

Policy Proposals for Implementing “Proactive Contributions to Peace” II

For a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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**Sasakawa Peace Foundation
International Peace and Security Department**

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For a Free and Open Indo-Pacific**

Table of Contents

PREFACE	i
Executive Summary	iii
Main Text	
Proposal 1, Security Strategy	1
Proposal 1-1, Japan should revise its National Security Strategy (Akiko Fukushima)	1
Proposal 1-2, Japan should have a security strategy for the Indo-Pacific (Hideshi Tokuchi)	2
Proposal 1-3, Japan should formulate a regional security strategy that accounts for the sub-regional differences in the Indo-Pacific (Noboru Yamaguchi)	5
Proposal 2, International Security Cooperation	8
Proposal 2-1, Japan should develop a strategy for international security cooperation (Koichiro Bansho)	9
<Column 1>, Japan and international peace cooperation activities: legal frameworks and developing missions (Koichiro Bansho)	11
Proposal 2-2, Japan should develop and implement a Capacity Building Assistance Charter (Akiko Fukushima)	12
<Column 2>, Challenges confronting current UN peace operations (Akiko Fukushima) ...	15
Proposal 2-3, Japan should develop human resources for international security cooperation, and promote diverse and multi-layered criteria for deployments (Koichiro Bansho)	18
Proposal 2-4, Japan should expand budgets and implementation mechanisms to pursue proactive security cooperation (Ippeita Nishida)	21
Proposal 2-5, Japan should establish a center of excellence (COE) to make greater use of expertise gained by Self-Defense Force personnel from participation in UN Peacekeeping (Ippeita Nishida)	23
Proposal 2-6, Japan should advance the exchange of research and education on international peace operations and promote its image to the world by creating a chair for peace operations at UN University, developing a network of think tanks around the world and becoming the center of international peace operations research (Akiko Fukushima)	25

Proposal 2-7, Japan should coordinate with other countries to strengthen aid for maritime law enforcement capacity in littoral states in the South China Sea (Susumu Nakamura)..... 26

Proposal 3, Space operations

Japan should advance space operations and lead other countries in the field. (Toshimichi Nagaiwa)..... 28

Proposal 4, Personnel system for JSDF service personnel

Japan should address the shortage of critical personnel in the JSDF by introducing a new system to recruit service personnel not only through the efforts of the Ministry of Defense (J-MOD) and the JSDF, but through a whole-government effort. Additionally, the treatment of JSDF service personnel should be improved. (Yoji Koda) 31

Proposal 5, Information strategy

Japan should understand the significance of and establish mechanisms for strategic communications. (Tsuneo Watanabe) 36

PREFACE

This proposal is the second and final installment of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation's Policy Proposal for Implementing "Proactive Contribution to Peace" project. Like its predecessor, the September 2018 report "Strengthening Japan's Defense System," this document presents high-priority policies designed to implement the government's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" doctrine, which was laid out in the 2013 National Security Strategy.

The previous report, which was published before December 2018 revisions to the National Defense Program Guidelines, focused on Japan's territorial security. This set of proposals is about international security cooperation.

Although the notion of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" was first defined in the 2013 National Security Strategy, its importance continues to grow. The broader concept, however, still lacks specific policies. As a result, revisions to the 2013 National Security Strategy are under consideration.

The Trump administration, which entered office in 2017 with the slogan of "America First," is asking Japan for more active "international security cooperation" in two different ways.

In one, Japan's security cooperation with states in the Indo-Pacific is becoming a more important part of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In 2018 the U.S. Department of Defense announced its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," similar to Japan's own "Vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific." In this strategy, the DOD explained why the U.S. should work with important actors in the Indo-Pacific to support the existing regional order and rules, and to oppose China's expanding influence. Expectations of partners such as Southeast Asia, South Asia and Pacific Islands are spelled out in detail. As an ally, Japan is also expected to play a large role.

The second way is a reaction to the Trump administration's policies. In line with its slogan of "America First," the administration is reducing U.S. military and political involvement around the world and adopting an inward-looking posture. This shift is not only due to President Trump's personal inclinations, but it also reflects fatigue among some of the American public from many years of military engagement around the world. With the U.S.' inward turn becoming clearer, there are growing calls for Japan, the world's third largest economy, to do more to support the international order. This is not simply a matter of international contributions. For Japan, a country that has profited greatly from the international order, it is an issue of vital national interest.

However, direct participation in international operations has been limited. While the law was revised in 2015 to allow for more flexibility in joining UN PKO, the last JSDF dispatch to such a mission was the South Sudan in 2016. There are many reasons for this, including

growing concern in Japan about participation in UN PKO, domestic political factors and limits and contradictions in the present law.

This document does not suggest that Japan should simply increase its participation in UN PKO. Rather it asserts that precisely because there are political, financial and capacity constraints in Japan's cooperation on international security, it should strategically execute policy by carefully using limited resources, while also working to ease existing restrictions as much as possible.

For example, the expertise of JSDF engineering units that have participated in UN PKO is a great asset, and they are training other countries that currently send UN PKO dispatches. To better understand these assets and to use them to greater effect, this report proposes that a center of excellence be established in Japan. Then, even if JSDF units themselves could not participate in UN PKO, Japan could effectively contribute within existing constraints.

To effectively execute this kind of specific policy, this report proposes revising the National Security Strategy and formulating a new plan for a Capacity Building Assistance Charter. It also suggests securing talented personnel for the JSDF to address both policy bottlenecks and a severe shortage of human resources.

The views and proposals in this report are those of the participating authors, though they reflect lengthy debate and consideration within the project team. The views of all authors are personal, and do not reflect their affiliated organizations, past or present. The authors would be grateful if the proposals here can be of any help to Japan's international security policy.

Tsuneo Watanabe, Project Leader

**Policy Proposals for Implementing
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Executive Summary

Implementing International Security Cooperation through Proactive Contributions to Peace

A New National Security Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Era

- A strategy should be formulated to support the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific, and Japan's National Security Strategy (2013) must be revised to reflect that
- The strategy should, account for sub-regional differences, and that should be reflected in a new national security strategy

A Strategy for International Security Cooperation

- The current National Security Strategy as written is sound, but because specific implementation mechanisms have not been systematized, an expanded definition for conventional "international peace cooperation" and an "international security strategy" need to be included in a new national security strategy
- To address various problems associated with UN PKO, personnel development and training in allied countries should be an urgent priority, and the JSDF's expertise should be expanded to aid in capacity building elsewhere
- Japan has provided aid for capacity building to littoral states in the South China Sea for the enforcement of maritime norms, but this must be strengthened to respond to the speed at which China is changing the status quo there
- To effectively manage aid for capacity building, and to strategically transmit the outcomes domestically and abroad, a Capacity Building Assistance Charter should be laid out

International Cooperation in Space and Securing Talented Personnel for JSDF

- Japan should lead other countries in advancing activities related to space as a public good for the Indo-Pacific, such as monitoring space and maritime conditions using satellites
- Japan must develop talented personnel to carry out security cooperation, and expanded budgetary measures and policies to secure them from all of Japanese society are urgently needed due to the severe staffing shortage in the JSDF

Information Strategy

- To transmit information about international security cooperation and to counter fake news, Japan should create a system for executing strategic communications

Proposals

Proposal 1, Proposals for a security strategy

- 1) Japan should revise its National Security Strategy
- 2) Japan should have a security strategy for the Indo-Pacific
- 3) Japan should formulate a regional security strategy that accounts for the sub-regional differences in the Indo-Pacific

Proposal 2, Proposals for international security cooperation

- 1) Japan should develop a strategy for international security cooperation
- 2) Japan should develop and implement a Capacity Building Assistance Charter
- 3) Japan should develop personnel for international security cooperation, and promote diverse and multi-layered criteria for deployments
- 4) Japan should expand budgets and implementation mechanisms for “promoting proactive security cooperation”
- 5) Japan should establish a center of excellence to make greater use of the JSDF’s expertise gained through UN PKO
- 6) Japan should advance the exchange of research and education on international peace operations and promote its image to the world by creating a chair for peace operations at UN University, developing a network of think tanks around the world and becoming the center of international peace operations research
- 7) Japan should coordinate with other countries to strengthen aid for maritime law enforcement capacity in littoral states in the South China Sea

Proposal 3, Proposal for space operations

Japan should advance space operations and lead other countries in the field

Proposal 4, Personnel system for Japan Self-Defense Forces officers

Japan should address the shortage of critical personnel in the JSDF by introducing a system to recruit officers from all of Japanese society, raising salaries and improving treatment of service members

Proposal 5, Proposal for an information strategy

Japan should understand the significance of and establish mechanisms for strategic communication

**Policy Proposals for Implementing
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Main Text

Proposal 1 , Security Strategy

Proposal 1-1 , Japan should revise its National Security Strategy

The “National Security Strategy,” announced in December 2013, was intended to guide Japan’s security policy for the following 10 years. The basic ideas therein are still sound, but the security environment surrounding Japan has become significantly more complex. The National Defense Program Guidelines, also issued in December 2013, were revised in December 2018. The government should similarly consider revising the National Security Strategy earlier than originally anticipated to proactively address future challenges.

Important Points of Revising the National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy lays out the government’s thinking in three fields: national security, regional security and global security. These can be further broken down into many discrete parts, but the following general points should be considered.

- 1) The Japan-U.S. alliance is still the cornerstone of Japan’s national security, but there has been criticism of the alliance’s “asymmetry,” such as U.S. President Donald Trump’s statement that the alliance is “unfair” (June 2019). Japan need not overreact to this sentiment, but it does indicate the need for research into how the alliance should function from here on, as well as into specific precedents, simulations and legal provisions. Additionally, the National Security Strategy needs to take a wide-ranging approach to security, including a commitment to acquire capacity in new domains, such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, which were noted in the revised National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2018.
- 2) Regarding regional security, the focus has shifted from cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The importance of security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region has not been discussed much until now, including in countries outside the region, so Japan must clarify its approach in detail. The importance of the Indo-Pacific region will be discussed in proposal 1-2.
- 3) On global security, as Japan is attempting to implement its policy of Proactive Contributions to Peace, the government should include an independent section on international security cooperation in the National Security Strategy. Many in the international community are aware of what Japan cannot do when it comes to participation in activities like peacekeeping operations. However, there is insufficient understanding about what Japan can do, and what it is ready to do. It is crucial that Japan clarify and strategically

communicate what it will do for global security. An outline for a strategy for international security cooperation will be explained in greater detail in proposal 2-1.

Akiko Fukushima

Proposal 1-2 , Japan should have a security strategy for the Indo-Pacific

The issues in the Indo-Pacific are not simply a matter of the U.S. against China, or the U.S. and Japan against China. They are a matter of the rules-based international order against authoritarianism by force. This situation cannot be viewed from the viewpoint of the Indo-Pacific alone, but for a maritime nation like Japan there is no question that the “Indo-Pacific” angle is important. At this juncture, Japan should revise its National Security Strategy to have its Indo-Pacific strategy.

1. From “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific”

The fundamental principle behind Japan’s national security is “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.” This was made clear in the 2013 “National Security Strategy.” At that time, terms like “the new Cold War” and “U.S.-China trade war” had not entered the common lexicon, the U.S. was rebalancing toward Asia under the Obama administration and the Modi administration had yet to arrive in India. China had not yet put forward its Belt and Road initiative, nor its New Asian Security Concept. The pro-China administration of President Ma Ying-jeou was still in power in Taiwan.

The 2013 National Security Strategy placed its emphasis on the “Asia-Pacific.” It focuses on the security environment of the “Asia-Pacific” influenced by the shift in the global balance of power in defining Japan’s ideals, national interests, national security objectives and the security environment surrounding Japan. The role and significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance are defined also primarily in the context of the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, the part on “enhancing the trust and cooperative relationship between Japan and its partners” is also based on the distinction between those in the Asia-Pacific and those outside of it.

However, the Indo-Pacific is rapidly substituting for the Asia-Pacific. The term “Indo-Pacific” appears in neither the 2013 National Security Strategy nor the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines. However, in the revised National Defense Program Guidelines issued at the end of 2018, the term “Asia-Pacific” is gone, replaced in every instance by “Indo-Pacific.” The role and significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance are now discussed also in the context of the Indo-Pacific and the alliance has been quietly redefined. Moreover, in the revised National Defense Program Guidelines, the promotion of “security cooperation” became a concept

grounded on the “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

2. The strategic concept of the “Indo-Pacific”

The “Indo-Pacific” is not only a geographic concept, but also a strategic one. In a speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi used the term “Indo-Pacific” with both strategic and geographic meanings. Japan needs to consider the idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as a strategic notion.

What is the “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” that the Japanese government has put forward? In the keynote speech at the 2016 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe laid out the thinking behind it, and the vision was subsequently outlined in the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Bluebook. The broad outline of the concept is somewhat visible, although its substance is not well articulated.

This vision includes the three main principles of 1) promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade, 2) the pursuit of economic prosperity, and 3) commitment to peace and stability. It has elements of a security strategy, but it is not comprehensive.

The U.S. too, even as the Trump administration tries to negate the policies of the Obama administration, had to “rebalance” to the region. In its 2017 National Security Strategy and in the Defense Department’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” issued in June 2019, the U.S. said that no country is excluded from its vision for the region, and yet it took a clearly more confrontational posture in labeling China and Russia as “revisionist powers.”

The Modi administration in India and the Morrison administration in Australia have also indicated they would be cooperative with the respective Indo-Pacific visions of Japan and the U.S., but their approaches are different from each other in nuance, which reflects their geographic circumstances and relations with China. The differences in their approaches are visible in the fact that while the four countries have created the Quad framework as a platform for their diplomatic coordination, they issue four separate documents with different points of emphasis, rather than a single unified document after each session of the Quad.

ASEAN, which worries about getting caught between the U.S. and China, had kept its distance from the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific strategy. However, in June 2019 it issued the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” based on its internal discussions. It is clear in this document that ASEAN emphasizes dialogue and cooperation, and stresses its centrality and economy. It is considerably different from the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific Strategy.

“Indo-Pacific” is today’s buzzword, but what Japan, the U.S., Australia, India and ASEAN respectively mean by this term naturally differs. Also, as indicated in “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” in which ASEAN means “the wider Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region”

by the “Indo-Pacific,” the Asia-Pacific has not lost its significance. The Asia-Pacific is a concept of bridging land and sea, whereas the Indo-Pacific is one of connecting the two oceans, i.e. the Indian and the Pacific. Japan also needs to consider which term more precisely describes the region’s distinctive feature.

Additionally, while the Indian Ocean seems outside ASEAN’s definition of the “Asia-Pacific,” that is not the general understanding of the “Asia-Pacific.” The “Indo-Pacific” represents the connectivity of maritime space, and thus is an attractive concept for a maritime nation like Japan. However, it alone is not enough. For example, it is not natural to consider the U.S.-centric network of alliances of the Asia-Pacific (formerly called the hub-and-spokes system), which includes the Japan-U.S. alliance, as the alliance network of the Indo-Pacific.

Japan needs to articulate what it will pursue under the banner of the “Indo-Pacific,” based on which Japan should establish a common strategic basis with relevant states including the U.S., Australia, India and the ASEAN countries.

3. The Necessity of a Japanese Strategy for the Indo-Pacific

Japan’s current defense policy is based on the new National Defense Program Guidelines, which were established in 2013 and revised in 2018. In explaining the major reasons for the 2018 revision, the Guidelines state that the “security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds,” and that “changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing.” They also state, “rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyber space and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.”

Today’s international security environment is acute, often described as “the new Cold War,” “competition of different political systems of governance” and “shaking of the liberal international order.” According to the Government of Japan at the time of the revision of the Guidelines, the security environment as a whole remains compatible with the basic recognition shown in the 2013 National Security Strategy. It would be necessary “to continue to watch medium- and long-term trends, though.”

It also states, “Japan’s ideals, national interests and national security objectives as defined in this strategy remain valid, and there is no change in the necessity and importance of the strategic approach.”

However, is this consistent with the recognition that the “realities of a security environment [Japan] has hitherto never faced,” as described in the 2018 Guidelines? Does this fact fall within the natural scope of the government’s notion as of 2013 that the U.S., previously the

propelling force of the rules-based liberal international order, is now disrupting that same order?

Strategy is a guide about where to go, from where and how to get there. Even if the destination or the way to it remains the same, the strategy needs to be reviewed if the starting point turns out to have been out of place.

The view of the Government of Japan that “the U.S. remains the country that has the world’s largest power as a whole,” is basically correct, and thus the approach of prioritizing the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to be appropriate. However, with significant changes continuing in the international society and in the U.S., the alliance will also naturally be changed. It is exactly in this sense that the alliance should be redefined in the context of the Indo-Pacific.

There are a number of people who point out visible discrepancies between the 2013 National Security Strategy and the revised National Defense Program Guidelines. What is now needed is not a quick fix to these discrepancies, but clear guidance for Japan on how to address “the realities of a security environment it has hitherto never faced.”

Hideshi Tokuchi

Proposal 1-3 , Japan should formulate a regional security strategy that accounts for the sub-regional differences in the Indo-Pacific

While continuing to work closely with the U.S. to create a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), Japan should formulate a security strategy for each area within the Indo-Pacific that accounts for the differing geopolitical and economic circumstances there.

1. The Necessity of Sub-Regional Security Strategies

Several areas constitute the Indo-Pacific: Northeast Asia, the West Pacific and the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East and East Africa. Each of these has their own unique geopolitical and economic features, and different actors wield influence in different regions. Japan therefore needs a different approach to security in each area.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is active in many of these places, and areas and economic sectors where cooperation with China is possible and desirable overlap with those where there is a high likelihood of confrontation. Additionally, many of these places are within the area previously called the “Arc of Instability,” so Japan must respond carefully to regional instability.

2. Accounting for each Area's Differences

(1) Northeast Asia

Denuclearization of North Korea remains the top priority here, so it is urgent to revive existing frameworks, such as the Six-Party Talks and UN resolutions. There also remains a need for cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and South Korea to remove the threat of North Korean military provocations, such as its nuclear weapons and missile programs. However, U.S.-South Korea relations, North-South Korea relations and Japan-South Korea relations are all changing more rapidly than ever before, and must be closely monitored.

(2) West Pacific and East China Sea

The dispute over the Senkaku Islands make Japan-China relations in this area unpredictable, but the balance of maritime security here is still advantageous to the U.S. and Japan, and deterrence is still functioning. For Taiwan, however, the situation is fraught. That said, political or military conflict would be unfavorable for China, so it should be possible to maintain the status-quo albeit in stalemate.

(3) South China Sea and the South Pacific

For Japan, maintaining free navigation in this area, which connects the country to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, is vitally important.

Unlike the West Pacific and the East China Sea, China can exercise significant influence over smaller states in the South China Sea, such as the ASEAN countries and Pacific island nations. The South China Sea is not large – about 2,000 kilometers north to south and 1,000 kilometers east to west – so problems of China's unlawful behavior could be prevented should the littoral countries try to enforce order in their respective surrounding waters and airspace. That means capacity building is very important for the security of ASEAN's maritime states.

China's actions in this area in recent years, such as building artificial islands and the provocative actions of the Chinese navy and maritime law enforcement agencies, have been criticized by many countries, including the U.S. They accuse China of challenging the "rules-based international order." In response, countries including the U.S., the U.K., France and Australia are engaging in so-called "freedom of navigation" exercises to deny China's claims and to clearly support the existing order. This trend should be welcomed.

The influence exerted on Pacific island states from outside the region has been particularly unsettling in recent years. Trends in the balance of political and economic influence, especially that held by Japan, the U.S., China and Australia, need to be closely monitored.

(4) Indian Ocean

In the Indian Ocean, states on the Indian subcontinent and Australia wield significant influence. In recent years, the construction of Chinese maritime facilities, the so-called “String of Pearls,” has sparked concern. Some worry that they could be put to military use in the future. But one should also keep in mind that those facilities are heavily influenced by the Indian navy, air force and medium-range ballistic missiles.

The strength of the U.S. navy will continue to be the most important factor in considering the presences of military forces in this area. The ongoing presences of the U.S., China, European states and Japan in the Somali Sea to support international anti-piracy missions will make clear both the possibilities for cooperation and the conflicts of interest.

(5) Middle East and East Africa

Sustainable economic growth is extremely important to this region. The region’s stability must first be secured, then economic growth stemming from sound investment can follow.

There are concerns that China’s influence is increasing through infrastructure investments related to the Belt and Road Initiative, which in some cases creates a so-called “debt trap.” Additionally, policy makers should keep in mind that that the stability necessary for growth will be eroded by unsustainable investment that leads to failed states.

3. Items to Consider when Formulating Sub-Regional Strategies

(1) Coordination with the U.S.

With the Japan-U.S. alliance functioning as an international public good, cooperation and coordination with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific is indispensable. In this, actors must be flexible in terms of leadership. It is not the case that the U.S. should take the lead in every initiative. Japan, for example, has a higher degree of flexibility in policy options when it comes to dealing with Myanmar, so it should lead there. Alternatively, sometimes it is more effective to have a regional actor, such as ASEAN or its individual member countries, assume leadership.

(2) Using Diverse Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Frameworks

The alliance with the U.S. continues to be Japan’s most important bilateral relationship.

However, multilateral frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus, and APEC have important roles to play in Japanese foreign policy. Minilateral frameworks of three or four countries have also proven effective. In executing a strategy and policy for FOIP, it is important to flexibly use these international structures, and in some cases multiple frameworks may overlap.

(3) Managing Relations with China

Japan's relationship with a rising China, and how to manage competition and coordination between China's Belt and Road Initiative and the FOIP are extremely important. In this, policy makers should bear in mind that in many cases there will be different degrees of receptivity to China between the U.S. and Japan, or between Japan and other friendly countries. Continued dialogue and exchanges of information about differences in attitude toward China, with the U.S. in particular, are indispensable. Moreover, there are opportunities to use these differences. For example, if there is an instance in which it is difficult for the U.S. to approach China, Japan instead could be the one to initiate dialogue.

(4) Cooperating with Security Partners Outside the Region

The growing interest of European countries, such as the U.K. and France, in the Indo-Pacific should be encouraged. It is particularly desirable that these countries contribute to supporting the "rules-based international order," especially freedom of navigation, and Japan should consider ways to cooperate with them.

4. Summary

Proposal 1-2 pointed out that Japan should have a "security strategy for the Indo-Pacific." The aim of this section is to serve as a starting point for breaking down this large geographic region into smaller units with their own strategies. Further debate will be needed from here.

Noboru Yamaguchi

Proposal 2 , International Security Cooperation
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Why Japan Needs a Strategy for International Security Cooperation

Peace operations, including UN peacekeeping operations, are an important element of Japan's participation in international security cooperation. Opinion polls in Japan consistently show public support for these activities. However, it is not possible to further develop these operations if reasons for Japanese participation are unclear. On that, the following three points are particularly important:

First, national security and international security are increasingly inseparable as globalization advances. Contributing to international peace and stability contributes to Japan's own security. Fulfilling Japan's international security obligations is thus not an act of charity, but rather a policy that supports Japan's national security.

Second, participating in international peace operations is appropriate for the world's third

largest economy and will help improve Japan's international standing. Other countries will be better disposed toward Japan if in the future it comes to need support from the rest of the world, or it wants to exercise leadership in international relations.

Third, Japan can develop a network of mutual trust with other countries and individuals by working with them in international security. Through these connections it could obtain the most up-to-date security intelligence, which would enable timelier policymaking. Additionally, participation in international peace operations, anti-piracy missions and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions would enable the JSDF to develop its own networks with the military forces of other countries. This would lead to improved interoperability, including command and control. This would be beneficial for Japan's national security in both peacetime and in times of emergency.

Akiko Fukushima

Proposal 2-1 , Japan should develop a strategy for international security cooperation

A growing number of countries are engaging in international security cooperation. Japan too must formulate its own strategy for these activities that lays out the government's thinking in some specificity. This will help Japan realize its concept of proactive contributions to peace, and to communicate its policies to international organizations and other countries.

1. The lack of an implementation system for international security cooperation

The 2013 National Security Strategy provides a thorough description of Japan's approach to diplomacy, international peace and issues like non-proliferation and arms control. Among the approaches Japan should take to achieve its objectives, it highlights "strengthening diplomacy for creating a stable international environment," "strengthening diplomacy and security cooperation with Japan's partners for peace and stability in the international community," "proactive contribution to international efforts for peace and stability of the international community," and "strengthening cooperation based on universal values to resolve global issues."

However, there are no systematized strategies or policies for implementing these approaches. For example, the document calls for diplomatic measures, defense measures, humanitarian aid, development cooperation and policies to address environmental issues, but no specific steps are laid out for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or any other players in government agencies, industry, academia or the public and private sectors. Japan needs to create a strategy for international security cooperation based on its National

Security Strategy that contains specific measures to advance policy objectives. It also needs to work together with various actors in a multi-layered and organic way based on a long-term vision.

Additionally, the concepts and legal frameworks of “international contributions” and “cooperation for international peace” that Japan has employed until now do not sufficiently cover the cooperative international securities operations that it should now pursue. For example, in addition to the “defense diplomacy,” “military diplomacy,” “international defense engagement strategy” and “foreign military aid” being advocated by other major countries, the JSDF has in recent years been undertaking “multilateral defense cooperation,” “capacity building support,” “technical cooperation for defense equipment” and “humanitarian aid and disaster relief.” These will be important elements of Japan’s international security cooperation, and they expand the definition of “cooperation for international peace.” An international security cooperation strategy should be laid out to incorporate these expanded activities.

2. The components of “international security cooperation”

Based on this understanding of the problem, Japan’s strategy for international security cooperation should include the following points:

- An understanding of trends in international security cooperation and the medium- to long-term security environment
- A basis for Japan’s approach to international security cooperation (systems and legal frameworks), and acknowledgment of its special features (including restrictions)
- The significance of and policies for international security cooperation for Japan
- Specific obligations and activities related to international security cooperation
- Developing and implementing a Capacity Building Assistance Charter (proposal 2-2)
- The responsibilities and roles of relevant ministries and agencies for international security cooperation
- Coordination between Official Development Assistance and international security cooperation
- Criteria for working with the UN and other international organizations, as well as other countries, on international security cooperation
- Criteria for working with both foreign and domestic non-governmental organizations, as well as industry, academia and the private sector on international security cooperation
- Strengthening and maintaining a domestic foundation for international security cooperation
- Spreading information about and strengthening the intellectual foundation of international security cooperation

Koichiro Bansho

<Column 1>, Japan and international peace cooperation activities: legal frameworks and developing missions

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For many years domestic politics related to international security and the JSDF ensured that any Japanese participation in international missions – especially by the JSDF – was considered taboo. With the changes that came with the end of the Cold War, however, Japan is expected to contribute more to international peace. This column will offer a brief review of the development of Japan’s participation in international peace operations from the Gulf War in 1990 to present day.

In the 1990s, the first stage, Japan’s participation in international peace operations could be effectively in its infancy. The Japanese government, responding to the changes in the post-Cold War order, submitted the UN Peace Cooperation bill to the Diet in October 1990, two months after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The aim was to facilitate cooperation in the Gulf War, but it was rejected by the Diet. However, when the war ended in April 1991, a minesweeping unit of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was dispatched to the Persian Gulf. It was the JSDF’s first overseas deployment since its establishment. In 1992, under Japan’s new UN PKO law, a Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) engineering unit joined the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. And, under the defense program guidelines formulated in 1995, in addition to defending Japan, the role of defense was expanded to include responding to large-scale natural disasters and contributing to a more stable security environment. In other words, cooperation in international peace operations was formally recognized as one of the JSDF’s missions.

In the second stage, the nature of Japan’s deployments changed. Missions became more involved in response to the Global War on

Terrorism that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2001. That same year an anti-terrorism law was enacted, and the MSDF participated in refueling missions in the Indian Ocean until 2007 as a part of the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing.” Additionally, after the declaration in May 2003 that the main fighting in the Iraq War had ended, the GSDF and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) undertook humanitarian/reconstruction support missions and transportation missions there until 2006 and 2009 respectively. Also, the law was amended in 2001 to permit broader peacekeeping missions, and in 2007 international peace cooperation was defined as one of the SDF’s core missions.

At the UN too, traditional PKO were expected to become more proactive and more compulsive after the Brahimi Report was issued in 2000. Japanese engineering units were dispatched to UN PKO in East Timor from 2002 to 2004, and in 2010 Central Readiness units under the newly established Central Readiness Force were sent to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Elsewhere, the UN Disengagement Observer Force at the Golan Heights, which had been in place since 1996, ended its mission in January 2013 due to deteriorating conditions in Syria.

The third stage is from the establishment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2015 to the present. The 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security contained revisions to the PKO Law that made “emergency defense,” “joint camp protection,” and the “use of weapons to accomplish missions” permissible. It also allowed Japanese forces to provide logistical support for multinational military units, making it possible to contribute more to international peace and stability than ever

before.

But while the legal framework has improved, there has been no Japanese troop participation in UN PKO since the dispatch to South Sudan ended in May 2017, halting the 25-year development of Japan's participation in international security cooperation. However,

regardless of the size of the deployment, one can say that Japan's participation in international peace operations has developed in terms of systems, capacity and posture.

Koichiro Bansho

Proposal 2-2 , Japan should develop and implement a Capacity Building Assistance Charter

Japan's contributions to capacity building support in UN PKO have been acknowledged by the UN Secretariat and other participating countries. Japan should formulate a "Capacity Building Assistance Charter" to strategically expand capacity building support and make further use of this asset.

1. A major issue for UN PKO is human resource development

UN PKO and PO are currently struggling with many challenges (see <column 2>, Challenges confronting current UN peace operations, p. 15). Human resource development and training in member countries for international PO is the key to overcoming them. Countries participating in PKO are obliged to provide sufficient training for troops before they head out, but there have been many cases in which personnel are deployed without it. As a result, the UN Secretariat and some member countries have started capacity building training to ensure dispatching countries can fulfill their obligations and the safety of the troops involved in the PKO. At a March 2019 Ministerial Meeting on PKO at the UN Headquarters, capacity building was one of the main topics of discussion.

Japan, working together with the UN and other donor countries, has provided capacity building support for countries that send personnel to PKO in the form of military engineering manuals for the "Triangular Partnership Project." Japan should lay out a Capacity Building Assistance Charter to strategically expand these kinds of programs. Much of Japan's capacity building support has been executed through supplemental budgets, meaning the financing for developing these programs is unstable. Capacity building support should be provided in a more stable manner through regular budgets, and in response to other countries' needs.

Japan has provided capacity building support first to countries in Asia, and after that primarily to those in Africa. It should also consider providing assistance to countries in South

and Central America that are focused on PKO (there is a PKO training center in Argentina), and working with Australia and New Zealand to provide more aid for Pacific island countries engaged in PKO, like Fiji and Palau.

2. Drafting a Capacity Building Assistance Charter

A “Capacity Building Assistance Charter” should cover the fields listed below. Japan has already provided support for engineering and construction training, and from 2018 it has provided training in medical treatment and sanitation. It should consider also providing support for information and communications training, as well as transportation control.

(1) PKO engineering and construction

Japan has participated in and contributed its engineering expertise to UN PKO in places like Cambodia, East Timor and South Sudan. When PKO forces withdraw, heavy machinery and equipment used on site is handed over to local authorities when possible. Japan provides training for how to operate and maintain that equipment. Japan has also provided engineering training to peacekeepers to be deployed on missions. This could continue to be a core piece of Japan’s capacity building support.

It is also necessary to consider working together with private companies. There are more opportunities to transfer and furnish defense equipment based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology laid out in 2014, and greater cooperation with Japanese heavy machinery manufacturers is possible. The government should consider using the ODA budget for that purpose.

Japanese companies sometimes cannot successfully bid on equipment on the basis of untied grants. In order to enhance further involvement of the Japanese private sector, it may be necessary to create a way for them to benefit from economies of scale by switching to tied grants. With these kinds of steps, the government will be able to secure a supply of essential parts and extended service for defense equipment.

(2) Medical services and sanitation

In recent years, personnel deaths on UN PKO have been increasing (see <column 2>, Challenges confronting current UN peace operations, p. 15), making it difficult for participating countries, especially developed countries, to contribute troops. The UN is currently promoting medical care, especially emergency care and first aid to peacekeepers. For example, the UK has dispatched a forward-deployed medical team and eight helicopters for emergency medical transport to the UN PKO in South Sudan. It also provides a package of “advice, support and mentoring” to Vietnam, which has dispatched its own emergency relief team. The UK is able to

work with multiple countries, entrusting helicopter operations to Australia and making use of Vietnamese medical personnel. Japan should learn from models like this.

Since 2019 Japan has operated a pilot project in Entebbe, Uganda aimed at building medical treatment capacity. It has drawn high praise from the UN Secretariat. There are also many talented medical personnel (doctors, nurses and paramedics) in Japan who have experience participating in UN PKO, and the government should consider temporarily assigning them to the UN Secretariat. With that kind of initiative it would be possible to promote capacity building in Japan's own medical and sanitation sector.

(3) Information and electronic communications

Based on the recommendation of a 2014 expert panel, the UN Signal Academy was established in Entebbe, Uganda to train PKO personnel in communications technology. The UN has one staff member at UN Headquarters and five at Entebbe to help improve the level of information-communications technology before being deployed. Many PKO personnel, including those from the military and police, have never even used a radio, so training prior to deployment is important. Japan has difficulty assisting in capacity building in this field in part because of interoperability issues between Japanese communication equipment and equipment used by the UN. However, greater cooperation, such as supplying equipment and sending instructors to the training center in Uganda, is possible and should be considered.

(4) Peacekeeping Intelligence

There has long been an awareness of the need for PKO intelligence at the UN, but some member countries harbor misgivings about it. No agreement has yet been reached on the issue. The Brahimi Report pointed out the necessity of PKO intelligence, and it was also emphasized in the HIPPO (Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations) report. The phrase "PKO intelligence" was also included in the updated mission mandate for the UN mission in Mali.

In 2017, a new PKO intelligence coordination team was set up in the director's office in the UN's Department of Peace Operations. It is currently comprised of just two people, but one of them is a Japanese civilian worker who is focused on drawing up and revising "intelligence policy." In this way, PKO intelligence comes not only from the deployed forces of member countries, but also from dispatches of individual civilian personnel. Drones and unmanned aerial vehicles are also set to play a growing role in gathering information in the future, and Japan can provide capacity building support in this field as well.

(5) Air and transportation control

Japan has been asked to cooperate more on aviation issues, so it is valuable to consider this

field as well. Transportation control is an essential element of UN PKO. Japan sent a transportation coordination unit to the UN's 1993-1995 mission in Mozambique, so it can contribute to human resource development here too.

(6) Election monitoring

Japan should also consider dispatching specialists to help monitor elections, which are crucial to building peace. A single election is not sufficient to create a democratic political system, so persistent assistance is necessary. A British specialist has suggested that it would be fitting for Japan to become a reliable partner in election support and combine that with capacity building support.

(7) Mechanisms to make capacity building support known

As Japan implements the capacity building measures outlined above, it needs mechanisms to ensure that these policies are recognized at the UN. Current rankings to measure the level of contribution are based on how many personnel countries are sending to UN peace operations. Japan should appeal to the UN to create a mechanism that recognizes member countries' contributions to capacity building support in terms of budgets, dispatched personnel and trainees. The UN Department of Peace Operation is aware of this issue and considering ways to address it, so Japan should lead in those discussions.

Akiko Fukushima

<Column 2>, Challenges confronting current UN peace operations

[Changing peace operations]

As of 2020 the number of UN peacekeeping missions is decreasing, and many UN officials have noted that their continued operation is at risk. To some degree this is because the number of conflicts around the world is decreasing, but it has become difficult to authorize new missions for areas that should be subject to peace operations because of greater risk of a reoccurrence of conflict. Some have also noted that peacekeeping missions are ended before the situation on the ground has stabilized.

The number of personnel deaths during PKO is rising in this context. Since UN PKO

began in 1948, about 4,000 personnel have lost their lives, with about 1,000 of them dying due to acts of violence. From 2013 to 2017, 202 PKO personnel died because of violent acts. The number of deaths decreased in 2018 and 2019, but the sense of risk remains.

At the end of 2017, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, who commanded the UN operations in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, investigated ways to reduce risk to PKO personnel at the request of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. This resulted in the report titled, "Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers," also called the "Cruz Report." "Peacekeeping

is a risky activity,” he wrote, so PKO need to be authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows for a greater use of force.

PKO mandates are changing from simply monitoring ceasefires to multifunctional missions that include general governance support and civilian protection. In other words, they are moving from a UN Chapter 6.5 model to a Chapter 7 one. Furthermore, hybrid missions with regional organizations like the African Union are shifting from a Chapter 7.5 model to a Chapter 8 model. Additionally, because PKO are increasingly employed in areas suffering from civil wars, political resolution to conflicts is important, and stabilization is frequently emphasized.

Among researchers, these changes have led the more general term “peace operations” to be used in place of peacekeeping operations. But some member countries continue to stick to the traditional three principles of PKO, and they continue to use that term. Regardless, missions are increasingly changing from ceasefire monitoring to supporting local stability, and the form of peace enforcement, as well as support for local administrations, is also changing.

[The three PKO principles]

UN officials and people familiar with the topic know that the traditional three principles of PKO are already far removed from the reality of conflict zones. Notably, gaining the consent of all parties to a conflict is nearly impossible when dealing with terrorist groups. The current reality is that PKO personnel are deployed with the consent of the host country, which is also a member country. Considering these changes, the issue of whether the three principles should be revised has been repeatedly debated both inside and outside the UN. However, member countries have been unable to reach a consensus. Even after the

Brahimi Report and the HIPPO Report, member countries have been unable to reach a position where they are ready to revise the three principles. However, those principles, which were previously compared to the Ten Commandments in regards to their inviolability, are no longer referenced much as they are so distant from the reality of PKO. The thinking now is that PKO are not mentioned in the UN Charter in the first place, so it is best to interpret the mandate according to the situation on the ground.

[A new initiative for PKO]

Based on the circumstances described above, Secretary-General Guterres in March 2018 launched the “Action for Peacekeeping: A4P” initiative. In September of that year the UN also put out the “Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” which called for more support for UN PKO, including sustainable and predictable funding. It also called for member countries to voice support these changes, and as of January 2020, 152 countries had stated their support. In the joint declaration, countries pledge to fulfill existing intergovernmental commitments on cooperation between military and police personnel from dispatching countries, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat for the purpose of strengthening consultations among PKO stakeholders about implementing mandates. Additionally, it highlighted the participation of women in the peace process to implement the priority items of “women, peace and security.” It also spelled out the UN’s zero tolerance policy against all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, it urged member countries to dispatch to UN peace operations personnel who actually have the ability to carry out the missions of UN PKO.

In order to sustain political momentum for

this A4P, in October 2019 countries were designated as “champions” that were responsible for each item of the agenda. Japan is in charge of performance accountability.

[Challenges facing PO]

Taking the above into consideration, the following five issues emerge:

- (1) Gap between expectations and reality: There is a lack of equipment and training for PKO personnel, meaning they cannot deal with actual conditions in conflict zones. If this is not remedied, PO will not produce successful results.
- (2) Protecting civilians: The role of PKO is expanding from ceasefire monitoring to peacebuilding and nation-building to ensure peace takes root. But conflict often reemerges repeatedly even after peace agreements are formed, so protection of civilians and refugees and providing humanitarian assistance to conflict zones are becoming increasingly significant parts of peacekeeping missions.
- (3) Political resolution: Political solutions, from conflict prevention to conflict control and peace consolidation, are becoming more important in increasing the efficacy of UN PO, including PKO.
- (4) Collaboration and connections: Because there is a lack of resources for UN PKO, it is necessary to coordinate with other organizations, and for the UN to work with regional organizations like the African Union.
- (5) Women’s participation: It is necessary to provide support to vulnerable women and children by reducing the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse and expanding the roles for women in PKO at all levels.

There is an existing forum for addressing these challenges.

A PKO summit was held at the UN Headquarters in 2014 and 2015 at the request of former U.S. President Barack Obama. After that, ministerial-level meetings were held on PKO in 2016 in London, 2017 in Vancouver and 2019 at the UN Headquarters in New York. The next such meeting is set for 2021 in South Korea. Japan has been a co-sponsor of every meeting since 2015. At these conferences, countries call for cooperation on the deployment of personnel, military alert systems and rapid reaction forces. Cooperation among and provisioning of support units (enablers) like air transport and medical treatment, and SEA policies are also important topics.

Against this backdrop, it has been pointed out that in addition to being unable to protect civilian populations, PKO personnel are often not able to safeguard even their own lives from conflict that is rekindled at dispatch destinations because of insufficient training. This has led to low morale among PKO personnel, which in turn is connected to SEA.

At the PKO ministerial meeting held at the end of March 2019, PKO’s three biggest issues were spelled out in the chairperson’s summary. They were: performance, civilian protection and women, peace and security.

Considering these trends, the importance of providing capacity building support to those countries that send military and civilian personnel to PKO but lack sufficient training capability themselves is clear.

Akiko Fukushima

Proposal 2-3 , Japan should develop human resources for international security cooperation, and promote diverse and multi-layered criteria for deployments

To promote “proactive contributions to peace,” Japan, as a developed nation, needs to deploy more personnel to areas that require a high degree of ability, rather than focusing simply on the scale of conventional dispatches. Japan should try to enhance its international presence by making the dispatch criteria for these kinds of international security cooperation more diverse and multi-layered. To do that, over the medium to long term Japan needs to develop both military and civilian human resources with the specialization and experience to carry out missions at the international level.

1. Background and existing problems

In 1992, the JSDF dispatched 600 engineering personnel and 8 ceasefire monitors to the UN mission in Cambodia, its first such deployment. Since then, Japan has developed its legal framework and allocated resources for international security cooperation to meet changing international expectations about the role it should play. Laws like the anti-terrorism law and Iraq humanitarian/reconstruction support law have authorized many of Japan’s international security cooperation operations. (For the history of Japanese personnel dispatches, see <column 1> Japan and international peace cooperation activities: legal frameworks and developing missions, p. 11)

However, while the supporting frameworks for deployments grew more robust, the number of personnel sent on missions decreased. Currently there are no Japanese troops dispatched to PKO missions. If one considers international peace cooperation operations in a broad sense, the MSDF has dispatched destroyer and patrol aircraft for anti-piracy missions, and the GSDF supports them with around 100 personnel. In dispatches of individuals too, the JSDF has achieved only limited results. There are four command personnel in the UN missions in South Sudan, and two in the Multinational Force & Observers that monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel on the Sinai Peninsula. To understand how these circumstances came to be, the following points provide useful background.

First, there has been a qualitative change in the post-Cold War UN PKO that Japan has participated in. Japan has received high praise for the contributions of its engineering units to projects like infrastructure development. Those projects are part of the multi-faceted support that UN PKO provide for the nation-building process, from the end of civil wars to democratic elections and the start of new governments. However, the qualitative changes that have been underway since the release of the Brahimi Report, along with the decrease in UN PKO and

their changing mandates, mean that the PKO that Japan can participate in through troop deployments are decreasing.

Second, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more testing and uncertain. That has required the JSDF to strengthen surveillance in Japan's surrounding waters, deploy units to the southwest region, establish the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, strengthen countermeasures against ballistic missiles and respond to new domains of operation like space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. All of that has been necessary to strengthen Japan's system of deterrence. It is therefore difficult to maintain deployments of thousands of personnel to UN PKO.

Despite these factors, Japan should not become a laggard in international security cooperation. Japan, which has adopted a national strategy of "Proactive contributions to peace based on international coordination," has built up trust through repeated cooperative international security operations. It would harm the country's national interest to see that trust eroded by decreasing cooperation now. Japan should therefore develop and secure human resources for international security cooperation to the greatest extent possible, which will enable it to sustain future participation.

2. Policies for developing and securing human resources for international security cooperation

(1) Strategic development of specialists and increasing the number of experienced and qualified personnel

The number of personnel in the JSDF that have experience in overseas missions has increased as a result of growing participation in UN PKO since the 1990s. For example, a large number of young officers have participated in the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights, where GSDF officers of the rank of Major have served as the commanding officer. Some of them later had a chance to play an important role in subsequent UN PKO, and that is how UNDOF was once referred to as the "school for international peace cooperation." Additionally, the overseas experience gained through these kinds of missions will broaden JSDF personnel's perspectives toward the rest of the world, and present a valuable opportunity to build personal relationships with their counterparts in other countries. The recent decline in deployment opportunities is also lost opportunities for human resource development. In promoting proactive contributions to peace, various opportunities should be used to give young people the chance to gain experience and to strategically develop personnel with both tangible and intangible qualifications who can participate in international missions.

(2) Strengthening coordination among relevant government agencies and civilian participation (including police)

The concept of proactive contributions to peace is not limited to the military sphere, and the number of fields where security must play a role is growing. In UN PKO, in addition to nation-building, tasks like humanitarian aid, development assistance, security sector reform, disarmament and addressing war crimes require that military organizations, judiciaries, law enforcement agencies, development agencies and more all work together. It is necessary to think that international peace cooperation is not the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, but rather an issue that all government agencies should work on.

(3) Expanding participation of key personnel in the command center, including mission commanders

Up to this point, a JSDF officer has never been appointed to the post of UN PKO mission commander. However, with the peace and security legislation in place and the growing number of experienced JSDF personnel, there are a considerable number of talented people in the JSDF who could take the position of commander or senior staff. Japan should strategically and actively work to fill PKO mission commander assignments with these people. Although the U.S. has traditionally dispatched few troops to PKO, a certain number of command personnel are continuously deployed. This gives the U.S., along with major European countries, a unique presence. It is no longer constructive to worry too much about the scale of participation in PKO. Rather, it is more important to focus on the quality and impact of that participation.

(4) Increasing women's participation

At the second UN PKO summit in 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that Japan would increase the number of female personnel it deployed. Gender issues have become increasingly important in recent years, and Japan should increase the opportunities for female JSDF personnel to participate in PKO and to handle gender issues in other international organizations. Japan is also focusing on training female troops in other countries, but the number of female personnel is small. In predominantly Muslim countries, women cannot be deployed alone so they must be deployed in pairs. Because of restrictions like these the number of women actually deployed is not rising. However, graduates of the UN Signals Academy in Entebbe are slowly starting to be deployed into the field. Female PKO personnel also need training in SEA countermeasures and protecting civilian populations, and Japan, which has a good reputation on SEA can likely contribute.

(5) Making use of human resources such as retired JSDF officers

When considering the reduced human resource development that comes with fewer PKO opportunities, making use of retired JSDF officers, diplomats and other former government personnel should be considered as an effective measure. For example, the retirement age for a colonel is 56, and it is 54 to 55 for lieutenant colonels and below. That is young compared to other workers in both the public and private sectors. These people have experience in overseas missions and as instructors in capacity building support, but they lose their status as public officials due to the retirement age. That means they also lose their values and qualification to participate in government work and public duties, like working at the UN.

These individuals are an overlooked resource for Japan. Generally, experienced personnel possess not only work-related knowledge, but also are familiar with safety measures, have wide-ranging personal networks and can successfully complete their assigned missions. In many foreign countries, military and public officials continue work even after their retirement. Japan also needs a framework that will enable retired officers to continue to be involved in deployment missions for some period after their retirement, as well as systems to deal with personnel status and compensation, a pool system for human resources and training for maintaining and recovering skills.

(6) Developing and securing human resources through contact with NGOs and private companies

With the concept and contents of international security cooperation expanding, the work is no longer limited to just JSDF officers and public officials. Talent should come from a broader range of backgrounds. Coordinating with companies and NGOs can also create a stable working environment for experienced personnel before international dispatch missions, while waiting to head out and after returning.

Koichiro Bansho

Proposal 2-4 , Japan should expand budgets and implementation mechanisms to pursue proactive security cooperation

In order to shape a desirable security environment, MOD should be well funded with appropriate budgetary measures to ensure the JSDF can execute its mandates and to establish or expand designated teams on defense exchange and cooperation across all services.

1. Expanding the JSDF's international activities

Since the early 1990s, Japan has worked to improve international security through contributions to UN Peacekeeping as well as bilateral and multilateral defense exchange and cooperation activities. In the current 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), security cooperation is listed in “Japan’s Basic Defense Policy,” along with the two fundamental policies that stress the strengthening of Japan’s own defense architecture and the Japan-U.S. alliance. This indicated a growing recognition among policy makers of the benefit of more active use of defense capabilities in peacetime.

The 2015 peace and security legislation expanded the legal basis for the JSDF’s international activities. At the practical level, the MOD/JSDF can now provide capacity building support to other country’s militaries, and it can transfer defense equipment. Ministerial and vice-ministerial consultations, and high-level exchanges between the top officials in each JSDF branch with their counterparts in other countries have become the norm, and documents on defense cooperation are being exchanged with like-minded countries besides the U.S. For example, General Security of Information Agreements (GSOMIA), Acquisition and Cross Service Agreements (ACSA), as well as defense equipment and technology transfer agreements have been concluded with the U.K., France and Australia. Similar agreements are being made with other countries. Along with these policy initiatives, working-level consultations and troop exchanges have increased dramatically in recent years.

2. Necessity of expanding budgetary measures and establishing responsible agencies

Both the quality and quantity of MOD/JSDF international engagement are expected to increase, but the organization and budgetary measures for that are not fully in place. In its 2017 reorganization the GSDF established the “Defense Cooperation Division” within the Ground Staff Office to promote defense exchanges with the U.S. and other countries. Also, in the Joint Staff Office, the “International Cooperation Office” oversees international operations like the anti-piracy mission, and there is a unit in the Defense Planning Department which manages security cooperation at regional and country levels. However, the MSDF and the ASDF, which face a growing need for defense exchange and cooperation, do not have dedicated units for this purpose. The reality is that just a few staff members keep in regular contact with each country to coordinate multiple projects simultaneously.

To shape a desirable security environment, as envisioned in the NDPG, it is necessary that each service have strategic planning on medium- to long-term defense cooperation. However, it appears that under the current resource arrangement, it is unlikely that the spare capacity for this exists. For this reason, it is urgent that each service be equipped with a designated unit for security cooperation that is substantially staffed so that it can meet the growing demand for

security cooperation.

The budget is another issue, and it is likely that additional funding is needed. Currently, other than the joint training/exercises that were planned in advance, there is no budget item specifically aimed at funding security cooperation at each branch of the JSDF. MOD's internal bureau, on the other hand, has sufficient funds available for exchanges and capacity building support programs. As a result, at each service necessary expenses need to be covered by drawing funds from foreign travel and other accounts to meet the growing need for defense exchange and cooperation. Additionally, overseas joint-training uses some of the funds marked for education and training, as well as that earmarked for fuel. Some believe this could lead to pressure on budgets for training troops, and there are concerns that this may affect the JSDF's ability to respond to emergencies over the medium term. All of this points to the need to consider appropriate budgetary measures.

A few years ago, "jurisdiction over international cooperation" was been added to Article 4 (jurisdiction) of the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense. Efforts are needed to have the Ministry of Finance and other agencies fully understand this need so appropriate funding can be secured for the effective implementation of proactive promotion of security cooperation.

Ippeita Nishida

Proposal 2-5 , Japan should establish a center of excellence (COE) to make greater use of expertise gained by Self-Defense Force personnel from participation in UN Peacekeeping

To make use of the knowledge gained by JSDF personnel and to maintain the international operation capability of engineering units that have participated in various UN PKO and disaster relief operations abroad, an "international engineering COE" should be established within the GSDF engineering school as the core research institution for engineering units in international peace operations.

1. Concerns about Japan's dwindling international peace cooperation

The GSDF has dispatched about 20,000 personnel – mostly engineering units – since the international peace cooperation law was enacted in 1992. Their activities have not been simply maintaining troop bases and operation infrastructure for the UN and other nations: they helped to build social infrastructure like roads and bridges that help societies recover after conflict, and performed tasks like dismantling houses destroyed in natural disasters. They have been highly

praised by the UN for their professionalism and the quality of their work.

The expertise gained through these operations is being compiled and incorporated into a revised edition of the manual for UN engineering units through a working group chaired by Japan. In recent years, the GSDF engineer units have also conducted capacity building support operations with counterparts in Asian and African countries.

However, there have not been any deployments of engineering units since June 2017, with the end of Japanese participation in the UN PKO in South Sudan (UNMISS). With no dispatches likely in the foreseeable future, there are concerns that the competence of the engineering units at international peace operations will decline. There are also concerns that the international goodwill that Japan has won to date, and its external influence, will dwindle.

2. The necessity of an international engineering institute

To avoid such losses, and to make use Japan's "specialty field," of engineering, consideration should be given to establishing an "International Engineering COE" as the core research center for engineering units in international peace operations. At this research center, Japan and other countries that deploy engineering units to international peace operations could conduct concept formation, training and lessons learned regarding engineering activities in UN and other missions like disaster relief, and share the results with the rest of the world. The COE should also equip mobile training teams to support field missions through their deployments.

The establishment of the Engineering COE will require close coordination with participating countries on local intelligence gathering and onsite security. It will also enable knowledge sharing in areas such as joint-camp protection and guarding units. In this way, even if JSDF units are not deployed to the field, the latest information and expertise can be collected at the COE in Japan. Japan will be able to make its presence felt in the area of engineering units, which form an important part of international peace operations.

Currently the GSDF has a plan to establish an "International Engineering Center (provisional)" for the GSDF only. Because there limits to the activities Japan can pursue on its own, any such organization should be open to other countries. In this respect, NATO, which has 24 COEs, is a useful model. NATO's COEs are made up of funding and personnel sent by the governments of member countries that are interested in the relevant field. In this way they are able to pursue ambitious, highly effective operations while dispersing burdens.

An "International Engineering COE (provisional)," could be jointly operated with not only countries that share basic values and abilities, such as the U.S., Australia and European countries, but also countries that deploy engineering units or plan to do so, like South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia.

Ippeita Nishida

Proposal 2-6 , Japan should advance the exchange of research and education on international peace operations and promote its image to the world by creating a chair for peace operations at UN University, developing a network of think tanks around the world and becoming the center of international peace operations research

Japan has contributed to international peace operations, but it faces widely known legal and political restrictions. The image of those restraints tends to surpass Japan's actual activities. By making Japan a COE for international peace operations, the country can strategically communicate its positive actions.

Japan can lead in human resources development for and research on international peace operations by establishing a peace operations chair at the UN University in Tokyo. At the same time it should create an endowed course at both the undergraduate and graduate levels about contributions to peace activities, and it should be the center of research and education on international peace operations. These operations face many problems, as it is difficult to secure peace and stability in conflict zones. However, accumulating mission experience for future use is essential. Training military, police and civilian personnel in increasingly complicated missions will help implement proactive contributions to peace. By accepting both Japanese and foreign nationals, this program would develop human resources both inside and outside the country.

In addition, it is also necessary to establish a network of ongoing research among think tanks around the world that are advising the UN. There are limits to what can be accomplished through research and debate only within the UN Secretariat, and similarly so at the EU and African Union. Recommendations from private think tanks like the Social Science Research Council in the U.S. are often adopted to fill in the gaps. It would be an important element of Japan's international security cooperation if UN University and Japanese think tanks can conduct research in international peace operations and network with various research projects around the world.

Akiko Fukushima

Proposal 2-7 , Japan should coordinate with other countries to strengthen aid for maritime law enforcement capacity in littoral states in the South China Sea

With the recent successive establishment of maritime security agencies in littoral states in the South China Sea, requests for assistance, such as provisions of ships and technical guidance, are increasing both in terms of sophistication and quantity. In response, the Japan Coast Guard in 2017 launched the Japan Coast Guard Mobile Corporation Team (MCT), a department dedicated to capacity development support. It is staffed by 10 people and headed by the JCG International Cooperation Promotion Officer. It has supplied patrol boats and assisted in developing maritime law enforcement capacity. However, capacity building support in littoral states should be further strengthened by providing more patrol boats and increasing staff at the MCT to respond to the speed at which China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea.

1. The urgent problem of littoral states in the South China Sea

In Japan, China's heavy-handed efforts to change the status quo in the South China Sea, best symbolized by the transformation of its artificial islands into military facilities, are often discussed in the context of the U.S.-China military confrontation over freedom of navigation.

But for littoral states, control over the affiliation of islands, and the accompanying economic benefits of development and fishing are more relevant to their national interest than freedom of navigation. CSIS, a U.S.-based think tank, has released satellite photos that show there is almost always at least one Chinese battleship or coast guard patrol boat accompanying Chinese fishing fleets in the South China Sea, and they maintain a certain distance from disputed islands. Furthermore, China's development of artificial islands is not just for military bases. Piers and other facilities can naturally serve as coast guard bases as well. It is easy to imagine the China Coast Guard rapidly increasing the number of ships in the region, and also expanding the scope of their activities.

Maritime law enforcement organizations (CG) generally have both military and law enforcement functions, which need to be strictly separated from each other. However, it has been pointed out that the actions of the China Coast Guard repeatedly exceed the enforcement powers of a democratic police force. Furthermore, China's CGs were reorganized in 2013 and in 2018 successively. In the 2018 changes, the People's Armed Police, which had previously been under the command of both the State Council and the Central Military Commission, was placed under only the Central Military Commission. At the same time all of the maritime police forces and their related functions were transferred to the People's Armed Police from the State Oceanic Administration. And, while increasing its number of patrol boats at an unusually fast

rate, China has commissioned two large-scale patrol boats of more than 10,000 tons, equipped with 76-mm guns. This kind of equipment is hardly ever needed for normal maritime law enforcement activities.

In this way, China is proceeding to militarize the China Coast Guard, while the procedural law relevant to law enforcement, such as the proportionality principle, has not been implemented. It continues to be the case that the CCG acts as a “rogue police force,” so to speak.

This is worrisome, because if a maritime dispute occurs between China and a littoral country with only a weak CG, that country will be forced to dispatch battleships to deal with the situation. That gives the Chinese side a pretext to come back with a military response, increasing the risk that the situation will escalate into military conflict. To reduce these risks, it is necessary to strengthen the CGs in littoral countries in the South China Sea.

2. The necessity of strengthening Japan’s capacity building support

CG support for littoral countries in the South China Sea is not limited to Japan. The U.S., France and Australia, all of whom are also concerned about the instability in the region, are providing ships and offering training for counterterrorism and search and rescue. These countries can be seen as trying to stabilize the South China Sea as a way of preventing China from changing the status quo there.

Under the “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Japan provides patrol boats to countries connected to the South China Sea, like Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Additionally, the Japan Coast Guard has received high praise for its support in not only law enforcement, but also in a wide range of fields like disaster prevention, preventing marine pollution, hydrographic surveys and marine environment conservation. There are high hopes that this aid will be further strengthened.

In addition, while the international community is increasingly calling for democratic processes in maritime law enforcement, in some littoral countries in the South China Sea, CGs may not be able to avoid executing their military function to counter terrorists and guerilla forces. This is why a clear distinction between the military and police functions of CG is particularly important. On this point, the JCG is one of the world’s leading CG when it comes to democratic law enforcement, and it is well placed to aid others. Furthermore, compared to other countries, Japan’s location allows it to provide more stable, ongoing aid.

Most major navigation routes go through the South China Sea, which is a part of the southern maritime area where the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean connect. In this sense the South China Sea is an important chokepoint for shipping routes in the Indo-Pacific region. For Japan, which greatly depends on maritime transport through the South China Sea, contributing

to capacity building support to stabilize the area is an issue of vital national interest.

Susumu Nakamura

Proposal 3 , Space operations

Japan should advance space operations and lead other countries in the field.

The 2013 National Security Strategy says that Japan should take a strategic approach to securing the stable use of space and promoting its use in security. This will result in the provision of useful social infrastructure in various countries under Japanese leadership, and will be an important part of implementing proactive contributions to peace.

The 2018 national defense guidelines note that it is vitally important to gain superiority in “new domains like space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum,” which are necessary to develop a truly effective defensive force. But to improve capability, information gathering, communications and positioning capability in the field of space, it is necessary to quickly promote related activities and lead other countries.

1. Contributing through Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

SSA is set to be the foundation for multi-layered deterrence and space control. The U.S. and Japan agreed in 2014 to an SSA information sharing pact, and they have started discussions on cooperation on SSA in the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, which began in 2013.

In the 2018 defense program guidelines, it was decided that the ASDF would set up a specialized unit for space surveillance. However, technical difficulties persist. It is hard to capture the details of satellite exteriors and their trajectories from the ground, and it is particularly difficult to assess the condition of those in geosynchronous positions in high orbit. The U.S. Air Force has already launched space-based space surveillance satellites, and it operates several SSA program satellites in geosynchronous orbit. The Canadian Airforce also since 2013 has launched small satellites for SSA to provide data to the U.S. SSA network.

At the sixth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, both sides agreed to promote SSA and STM, along with orbital services and active debris removal. They also agreed to improve the interoperability of SSA data and to enable further sharing, and to pursue discussions on aid for ongoing efforts to develop standards of conduct, best practices and codes of conduct. To implement these goals, it is necessary to promote the creation of interoperable, complementary SSA systems between the U.S. and Japan.

The ASDF’s air control and warning network has been highly praised by the U.S. for its

accuracy and reliability when used in joint operations. If it can maintain its SSA ability with high-value information in space, it could be valuable for both the U.S. and Japan.

Additionally, with the establishment of the Indo-Pacific Region Space Monitoring Center that watches debris and more, and the monitoring of maritime conditions as described below, it will be useful in Japan's future space strategy that calls for Japan to take leadership on space utilization.

2. Contributing through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Ensuring the safety of maritime traffic is essential to a trading nation like Japan. Japan has relied on efforts of the U.S. and other countries' to secure this, but, reflecting the inward turn in the U.S., President Trump has called on Japan to strengthen its own self-help efforts. Now Japan needs to fulfill this role in real time to secure its own maritime traffic routes.

Regarding non-traditional security in these circumstances, it will be in both Japan's and the U.S.' interest if the Japanese space system can be put to use for space-based MDA and the related U.S. capabilities can be strengthened and complemented. Additionally, if a framework and social infrastructure for information sharing with relevant countries in the Indo-Pacific can be established, Japan's image in the region would be further elevated.

Japan's understanding of maritime conditions is formed by effectively and efficiently gathering and sharing information that contributes to Japan's maritime security, conservation of the environment, promotion of marine industry the development of science and technology.

In particular, when considering Japan's security, it is important to secure an operational system that can capture dangers and threats in the necessary maritime areas globally and in real time. Japan should pursue wide-ranging means of unifying maritime information, including the use of space.

Currently, ships of 300 gross tons or more must have an automatic identification system (AIS). By combining information from this AIS with information from satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radar, which can be used even in bad weather and at night, it is possible to build a Japan-led maritime monitoring network.

It is also necessary to strengthen cooperation with relevant countries on space monitoring and remote sensing systems used for assessing maritime conditions. From the perspective of maritime security in the wider region, the National Security Council should take the initiative, and the Ministry of Defense should take the lead in establishing a system for MDA.

3. The benefits of cooperation on space with other countries

(1) The benefits of cooperating with the U.S., France, Canada and others on space

Strengthening cooperation with the U.S., Japan's ally, is natural, but there are many

benefits to close cooperation with other space-capable countries. SSA operational capability, for example, is expected to be further improved by the creation of a continuous monitoring system for orbiting space objects through close cooperation with countries that possess the capability. Further, the distribution of satellite ground facilities (satellite control stations, data transfer bases, etc.) makes it possible to improve the satellites' operational capability (satellite control, data downloads and survivability).

By jointly developing and operating one satellite with a friendly country, through techniques like hosted payloads, it will be possible to divide the satellite's maintenance costs. Additionally, deterrence can hopefully be strengthened by having one satellite owned by multiple countries.

(2) Strengthening cooperation with India in space usage

In the Indo-Pacific, the country most interested in space activities, with the exception of the U.S., is India. In addition to strengthening cooperation with the U.S., it is indispensable to strengthen cooperation with India in the domain of space. A major feature of space development in India is that space has been positioned as a new place for social and economic development, and for the development of social infrastructure. As a result, India now has one of the most extensive networks of communications and Earth observation satellites in the world. It has also recently become more active in using space for security purposes. China's 2007 anti-satellite missile test, in particular, is thought to have had a large impact on India's thinking on space security.

India currently operates 13 communications satellites, including military communications satellites, as well as its own satellite positioning system, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). The IRNSS provides timekeeping and positioning functions throughout India and the surrounding areas using 7 satellites, including 3 geosynchronous satellites.

India and Japan have announced that they will cooperate on a lunar exploration project. India's development of space activities also makes it an appropriate partner in checking China and Russia when it comes to the space security of the Indo-Pacific.

Toshimichi Nagaiwa

Proposal 4 , Personnel system for JSDF service personnel

Japan should address the shortage of critical personnel in the JSDF by introducing a new system to recruit service personnel not only through the efforts of the Ministry of Defense (J-MOD) and the JSDF, but through a whole-government effort. Additionally, the treatment of JSDF service personnel should be improved.

The low fulfillment rate for all three JSDF services that has undermined its operational capability is like a chronic disease in a human body. This and the insufficient state of the current rookie-personnel recruitment system have been extremely serious issues for the JSDF for decades. If present trends continue, the JSDF will undoubtedly encounter difficulties carrying out its fundamental mission of national defense, and the situation will become a serious bottleneck in Japan's international security cooperation. To solve this chronic problem Japan should introduce a new system of recruitment in which all sectors of Japanese society, including the entire government and other parts of civil society, like private companies, participate.

The JSDF's recruitment of rookie service personnel has been entirely the responsibility of the JSDF since its foundation in 1954. However, the recruitment environment has become extremely unfavorable because of substantial changes in all sectors of Japanese society in the last several decades. This nationwide social phenomenon has made the JSDF's recruiting operations more difficult than ever. The JSDF has continued to make all possible, sometimes painful, efforts to meet its targets and overcome the situation. Thanks to these "recruit at any cost efforts," the JSDF has barely managed to maintain its minimum force strength for years. But these efforts are reaching a breaking point, and the JSDF's lone efforts are no longer working effectively to recruit rookie personnel.

This is why the JSDF's recruitment system should be totally reviewed and should be shifted from the familiar business of only the JSDF to an all-Japan operation. It is especially important that the Government of Japan (GOJ) take the lead in integrating Japanese society's efforts into the JSDF's recruiting.

At the same time, it is also necessary to create a system to improve life planning and stabilize post-discharge/retirement life for JSDF service personnel, many of whom must retire at a younger age than the Japanese average. This will help ease the uncertainty of service personnel's total-life-planning associated with retirement at a young age. This measure is expected to increase the number of applicants for JSDF recruitment. It is also particularly important to raise JSDF service personnel salaries and allowances to reflect the inherently dangerous nature of JSDF duties, which range from disaster relief operations in life-threatening weather and in wild terrain, to fierce combat with enemy forces. Details of JSDF personnel

salaries will be discussed in a later chapter.

1. Analysis of current conditions

(1) Trends in the number of JSDF service personnel

The consistent personnel shortage in the JSDF can be compared to a chronic illness that is “a serious problem for the Self-Defense Forces that shows no signs of improvement.” Presently each unit just barely carries out its duties while managing the problems and contradictions caused by the shortage. There have long been muffled complaints about the shortage of service personnel in the JSDF, but more recently media reports have verified the severity of the situation for the first time.

Table 1 below shows changes in the number of JSDF personnel over 15 years at five-year intervals. Over those 15 years, the maximum number of GSDF personnel (GOJ/J-MOD Authorized Strength) has been reduced by about 12,000 on paper, and its actual active personnel fell by about 10,000. The authorized personnel strength of the MSDF and ASDF are smaller, so while the drops look smaller, the actual reductions for both were more than 2,000, or about 5% of personnel strength. These reductions continue to deal major blows to the three services of the JSDF.

There is an annex-table in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that specifies the number of basic units and the authorized personnel strength of each service. For example, in the 2018 NDPG the number of basic units in the GSDF is nine divisions and eight brigades of various types. However, the above-mentioned shortage of about 10,000 GSDF service personnel is equivalent to one full division less than the specified nine divisions, or two to three brigades fewer than the planned eight brigades. The same is true for the MSDF and ASDF. There are effectively one fewer escort flotilla (eight destroyers) in the MSDF and one fewer air wing (40 fighters) in the ASDF because there are not enough service personnel to staff them.

At present, the number of units is just barely maintained because of the decreased fulfillment rate in all units. Unit fulfillment rate is the ratio of the actual number of service personnel assigned to a unit and the authorized strength of service personnel for the unit. Thus the degraded ability of each unit to achieve its original mission caused by the poor fulfillment rate is serious, but has been ignored for a long time.

[Table 1]

		GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff Office	Total	Initial defense spending
FY2002	Authorized Strength	163,330	45,826	47,280	1,854	258,290	4.9392 trillion yen
	Actual Strength	148,226	44,375	45,483	1,722	239,806	
	Fulfillment rate	90.8%	96.8%	96.2%	92.9%	92.8%	
FY2007	Authorized Strength	153,220	45,716	47,313	2,398	248,647	4.7815 trillion yen
	Actual Strength	138,442	44,088	45,594	2,187	230,291	
	Fulfillment rate	90.3%	96.4%	96.4%	91.2%	92.6%	
FY2012	Authorized Strength	151,063	45,517	47,097	3,495	247,172	4.6453 trillion yen
	Actual Strength	136,573	42,007	42,733	3,213	224,526	
	Fulfillment rate	90.4%	92.3%	90.7%	91.9%	90.8%	
FY2017	Authorized Strength	150,856	45,363	46,942	3,993	247,154	4.8676 trillion yen
	Actual Strength	138,126	42,289	42,785	3,589	226,789	
	Fulfillment rate	91.6%	93.2%	91.1%	89.9%	91.8%	
Change over 15 years	Authorized Strength	-12,474	-463	-338	+2,139	-11,136	-71.6 billion yen
	Actual Strength	-10,100	-2,086	-2,698	+1,867	-13,017	

Source: Annual Defense White Paper (Defense of Japan) of corresponding year

(2) The contradictions of increasing JSDF missions and current government policies

For a military organization like the JSDF, human elements are critically important. Moreover, the “multi-domain defense capability” and “cross-domain operations” that are laid out in the 2018 NDPG, along with the various measures needed to keep the JSDF’s capabilities in new fields like space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum globally competitive, will require more personnel than today. Furthermore, the international security cooperation called for in this document demands an increase in staff.

However, neither the GOJ nor the J-MOD has mentioned an increase in personnel in the NDPG or Mid-Term Defense Build-Up Documents to carry out the new missions laid out in the NDPG. The GOJ’s policy inevitably forces the JSDF to conduct an increased number of new missions with its fixed current personnel strength. In other words, the personnel situation to meet more new mission assignments will be thin and widely stretched among additional new units.

While acknowledging recruitment is a problem, the GOJ and J-MOD appear to have given up on finding a solution. For this reason, it is believed that each branch of the JSDF is just managing to address the new domains laid out in the NDPG by transferring some personnel from existing units to new ones. The real risk of this method, which is a tentative attempt to get out of the immediate pinch, is that both the receiving units and the sending units are not at a 100% fulfillment rate – the size of the pie is fixed, but the number of eaters has increased. But

under the GOJ’s current policy of not increasing personnel, this transfer method, or “diluting magic,” is the only feasible solution for the JSDF to meet its new requirements, even just tentatively. Thus, the capability of the JSDF as a whole will decline.


The only fundamental solution is to increase both the total authorized strength and number of actual JSDF service personnel. But this option was not included in the 2018 NDPG because it is difficult to recruit JSDF personnel when the government’s broader policy is to reduce the number of civil servants to cut down on overall personnel expenses in the national budget.

(3) Decrease in the number of potential applicants (number of births)

The number of births is a major factor in recruiting JSDF service personnel. There were about 2.7 million births per year in the first post- World War II baby boom period (1947-49), and about 2.1 million in the second (1971-74). However, the number of births fell below 2 million in 1975, and has continued to decline since. It fell below 1.5 million in 1984, and has trended downward since 1991. In 2016 it fell below 1 million for the first time since 1899, the first year the statistic was tabulated. (Chart 1)

There were about 1.3 million births in 2000, the current generation of 20-year olds being targeted for recruitment. That is only about 60% of the 2.1 million births per year during the second baby boom period, when the JSDF competed with private companies to recruit personnel during Japan’s high-economic-growth period. In other words, the current situation is significantly worse than what was previously the biggest recruitment crisis in JSDF history.

[Chart 1]



Source: “Part 1 Current Status of Countermeasures against Declining Birthrate (Summary),” 2018 Declining Birthrate White Paper (Summary), Cabinet Office Home Page, p.6, <https://www8.cao.go.jp/shoushi/shoushika/whitepaper/measures/english/w-2018/pdf/part1-1.pdf>.

Considering the declining trend of births, it is unlikely that the recruitment environment will improve in the future.

(4) Slowly improving treatment of JSDF service personnel

Examining the treatment of JSDF service personnel is important when analyzing the difficulty in recruiting them. Service personnel are, in general, obligated to live in designated on-base barracks or military quarters and ships, and to maintain a 24-hour mission readiness status to ensure a possible response to any type of national security contingency or disaster. Additionally, to conceal troop operations and maintain the confidentiality of military activities and information, access to smartphones and the internet – both now indispensable to young people – is usually highly restricted. JSDF service personnel work under significantly more severe restrictions than typical workers in civil society. In addition to those restrictions, service personnel work in or are deployed to significantly more dangerous environments and missions than other occupations.

Nevertheless, JSDF service personnel’ salaries and allowances have not received the same treatment as salaries of employees at private companies (Chart 2). It is true that the food, clothing and berthing of JSDF service personnel are government-issued. However, it is clear that the current status of the JSDF salary system is a significant constraint on recruiting service personnel.

[Chart 2]

High school degree	JSDF official cadet (fixed-term personnel)	General sergeant cadet (trained as “sergeant”)	Private-sector employee
	130,800 yen	166,500 yen	161,300 yen
University degree	Officer cadet/second lieutenant		Private-sector employee
	222,000 yen / 244,800 yen (second lieutenant with undergraduate degree)*		203,400 yen
	243,100 yen (graduate degree) / 252,800 yen (first lieutenant with graduate degree)*		231,400 yen (graduate degree)

Source: KOUMUIN Research Institute, Nov. 17, 2018, <https://koumu.in/articles/1132q>

KOUMUIN Research Institute, Apr. 27, 2018, <https://koumu.in/articles/768>

2. Specific measures

(1) Resolving recruitment difficulties through an all-Japan/all-GOJ effort

The GOJ must face the fact that the J-MOD and the JSDF alone cannot solve the recruitment problems. A structural solution, which will require new ideas not bound by conventional frameworks, is needed.

The NDPG notes that securing human resources and improving the ability and morale of JSDF personnel are “essential to strengthening defense capability.” In addition to expanding the hiring pool, the guidelines also promote raising the retirement age and utilizing female JSDF personnel to secure human resources. Pursuing these kinds of policies is a natural course of action, and the JSDF has to realize them by all means and at any cost. But implementing these measures within the J-MOD and JSDF is, generally speaking, a superficial plan, and they will not serve as a fundamental solution to the difficulty of recruiting JSDF service personnel.

There is no simple solution, but solving the problem will require reconsidering the rules and norms of recruitment across all of Japanese society, including government, the business world, academia, media and so on.

(2) Improving treatment of JSDF service personnel to reflect their work

As stated above, the salary system for JSDF service personnel should be improved to be comparable to that of private-sector workers, and to reflect the highly restricted and dangerous nature of their duties. Specifically, it is necessary to improve life planning and stability support, as service personnel must retire at a young age. In particular, JSDF service personnel salary, which is just “slightly” higher than the national average for people in the same age cohort, should be raised to a level that justifies their risks and sacrifices. It goes without saying that in addition to the salary system, civil society’s support and respect for JSDF personnel who risk their lives in their duties for the nation and its people are also important.

Yoji Koda

Proposal 5 , Information strategy

Japan should understand the significance of and establish mechanisms for strategic communications.

The spread of fake news is dramatically changing the strategic importance of information passing between countries. That means it is urgent that Japan clearly communicate its policies for international security cooperation to the rest of the world. Additionally, an integrated government communications strategy should be implemented to counteract the negative communications strategies of revisionist states and non-state actors trying to undermine the international order.

1. What are strategic communications

Strategic communication is “the use of words, actions, images or symbols to influence the

attitudes and opinions of target audiences to shape their behaviour in order to advance interests or policies or to achieve objectives,” according to Neville Bolt, the director of the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications at King’s College in London. Under the heading of “Building comprehensive architecture for national defense,” the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond say “Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications by systematically combining all available policy tools.” The need for this “strategic communication” is growing rapidly.

2. The strategic communication Japan should carry out

It is insufficient to simply execute the international security cooperation proposed in this document. Japan also must communicate the objectives and significance of its policies to the rest of the world in a clear and strategic manner with consistent logic. Staying true to one’s words doubles their impact. In particular, Japan’s capacity building assistance is often met with gratitude in receiving countries, but without these ongoing efforts being effectively and strategically communicated, they will be underrated on the world stage.

This is a hindrance in increasing Japan’s soft power, and it makes it more difficult to obtain sustained support for these programs from Japanese taxpayers. It is essential to develop a clear strategy for international security cooperation that can be easily understood, and to communicate it effectively both to the Japanese people and to the rest of the world. Japan needs to follow the example of the UK, for example, which laid out its International Defense Engagement Strategy in 2017 so as to develop a similarly clear strategy and spread information accordingly. The strategy for international security cooperation (proposal 2-1, p.9) and the Capacity Building Assistance Charter (proposal 2-2, p.12) in this document contribute to that goal.

The importance of strategic communication is also increasing in the field of counter-misinformation. The internet is flooded with fake news, and populist administrations that prioritize narrow national interests and have no interest in the international order have risen to power. The influence operations by Russia and others on these populists has become apparent. Intergovernmental cooperation and education for civil society are urgently needed to deal with the increasing intensity of information warfare, both in the cyber domain and elsewhere.

The first thing Japan should do is give shape to the literacy of both government officials and ordinary citizens in order to understand the nature of the information warfare spreading throughout the world. Currently the National Security Secretariat under the prime minister handles coordination among relevant government agencies, including for defense in the cyber domain. In addition to cyber defense, creating a function for strategic communication in the National Security Secretariat that can both strategically dispatch messages and counter

malicious fake news, along with providing a unified government plan of action, would be a good first step.

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