royal Navy train, prepare, and take full advantage of this concept of Expeditionary Cooperation.

When we estimate our future, we should not just be a fortune-teller holding a crystal ball. Instead, we should forecast our future by calculation, analysis, and a sound thought-process based on accumulated facts and intelligence. Under today's security environment where full-scale-war between major powers has become less-possible, it is clear that the future crisis which we will certainly face and engage-in, would be a non-conventional or asymmetric security incidents, which have become prominent after the end of the Cold War. Especially in various crises after the Kuwait invasion by Iraqi forces in 1990, many nations autonomously selected participation in a military coalition operation as their form of support for international crisis management and resolution. This general flow of the tide toward coalitions has been a kind of emerging wisdom-of-life in the international community that is naturally created to meet current situations in the new and complex world of international affairs.

Within these developments, one thing we should notice is the fact that all the efforts to form coalitions and conduct operations under this framework since 1990 were arranged under the initiatives and lead of USA. The USA, as a single superpower and the greatest naval power in recent history, has various national interests in any incident in the world, and also has heavy responsibility to maintain world security and stability. If so, coalition, under USA's lead, has been and will be designated as "Coalition built on USA initiative." For non-partner nations of

alliance with USA, their deployed forces will receive basically the same benefits from the coalition mechanism built around U.S. Forces, if they join its coalition structure.

*** Coalition Built on Well Respected Naval Kingdom: UK**

I believe, however, that we must think about a new form of coalition in the future, and make ourselves ready for the coming complex future situations for which we will have little experience. Most likely, the possible case to meet this criterion could be the one when the USA cannot, or will not, take the lead in forming a coalition framework, due to miss-matches of national interests, or other vital reasons of the USA. Here, a little deeper examination of the possible cases or incidents must be made.

The first case is an international security crisis or incident in which the USA does not see any, or perhaps only a little of its national interests being involved. In this case, the USA could be very reluctant to take any action with its navy.

Second is a situation where another major power has stronger national interests than that of USA. In this case, some other nation could forestall the USA, and then take the lead to form its own type of international cooperative mechanism, and USA could not find an active incentive to interrupt the other's initiative. It is natural and understandable that USA may become unwilling to take lead of new coalition. Generally speaking, these could be the cases where another major power, which does not share common interests with that of the USA, has strong intentions to engage in the incident.

If these are the cases, there are two potential nations which could fill the gap of the absence of USA and might take lead.- That is to say, one is a reviving Russia, and the other is an emerging China.

Should a coalition or other form of international cooperative body be formed without USA, it could be acceptable for international community, as long as its objective remains fair and reasonable. However, in some vital cases, it would not be desirable for Japan, UK, and USA. In addition, from a practical naval operation point of view, such a coalition would not be desirable because of a lack of well-established common SOP which most participating navies appreciated under the strong leadership of U.S. Navy. Such a coalition could generate tactical confusion and some hazardous situations affecting operational safety.

If we are wisely to take these problems into consideration, the best and most practical resolution to this fragile situation is to form a coalition framework under the Royal Navy's lead. The Royal Navy has been regarded and respected as a founder of the modern navy. Even the Russian Navy or Chinese PLA Navy cannot deny this historic fact. Furthermore, the Royal Navy has historically been very good in exercising its soft power to convince these two big navies to accept Royal Navy's lead. At the same time, its ability to influence other navies is another advantage of the Royal Navy. So, if we were able to take the Russian, Chinese, and other navies, into a future coalition framework under UK's lead, a new type of international cooperation would properly function as we desire.

Especially, major powers like USA, Russia, and even China may not object to or resist this new framework under the UK's lead, and more importantly, this idea may save the faces of both Russia and China. The thought behind this idea is an estimate that even the Russian Navy or the PLA Navy has to pay special respect to the historical achievements and well established credit of the Royal Navy in case of an international crisis. This sense of respect may give either Navy, and more importantly their governments, some room to make practical compromises without sacrificing national prestige.

Under this concept, what is important for all three navies, i.e. JMSDF, the Royal Navy, and U.S. Navy, is that they should start examining this proposal at the earliest opportunity. In other words, well before the real-world incident actually happens, these three navies should start analysis and evaluation. There seems to be plenty of time for the three navies to examine, coordinate, and develop their common strategies toward jointly handling an undesirable international problem -- however, the wisdom of mankind also tells the fact that history does not wait for those who are not prepared. We should be ready for the abovementioned situation before it gets too late. This new concept of coalition under Royal Navy's lead is designated as "Coalition built on a well-respected naval Kingdom."

*** Promote European Nations' Active Support for "Freedom of Navigation" in Asia**

Traditionally and historically, successive U.S. Governments have taken clear positions on territorial disputes in the SCS. In other words, the USA does not support any specific nation in terms of territorial ownership, but rather it encourages nations involved in sovereignty disputes to take peaceful means to solve the problem. The U.S. Government seems to intend to maintain this policy strictly in the future too. In this context, the position of the U.S. Government has been neutral, even towards China, which has for years created many territorial disputes

over SCS islands and rocks with other coastal nations. However, facing the quick build-up, in recent years, of China's naval capability, its aggressive expansion of maritime activities, and its tough position on territorial and EEZ-related issues in the SCS, the U.S. started taking new positions on the SCS problems, starting in 2010. The U.S. Government does not single-out China in its new policy; however, it started to re-affirm "Freedom of Navigation" as one of the key national interests of USA. After first being mentioned by then-U.S. State Secretary, Ms. Hillary R. Clinton, in July 2010 at ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, the U.S. Government has repeatedly used this expression at various opportunities since then. For China, which is not specifically designated by USA, this new USA's policy is a strong warning to China's aggressive and tough position on SCS issues. This is one of the reasons why China tried to hush-up the new binding declaration at ASEAN's foreign ministers' meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July 2012, and China's reluctant position on multilateral dialog to resolve SCS disputed issues.

Having said this, the current situation seems that USA, supported by Japan and several other ASEAN nations, has been making a singlehanded policy offensive against China, and almost no support has been received from European nations -- especially those in NATO. I strongly believe that since this issue is a matter of fundamental interpretation of traditional Maritime International Law, and UNCLOS, Japan and UK should cooperate closely to promote European nations' support for the "Freedom of Navigation" Issue. If we fail to influence China on this subject, the future of world-wide maritime and seafaring activities will be seriously jeopardized.

Summary

In my presentation, international cooperation at sea, from a Japanese point of view, where the Japan-USA Alliance has been a core element of its national security, has been discussed. In this process, the history and current status of cooperation between JMSDF and the Royal Navy was touched upon. Bilateral operations and exercises with Royal Navy, of which the size and frequency are normally small and few, have still provided precious opportunities to improve the operational capability of JMSDF.

Especially, taking full advantage of occasional visits of surface ships and nuclear power submarines (SSNs) of the Royal Navy to Japan, JMSDF has appreciated the unique operational experience gained through these exercises. They were a little different experiences and lessons compared to those from training with U.S. Naval

forces stationed in Japan. For example, an exercise with Royal Navy's surface ships provided some strong contrasts to JMSDF's exercise with the big-deck aircraft carrier strike group (CVSG) of U.S. Navy, which has been forward deployed to Japanese ports since the early 1970s. USS Midway arrived in Yokosuka in 1973, and was subsequently replaced by USS Independence, USS Kitty Hawk, and USS George Washington, respectively. JMSDF has become very familiar with how to operate with the CVSGs of U.S. Navy for many years; however, the experience of working with a surface task group, or even single ship, of the Royal Navy is a unique opportunity that JMSDF has had very few chances to receive in West-Pac waters.

In addition to these, when Japan deployed its JMSDF mine countermeasures (MCM) force to Kuwaiti waters in 1991, immediately after the end of the first Iraqi War, the Royal Navy's MCM on-scene units provided unforgettable support for our MCM force. At that time, JMSDF MCM ships badly need to receive a must-have type of magnetic field calibration prior to conducting actual clearance operations in a harmful mine field off of Kuwait. The only naval unit capable of conducting this calibration was the Royal Navy's MCM support range at Dubai. Despite the absence of diplomatic arrangements to conduct mutual military support, the Royal Navy unit there kindly granted short-notice request of JMSDF and provided perfect support for its ships. Without this calibration support, JMSDF's MCM operation off the coast of Kuwait could have ended in failure. This episode seems small and less visible than other large scale operations, however all JMSDF shipmates there, and in Japan at that time, really appreciated and applauded the true sense of solidarity as true seamen shown by sailors of Royal Navy.

Besides at-sea operations and exercises, navy-to-navy staff talks between Ichigaya and Whitehall provide another good opportunity to exchange various strategic views and opinions between two geographically separated navies, i.e. JMSDF in eastern waters off the Eurasian continent and Royal Navy in western waters off the continent. These exchanges really made up enough for their handicap of geographic separation.

By fully understanding these characteristics of JMSDF and the Royal Navy, a new concept or interpretation of 'Expeditionary Cooperation' for JMSDF and Royal Navy was discussed in this chapter. Then, two new concepts with their title, i.e. "Coalition built on a well-respected naval Kingdom" and "Promote European Nations' Active Support for "Freedom of Navigation"" were provided.

These are my thoughts, based on my experience and situational analysis from a 37-year-long experience in the JMSDF. These thoughts were also products of my involvement in both JMSDF-U.S. Navy and JMSDF-Royal Navy exchanges as an action officer and a senior staff in Tokyo from 1987 until retirement in 2008. I am more than happy if this presentation has been somewhat helpful and can provide a point of reference for all sailors of JMSDF and Royal Navy.

-----END-----

Note-1

`The Constitution of Japan`

<http://homepage3.nifty.com/constitution/materials/econst.html>

December 22, 2009

The new Constitution of Japan, which replaced old Meiji Constitution, was enacted on 3 November 1946 and was put in force on 3 May 1947 in occupied Japan. Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits Japan from having Armed Forces.

Article 9

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Interpretation of this Article 9 by GOJ is that the Constitution has banned a “war of aggression” not a “war of self defence.” And JSDF is a force so designed as to function only for self defence of the nation when attacked. In this regard, JSDF is purely a constitutional entity.

A collective view of Hatoyama-Cabinet* submitted on 22nd of Dec. 1954

* Ichiro Hatoyama: Grandfather of former Prime Minister of Japan “Yukio Hatoyama” of DPJ from September 2009 to June 2010.

Note-2

`Boei Handbook of 2009` (Hand Book for Defence 2009)

Tokyo: Asagumo Shibunshya, pp17, pp.19~50:

Since foundation of JSDF/JMSDF in 1954, defence strategy of Japan has been constructed on Japan-USA Alliance. Article 4 of the Basic Policy for National Defence which was adopted by National Defence Council and approved by the Cabinet on 20 May 1957 had clearly stated that defence policy of Japan should be based on this strategy.

Then, following 3 major defence documents, National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) of 1977, NDPO for 1996 and National defence Program Guideline (NDPG) for 2005 and after, commonly stated following factors as basis of national security and defence.

1. Capability of JSDF.
2. Japan-U.S.A. Alliance

Note-3

`Home page of Ministry of Defence of Japan`

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/hokyushien/pdf/siryou_080311.pdf

<http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/oef/info/p20091109oef.pdf>

December 22, 2009

As of 31 October 2009, record of Replenishment at Sea (RAS) from JMSDF units deployed in Northern Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to RAN ships are 43 times for ship fuel, 2 for fresh water and 6 for aviation (helicopters) fuel. These are about 5% of total number of RAS conducted by JMSDF units. Number of RAS to USN ships is about 40% of total. There are 12 navies which have received support from

JMSDF units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom during 8 years period from December 2001 to October 2009.