

# Policy Recommendations by the Quadripartite Commission on the Indian Ocean Regional Security

Towards a more stable security environment  
in the Indian Ocean region





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in the Indian Ocean region

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation  
in cooperation with  
Australian National University  
Vivekananda International Foundation  
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA



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Printed at Urban Connections Co., Ltd.

# Foreword

In its international approach, Japan has in recent years adopted the basic philosophy of “Value Oriented Diplomacy,” based on universal values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law, and the market economy. It has expanded the circle of freedom to the Indo-Pacific region in an effort to form a rich and stable area based on the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept. Undoubtedly, when the entirety of the Indo-Pacific region is viewed in geopolitical terms, the Indian Ocean region that lies within it functions as an axis for international politics, economics and security.

Recognizing that stabilizing the security environment in the Indian Ocean region is extremely important for peace, prosperity and the sustainable development of international society, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan invited the Vivekananda Foundation of India, the National Security College of the Australia National University, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation U.S.A. to form the ‘Quadripartite Commission on Indian Ocean Regional Security,’ which convened for international conferences in February 2017 and February 2018. The participant organizations reflected independent ‘second track’ viewpoints from four nations with significant stakes and involvement in the Indian Ocean region and with shared democratic values.

This policy recommendation was created by the representatives of the organizations from four different nations, based on the results of the commission’s research, and reflects their personal position.

The content of this policy recommendation does not indicate the views of the respective nations or specific organizations to which the members of the commission belong.



## Indian Ocean Area



Source: University of Texas Libraries

[https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands\\_oceans\\_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg](https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg)

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## **Preface**

### **The Growth of the Indian Ocean Region**

The global center of economic growth is shifting from East Asia to the Indian Ocean region. The GDP growth rate of the Indian Ocean region countries was remarkable, exceeding that of other developing areas and reaching 7.0% in 2015 and 6.6% in 2016. Furthermore, it is expected to grow at 7.3% in 2017. India's GDP has continued to increase by an average of 6.5% per year since 1990. Accordingly, direct overseas investment in Indian Ocean countries increased by 22% to 50 billion US\$ in 2015. Of this total, 44 billion US\$ was invested in India alone. Arguably, the Indian Ocean region supports the global economy, and the Indian Ocean region economy gives impetus to that of India.

As regards population figures, South Asia was home to 1.823 billion people in 2015, accounting for a quarter of the total world population. According to some estimates, by the year 2030 this number will have further increased by 324 million people. A large percentage of this population will be young: the most populous age group will be 29.6 years old. The percentage of the population in the labor force increased from 63.5% in 2010 to 65.0% in 2015, providing a strong human foundation supporting economic growth.

### **The Origins and Current State of Maritime Eurasia**

The Indian Ocean region is characterized as an oceanic zone, and its sea lanes form an aorta supporting the logistics of the global economy. In different phases of history, the Indian Ocean has linked India as well as the Arab world commercially to Southeast and East Asia. In line with European expansion, the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean channeled resources from Asia to the West. The post-Cold War globalization of economic activity is also transforming the economically growing Indian Ocean region into a global market.

The total area of the Indian Ocean covers 21,400,000 square nautical miles, accounting for about 14% of the earth's ocean area. Connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Pacific through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca/Singapore, the Indian Ocean occupies a highly strategically important geographical position that affects the politics, economics and security of the world at large.

### **Energy Routes and Safety in the Indian Ocean**

The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean form the world's largest route for trade and energy flows, which are the driving force for all economic activity.

An estimated 100,000 vessels, including crude oil tankers, LNG tankers, and container ships, are currently in service in the Indian Ocean. The energy resources that they transport are vital to the economy of the Asian countries and the rest of the world. This makes the Indian Ocean a zone of strategic importance not only to China but also to the major economies of the Indo-Pacific. Almost 80% of the world's oil tankers sail across the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Straits of Malacca/Singapore. Global crude oil transport is continually increasing, and it is predicted that it will rise from 38.8 Mb/d in 2014 to 44.6 Mb/d in 2040, influenced greatly by economic growth in the Asian region. Energy demand in non-OECD countries in Asia is projected to increase by 60% from 2013 to 2040. Crude oil demand

in the Asian region is estimated to increase by 70% to 82% from 2014 to 2040.

The Indian Ocean region is both a transit route and an increasingly important collective economy in its own right. It is vast, and the straits within it that act as choke points either belong to the territorial seas of several countries or are international straits. In order to stabilize the security environment in the Indian Ocean, the cooperation not only of the Indian Ocean region countries but also of other countries will be indispensable.

Currently, non-state actors engaged in illegal acts such as piracy/armed robbery, terrorist attacks, drug trafficking/illegal trafficking, illegal fishing etc, are a threat to security in the Indian Ocean region. The frequent occurrence of natural disasters caused by cyclones and refugee problems such as that of the Rohingya, are other security issues. Moreover, if storm surges and sea level rises caused by global warming cause damage to the coastal areas of South Asian countries, their governments will face major economic and social pressures.

There are long-standing rivalries and territorial disputes in the region between India and China, and between India and Pakistan. In recent years there have been incidents such as the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 and periodic reports of Chinese incursions across the lines separating the forces from the two countries. However, there is no indication that the countries involved are preparing for large-scale armed conflict to settle the issues between them.

### **The Power Balance and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’**

Though it is uncertain how successful China will be in achieving its huge ambitions, its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), even if executed only in part, has the potential to cause a fundamental shift in the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean rim as well as on the Asian landmass, extending to Europe through the planned infrastructure links to boost trade and investment with the European Union and the Balkans. The maritime dimension of the BRI is linked to its continental dimension across Eurasia through the corridors in Pakistan and Myanmar. Even if the initiative is projected as one intended solely to expand trade and economic development, with the planned investments, China’s influence in Central Asia and South Asian countries, including Pakistan and Myanmar, will strengthen and the power balance in the Indian Ocean region will become more fluid. This, in turn, will exacerbate rivalries and sow the seeds of new inter-state disputes involving the big powers as well as the regional ones. In this context, countries that share values such as democracy, the market economy and a rule-based international order will need to coordinate more closely to manage the disruptions that accompany these changes.

### **The Need for International Efforts to Stabilize the Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region**

In 2007, during the first term of his administration, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave an address to the Indian parliament entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas.” In this address, he quoted Swami Vivekananda, the great Indian spiritual leader: *“The different streams, having their sources in different places, all mingle their water in the sea.”* Abe continued, stating: *“We are now at a point at which the “Confluence of the Two Seas” is coming into being,”* and concluded by saying: *“The Pacific and Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. Japanese diplomacy is now promoting various*

*concepts in a host of different areas so that a region called the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity will be formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent.”*

Nine years later, in 2016, Prime Minister Abe presented the strategic concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” in his opening speech at the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development. The expression “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region,” previously used by the leaders of other countries at the ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit in 2017, has now become current as a concept.

U.S. President Donald Trump also announced at the APEC Summit in November 2017 that he “will make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” and described this as the “Indo-Pacific dream.”

As the nations with a great deal of involvement in the Indian Ocean region and that share common values including respect for democracy, human rights, and freedom, Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. should be key players for ensuring the security, sustainable development and prosperity of the Indian Ocean.

Recognizing the above, on behalf of the Australia-India-Japan-US Quadripartite Commission on Indian Ocean Regional Security, we propose the following policies.

The Representatives of the Australia-India-Japan-US Quadripartite Commission on Indian Ocean Regional Security:

Nobuo Tanaka, Chairman, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Chair)

Rory Medcalf, Head of College, National Security College, ANU

Kanwal Sibal, Member, VIF Advisory Council, VIF

Dennis Blair, Chairman, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA



## Policy Recommendations

### – Towards Construction of a Stable Security Environment and Peaceful Development in the Indian Ocean Region –

*With the globalization of economic activity after the Cold War* and emergence of the U.S. as the most powerful international player, the Indian Ocean became a theatre of economic activity for various regional and international powers, and also presented a range of security concerns. The region has seen cooperation in areas such as suppressing piracy, the use of the oceans for terrorist purposes such as the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and LTTE activity around Sri Lanka, illegal use of the waters for smuggling, piracy and illegal fishing, and concern on the part of many of the littoral countries regarding threats to their coasts. More recently, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative plans and the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti have caused concern. Given the multiplicity of players involved, there are no agreed regimes that govern the use of the Indian Ocean. Although India has helped stabilize the security environment, the Indian Ocean is vast and a power vacuum exists in some areas. What kind of ocean use paradigm should be adopted in the Indian Ocean with the current risk of the security environment becoming more fluid? An appropriate response, grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is required from the countries that share interests in the Indian Ocean.

*From a global perspective*, the Indian Ocean meets the Atlantic Ocean through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, while at the same time connecting the routes to the seas of East Asia and the Pacific through the Straits of Malacca/Singapore and the Indonesian archipelago.

The Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are drawing closer due to the continual ice-melt in the Arctic Ocean. The Indian Ocean, with its role in the expansion of the world economy, is the central buckle of the blue belt that circles the Eurasian Continent.

It is essential to think of the “New Era of the Indian Ocean” as not being limited solely to the Indian Ocean region, rather, we must take a broader perspective that views the Indian Ocean as an integral part of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”.

*The security threats in the Indian Ocean*, such as piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism, originate primarily from non-state actors. The multinational anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions are producing results, but there are still occasional acts of piracy in Southeast Asian waters.

And as regards maritime terrorism, we have seen little activity since the suicide bombing attacks by Al Qaeda on the US Navy destroyer ‘Cole’ at the port of Aden in 2000, counter-terrorism operations at sea by multinational forces following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 in which Islamic terrorists travelled to Mumbai by sea in order to carry out the attacks. The end of the Sri Lankan civil war brought LTTE maritime terrorism to an end.

However, terrorists with maritime capabilities still exist, such as the militants in the southern Philippines. In addition, while the forces of the Islamic State have lost ground rapidly, terrorist acts by Islamic extremists

continue in Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere. We should remain vigilant about the maritime threat posed by violent extremists linking forces with militant anti-government or separatist groups and targeting vessels and harbors in the Indian Ocean.

***In the area of non-military threats***, Illegal Unregulated Unreported Fishing (IUUF) is coming into focus as a threat to fishermen and national economies. A report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) states that 50% of fishery resources are overfished. Overfishing destroys ecosystems, which in turn threatens human lives.

Natural disasters such as cyclones and storm surges in the Indian Ocean are also security issues in a broad sense. According to some theories, natural disasters are increasing in frequency because of climate change. In this sense, coping with climate change should also be considered in the framework of security.

As these threats cause harm and damage beyond national borders, they necessarily require multilateral efforts across national borders.

***At the present moment***, the Indian Ocean is showing no signs of an imminent large-scale inter-state armed conflict. However, terrorism that crosses borders and poses a danger to other countries is a probable scenario that could lead to armed conflict between states. If terrorists frequently enter another country by sea, an armed conflict could arise between the state attacked and the state hosting the terrorists.

Given that there is little likelihood of large-scale armed conflict between countries at the present moment, preventive security measures to avoid dangers such as those outlined above should be considered.

***Even greater attention should be paid*** to the change in the global power balance caused by China's entry into the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative is the driving force behind China's entry into this area. The Belt and Road initiative is presented as a project for economic development, and countries that receive Chinese capital generally perceive it in developmental, rather than geopolitical terms. However, when a new and powerful country like China increases its diplomatic, economic and military presence in a region, there is bound to be uncertainty and friction. The response needs to be inclusive, cooperative and rule-based, and grounded in the realities of a multipolar region where the rights and interests of all nations need to be respected.

If the interests of the major powers are affected, the power balances in the region will inevitably become more fluid, affecting the strategic environment as well. If Chinese naval vessels regularly make calls at ports along the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" and establish bases there, the security environment will change drastically. As the Indian Ocean region is the growth center of the world economy, a power shift amongst the major powers in the region will inevitably lead to a change in the global power balance.

China's current strategy is to establish a powerful commercial presence in critical ports in the Indian Ocean such as Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan, Djibouti - a key point in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait - and the neighboring Doraleh. Currently the PLA Navy has only one base, in Djibouti, but China controls areas hosting commercial ports, hence it has the potential to provide logistic support and even full military support at a network of ports

spread across the Indian Ocean. If the PLA navy is able to draw on military logistic support at these ports, the security environment in the Indian Ocean will change dramatically.

**In view of the above, the following recommendations are presented;**

\* \* \* \*

### **For Diplomacy**

***Diplomatically,*** Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. recognize the fundamental importance of an Indo-Pacific region defined by a rule-based order and principles of freedom and openness. They believe also in the strong relationship among the four nations. All four nations are paying increasingly greater attention to the Indo-Pacific region, partly out of concern that China's economic and military initiatives in the region will affect their interests.

Freedom and safety of navigation is of vital interest to all the nations in the Indo-Pacific. In order to maintain the stability of the Indo-Pacific sea lanes, which are vital for the world economy and civic life, a common understanding for the "rule of law" based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should be firmly secured among user states and coastal states. As regards the "rule of law", in addition to UNCLOS and its related arrangements, regional arrangements/agreements, and applicable international laws, judgments and awards of international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea should be observed.

The Indo-Pacific has enormous infrastructure needs for economic development. Infrastructure investment in the region should be welcomed from all sources, so long as it is on the basis of responsible debt financing practices, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment. In addition, economic projects should ensure alignment with local economic and development strategies, safety, resilience, social impact, and job creation as well as capacity building for the local communities. The proposed economic corridors through Pakistan and Myanmar and port projects in Sri Lanka and Maldives pose special risks to these principles.

### **Recommendation 1:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with the aim of supporting a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region" which recognizes the central and growing importance of the Indian Ocean.

### **Recommendation 2:**

Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. should maintain the momentum of high-level Quad consultation that has begun, and progressively move it to the political level.

**Recommendation 3:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should work with other partners to oppose the establishment of permanent Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean region. This should include demonstrating to China that its security needs can be met through cooperation and consultation with other nations and without recourse to a disruptive unilateral military presence.

**Recommendation 4:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should work with the countries in the Indian Ocean region to help them maintain independent security and economic policies by supporting high-quality alternatives to unilateral Chinese investments and political alignment with Chinese regional objectives.

**Recommendation 5:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with or support the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and other regional frameworks in the Indian Ocean and South Asia.

They should also encourage interest by ASEAN and ASEAN-centric institutions, such as the East Asia Summit, in contributing to the security of the Indian Ocean as part of the wider Indo-Pacific.

**Recommendation 6:**

Australia, India, and the U.S. should encourage the establishment of a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea – an area of critical importance in the Indo-Pacific region – and assist maritime ASEAN countries to strengthen their capacity to enforce their rights and obligations under UNCLOS.

**Recommendation 7:**

While discouraging a unilateral military role for China, Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should involve China in diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of navigation through critical energy routes, including in the Persian Gulf.

**For Economy, Environment and Humanitarian Security**

*Economically*, India and Japan have positioned their bilateral relations as a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” at the September 2014 Summit Meeting, and in December 2015 laid out guidelines for cooperation up to 2025 in “Japan India Vision 2025.” Based on these guidelines, they have been building close relations through the construction of the Chabahar port in Iran, joint support for Sri Lanka and projects such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.

In November 2017, Australia brought out its “Foreign Policy White Paper,” which states its intention to work for a safe, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region based on networks of partnership.

*The growing economic activities in the Indian Ocean are accompanied by* overfishing and destruction of the environment, which create risks for the sustainable development of the region. Cyclones and high tides



often cause damage to the civic life and infrastructure of the Indian Ocean region, necessitating Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations by multinational rescue forces. But, in many cases, multinational forces dispatched on rescue missions cannot always work effectively as there are no agreed “Standard Operational Procedures” (SOP) to guide their functioning.

**Recommendation 8:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should jointly encourage and wherever possible participate in high-quality infrastructure development that meets the required financial, environmental and social standards.

**Recommendation 9:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should take coordinated action within multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to ensure that infrastructure investment follow high standards.

**Recommendation 10:**

Japan and the U.S. should consider participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to encourage high standards by projects involving China and to build further their economic cooperation with others, including Australia and India.

**Recommendation 11:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should begin consultations on a future comprehensive and collective energy strategy in Asia.

**Recommendation 12:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should collectively encourage user states and coastal states to formulate appropriate policies and provide technical assistance for the “blue economy” and green development.

**Recommendation 13:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should build on the experience of the December 2004 tsunami relief operation and be prepared to form the core of multinational forces at the time of a large-scale disaster, with combined planning and exercises to this end. The four nations should be prepared to act inclusively with other nations in such work, including China, the ROK and key ASEAN and European partners. The four nations should coordinate in their provision of capacity building, equipment and technology related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

**For Defense and Security**

*Security threats from non-state actors* include piracy, smuggling, IUUF and cyber attacks. Natural disasters are also a threat. Fundamental to international cooperation to deal with all these threats is a shared

picture of the location and identity of vessels in the Indian Ocean, often called Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA. For example, one possibility could be to expand the roles and functions of the “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)”. It would be a good idea to implement MDA widely in the Indo-Pacific Ocean, without limiting efforts to the Indian Ocean.

In addition to lacking maritime domain awareness, many coastal states in the Indian Ocean have insufficient capacity to crack down on illegal activities. At the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Vientiane, Laos on 16 November 2016, discussions were held on providing support for capacity building by hosting international law seminars concerning the oceans, HA/DR, defense equipment and technical support.

*As its naval power grows*, China is playing a more prominent and assertive role in the Indo-Pacific region. In the South China Sea, this disruptive unilateralism is most apparent in support of extravagant maritime claims. China’s ambitious naval expansion will give it the capability to increase its maritime forces in the Indian Ocean substantially. For their part, the four nations will have to increase their force deployments and cooperate with a growing range of other partners to balance the destabilizing impact of a larger Chinese presence. Japan is widely recognized as having an extremely defense-oriented policy for its national security. However, in view of the importance of the economy and sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, Japan will need to increase the long-range operational capability and deployment of its naval fleet, including its submarines.

**Recommendation 14:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should join forces to increase Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) of security threats, and provide assistance to other coastal states to participate in a regional common operational picture in order to deal with non-state security threats. This could include improved access to each other’s naval and air bases and facilities.

**Recommendation 15:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should work with others to further support capacity building for maritime law enforcement in coastal states around the Indian Ocean.

**Recommendation 16:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should work with other states to conduct activities such as convening international law seminars to explain and disseminate the principles of law-based behavior in the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific.

**Recommendation 17:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should conduct an annual planning conference to achieve maximum effect from the maritime operations of all four nations. This would include more frequent information exchanges and exercises, especially in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare operations, shipping defense and submarine exercises.

**Recommendation 18:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should enhance sea lane defense capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Each nation will need to make judgments about its capabilities based on its interests. For instance, naval fleets will need to evolve to allow increasingly long-range operations. This may require consideration in Japan of new options such as nuclear propulsion for its submarines.

**Recommendation 19:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should explore possibilities of mutual logistical support to increase the total maritime operations in the Indian Ocean.

**Recommendation 20:**

In order to build stronger quadrilateral maritime defense capability in the Indian Ocean, India and the U.S. should invite Australia to participate in the Malabar naval exercises. The four nations should also consider inviting other countries that share maritime interests to this cooperative group.



## **Summary of the Policy Recommendations to Australia, India, Japan, the United States**

### **For Diplomacy**

#### **Recommendation 1:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with the aim of supporting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region” which recognizes the central and growing importance of the Indian Ocean.

#### **Recommendation 2:**

Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. should maintain the momentum of high-level Quad consultation that has begun, and progressively move it to the political level.

#### **Recommendation 3:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should work with other partners to oppose the establishment of permanent Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean region. This should include demonstrating to China that its security needs can be met through cooperation and consultation with other nations and without recourse to a disruptive unilateral military presence.

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#### **Recommendation 5:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with or support the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and other regional frameworks in the Indian Ocean and South Asia.

They should also encourage interest from ASEAN and ASEAN-centric institutions, such as the East Asia Summit, in contributing to the security of the Indian Ocean as part of the wider Indo-Pacific.

#### **Recommendation 6:**

Australia, India, and the U.S. should encourage establishing a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea – an area of critical importance in the Indo-Pacific region – and assist maritime ASEAN countries to strengthen their capacity to enforce their rights and obligations under UNCLOS.

**Recommendation 7:**

While discouraging a unilateral military role by China, Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should involve China in diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of navigation in critical energy routes, including those in the Persian Gulf.

**For Economy, Environment and Humanitarian Security****Recommendation 8:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should together encourage and wherever possible participate in high-quality infrastructure development that meets the required financial, environmental and social standards.

**Recommendation 9:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should take coordinated action within multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to ensure that infrastructure investment follow high standards.

**Recommendation 10:**

Japan and the U.S. should consider participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to encourage high standards by projects involving China and to build further their economic cooperation with others, including Australia and India.

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## **For Defense and Security**

### **Recommendation 14:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should join forces to increase Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) of security threats, and provide assistance to other coastal states to participate in a regional common operational picture to deal with non-state security threats. This could include improved access to each other's naval and air bases and facilities.

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### **Recommendation 19:**

Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. should explore possibilities of mutual logistical support to increase the total maritime operations in the Indian Ocean.

### **Recommendation 20:**

In order to build stronger Quadrilateral maritime defense capability in the Indian Ocean, India and the U.S. should invite Australia to participate in the Malabar naval exercises. The four nations should also consider inviting other countries that share maritime interests in this cooperative.





## **List of Participants in the International Conference**

**(Held on 6th and 7th February, 2017 (FY2016) and on 22nd and 23rd February, 2018 (FY2017))**

### **India**

Gen NC Vij (Retd), Director VIF (FY2016)

Amb. Kanwal Sibal, Member, VIF Advisory Council, VIF

Lt General R K Sawhney, Dean, Centre for Defence Studies, VIF (FY2016)

Commodore Gopal Suri, Senior Fellow, VIF (FY2016)

Commodore Somen Banerjee, Senior Fellow, VIF (FY2017)

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, Visiting Professor and Senior Fellow, Gujarat National Law University

Ms. Madhumita Kothari, Research Fellow & Coordinator, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (FY2016)

Dr. Meena Singh Roy, Research Fellow and Coordinator, West Asia Centre (FY2016)

Rajorshi Roy, Researcher, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (FY2016)

### **Australia**

Prof. Rory Medcalf, Head of College, National Security College, ANU

Dr. David Brewster, Senior Research Fellow, National Security College, ANU

Dr. Jennifer S. Hunt, Lecturer, National Security College, ANU (FY2016)

Dr. Anthony Bergin, Senior Research Fellow, National Security College, ANU (FY2016)

Dr. Benjamin Herscovitch, Sea Power Centre – Australia (FY2017)

### **U.S.**

Adm. Dennis C. Blair, Chairman, SPF-USA

Amb. James Zumwalt, Chief Executive Officer, SPF-USA (FY2017)

Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt (retired), Senior Fellow, Center for Naval Analyses (FY2017)

Ms. Nilanthi Samaranayake, Analyst, Center for Naval Analyses (FY2016)

### **Japan**

Amb. Yasukuni Enoki, Former Ambassador of Japan to India

Professor Jun Arima, Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo (FY2016)

Professor Makoto Kojima, Professor Emeritus, Takushoku University (FY2016)

Capt. Takuya Shimodaira, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies (FY2017)

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Mr. Nobuo Tanaka, Chairman, SPF

Ms. Junko Chano, Executive Director, SPF (FY2017)

Mr. Takashi Nishigata, Director, Project Planning and Development Office for International Security (FY2016)

Mr. Masataka Saburi, Director, International Peace and Security Department (FY2017)

Mr. Tsuyoshi Murakami, Program Director, Pacific Island Nations Program, International Peace and Security Department (FY2017)

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