

Defense Diplomacy of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

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Admiral Takei retired from active duty in December 2016 after having served for two years as the 32nd Chief of Staff of the JMSDF. Prior to assuming this post, he served as the Commandant, JMSDF Yokosuka District (2012-2014); Vice Chief of Staff, JMSDF (2011-2012); Commandant, JMSDF Ominato District (2010-2011); Director, the MSO Operations and Plans Department (N3/N5) (2008-2010); Chief of Staff, Kure District (2007-2008); Director, the C4I Systems Department (J6), Joint Staff Office (2006-2007), among others.

He joined the JMSDF after graduating from the National Defense Academy and holds a master's degree from the University of Tsukuba. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, class of 1999. In 2016, Admiral Takei was awarded the Legion of Honour (L'ordre national de la Légion d'honneur) by the Government of France and has been awarded the Legion of Merit from the U.S. four times, as well as the Legion of Merit from Turkey. After retirement from active duty, Admiral Takei assumed the position of CNO's Distinguished International Fellow in the International Programs Department at the U.S. Naval War College in April 2017.

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The Maritime Self-Defense Force is essentially a navy.

On May 1, 1948, the Japan Coast Guard, or JCG, was established. It was modeled after the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and was initially tasked with guarding the coast of an outpost belonging to the (then) Department of Transportation. Although the USCG has always been a structured military organization,¹ and despite the fact that the JCG was given a wide range of missions (including what could be classified as naval activities, such as clearing obstructions to navigation, including mines) the JCG, at the behest of the General Headquarters of the Occupying Forces, had to be "nonmilitary".²

The Coastal Security Force [Kaijō Keibitai], the predecessor of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), was established on April 26, 1952, alongside the newly-revised JCG Law. Although the organization was placed under the JCG, the Coastal Security Force was created from the beginning as an organization dedicated to maritime defense³, as evidenced by the fact that it was established through the U.S. government at a time when rearmament of Japan was seen as creating a bulwark against Communism during the preceding years.⁴ The Coastal Security Force became the Maritime Safety Force [Keibitai] just a few months later, in August of that year, and on July 1, 1954, it was finally reorganized as the JMSDF. The Japanese government frequently referred to the Self-Defense Force as a military organization in the Diet sessions, despite its ostensibly nonmilitary status.⁵ Further evidence of the JMSDF's de facto status as a navy was the invitation for the first time to the International Sea Power Symposium hosted by the U.S. Navy, which was established in 1969. The JMSDF has also been invited to both the U.S. Naval Command College and Naval Staff College for foreign naval officers since the program's inception. The JMSDF is not a navy technically, but in terms of equipment, organization, operations, education, and training it is essentially a navy both from a domestic and international perspective.⁶

This paper positions the JMSDF as a navy and discusses the evolution and future prospects of the JMSDF's defense diplomacy within the larger context of global naval diplomacy.

Diplomatic Role of the Navy

The scope and content of naval diplomacy have changed in response to changing times and strategic environments.

At a time when maritime transportation was limited to ships, warships were seen as the safest mode of transportation. Military vessels were not merely means of transport; they also functioned as a physical manifestation of a nation's diplomatic presence and as a venue to host events. The purpose of naval diplomacy at this time was exclusively gunboat diplomacy.

According to Yasunobu Somura, a specialist in diplomatic history and international politics, the U.S. Navy was born out of the Revolutionary War and started out solely on a mission of *guerre de course* (commerce raiding).⁷ Following the Anglo-American War of 1812, the United States learned that a strong fleet was necessary to protect coastal trade and shipping routes. The nature of war was changing, and if the goal was to completely disrupt enemy commerce, then one had to hold the enemy's ports by offensive naval operations from the outset.⁸

Learning from this lesson, the U.S. Navy's primary role in the 19th century was to protect U.S. maritime commerce by sending as many warships as possible to the Mediterranean and African coasts to make shows of power. For Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who later led the U.S. Navy's East India Squadron to force Japan to open its doors to the United States, his first campaign was "negotiations" with the pirates of Algiers in 1815, which was typical gunboat diplomacy. Through these operations, Perry learned that the more aggressive and overwhelming a demonstration was, the more effective it proved to be as a show of force and deterrent to would-be belligerents.⁹ According to Somura, in Perry's time, "showing the flag," when warships visited other countries' ports for diplomatic purposes, was inseparably intertwined with gunboat diplomacy. Naval power became so synonymous with international relations that it was apparent that deft usage resulted in strengthened international relations, but too heavy a hand could result in one-sided bullying and intimidation.¹⁰ A warship needed to show that her visit's purpose was friendship and goodwill while maintaining the dignity of a navy. Commodore Perry's East India Squadron consisted of 10 warships, including the newly commissioned frigate *Susquehanna* and three transports. It was the largest fleet available to the U.S. at the time for overseas demonstrations.¹¹

Ken Booth, writing in 1977 at the height of the Cold War, categorized the navy's functions into three functions: military, policing, and diplomacy. These three were referred to as a trinity. According to Booth, the unifying characteristic of this trinity is provided by the idea of "the use of the sea."¹² The three diplomatic functions are "negotiation from strength," "manipulation," and "prestige."¹³

"Negotiation for strength" is the traditional function of navies. It is typically a political demonstration of naval force which seeks to achieve diplomatic objectives through the display of naval power. "Manipulation" refers to the usage of naval power to influence political decisions. "Prestige" is basically the promotion of a country's image and status, which, while more indirect than the other two functions, is no less important.¹⁴

In his 1990 book at the end of the Cold War, some 13 years after Booth, Eric Grove argued that the overriding purpose of the "use of the sea" as the basis of Booth's trinity theory is the use of the sea for diplomatic or military purposes rather than commercial ones due to internationalization of the oceans and changes in the security environment during the Cold War.¹⁵ Grove said that due to the United States' traditional superpower status and the public's perception that America was responsible for the defense of the West, the White House would not hesitate to project and fully utilize naval power when necessary.¹⁶

Grove then redefined the content of Booth's three functions, replacing the diplomatic role with yet another definition coined by James Cable. Grove stated that while Booth's definitions were a means to an end, Cable's definition was more concretely that end.¹⁷

Cable identified two diplomatic roles: showing the flag and gunboat diplomacy. While Somura distinguished between these two, Cable held that showing the flag was often used broadly as a synonym for gunboat diplomacy. Cable also took the view that showing the flag was an act involving the use or threat of limited naval power for a specific purpose, reminding foreigners more generally of the presence of another country's navy.¹⁸ He also specifically defined gunboat diplomacy as "the use or threat of limited naval force by a government, short of an act of war, in order to secure an advantage or to avert loss - either in an international dispute or to against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state". This definition could theoretically encompass all naval activities, but practically-speaking, naval movements, visits, exercises, and other benign actions that pose no threat are usually not considered as part of this gunboat diplomacy function.¹⁹

Kevin Rowlands, writing in 2019, 35 years after Booth, states that the theories of Booth, Cable, and other strategists up to the end of the 20th century are not suitable for 21st century naval diplomacy. He contends that there are significant differences between the theories of Booth et al. and the modern reality, and that this divergence in the global context from those past experiences is accelerating at a previously-unfathomable rate due to the effects of globalization.²⁰ Rowlands expands the category of naval diplomacy to include occupation, offensive operations, and blockading, all of which are considered acts of war under international law. This differs significantly from Booth's view of the navy's diplomatic role as a foreign policy apparatus that does not involve the actual use of force and from Cable's view that a diplomatic action, as long as it is couched under the guise of diplomacy, does not amount to an act of war.²¹

The reason for this difference of opinion between Cable and Rowlands, both Cold War strategists, can be attributed solely to the change in the strategic environment. The Cold War was a time of super-accelerated changes in military technology, international policies, and by extension, a time of great change for the role of a navy. A polarized global structure, rapid economic development of India and China, dramatically transformed naval theatre with the entrance non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations and NGOs, and the proliferation of internationally-active maritime law enforcement agencies, all contributed to a shifting landscape for naval operations.²² On top of all this, the very nature of "war" has transformed from clearly-defined conflicts between nations to extended gray-area operations fought by proxy or through non-state entities, which has led to a perpetual state of operational activity that can neither be classified as war or peace.

In his paper in 1986, Cable noted that "gunboat diplomacy has a life expectancy independent of the technical characteristics of the warship involved," and noted that naval diplomacy does not lose its significance in spite of changing times and military technology. Grove also states that "navies will continue to be used in these [triad] roles as they have in the past, although the balance of context in

which they work may change."²³ In other words, it can be assumed that while the core trinity of naval functions will remain consistent, their content will continue to adapt with changing circumstances of the modern operational environment.

JMSDF's Diplomacy

Training operations to foreign ports, colloquially known within the JMSDF as Overseas Training Cruises, became the first opportunity for the JMSDF to dispatch a ship flying their ensign of the Rising Sun. The first training cruise was Hawaii in January 1958, four years after the establishment of the JMSDF. The second took place in October of the same year, carrying the first graduates of the National Defense Academy and visiting the west coast of North America.²⁴ The countries and ports of call were expanded each year, including Europe in the sixth year and a circumnavigation around the world in the 12th year. At each port of call, the JMSDF offered flowers to the national memorial and participated in local parades in order to show a friendlier, more authentic representation of what the Maritime Self-Defense Force really was. The purpose of the training cruise to distant seas is to cultivate the familiarity and international awareness of the junior officers and to promote friendship and goodwill with the countries they visit.²⁵ Beginning from the mid-1960s, the course was selected from five regions in sequence (East and West Coast of North America, West Coast of North America and East Coast of South America, Oceania and West Coast of South America, and Europe) and the ports of call were selected in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The concept of the Overseas Training Cruise falls under Booth's definition of a navy's diplomatic function being "prestige" or "showing the flag" with the aim of political goodwill.

Yukio Sato, a former ambassador of Japan to Australia in 1996, said that the sight of the training fleet offering flowers at the national memorials for the war dead everywhere it visited helped to ease the bad feelings that surfaced in the 50th year after the war, and also gained respect from people in various fields and at various levels.²⁶ The diplomatic effect of the gesture was significant. Admiral Makoto Sakuma, former chairman of the Joint Staff who participated as a trainee in the second Overseas Training Cruise, described the scene when the squadron arrived in San Francisco for the first time after the Pacific War as follows:

“When we entered San Francisco, we passed under the Golden Gate Bridge, and I felt a big stir of the Japanese-Americans who had come to meet us at the wharf. I thought it was really amazing. They were moved to see a Japanese destroyers come in after the war, flying the JMSDF ensign, the same flag as the Japanese navy ensign. And there were three ships of Japan-constructed, so I think they were deeply impressed.”²⁷

In the era of gunboat diplomacy, larger forces resulted in more drastic results. The same thinking can apply to missions with the goal of goodwill. In the case of the Training Squadron's first postwar visit to North America, which Admiral Sakuma participated in, three of the six ships were newly commissioned Japan-made destroyers (the rest on loan from the United States), and for the first voyage to Europe, all four of the mission's ships were large and modern Japan-constructed destroyers.²⁸ From Admiral Sakuma's comments, it can be said that the Training Squadron visibly demonstrated to the visiting countries that Japan was steadily recovering from the ruins of the war, and the "big stir" from the people who greeted the squadron indicated that the visit achieved a sufficient diplomatic effect.

During the Cold War, with the exception of the JMSDF leadership's visit to foreign countries and the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC, which the JMSDF has been participating in since 1980), there were few opportunities for JMSDF to go abroad, and the Overseas Training Cruise was its only diplomatic role.

After the end of the Cold War, the JMSDF's diplomatic role expanded geographically and in content through participation in multilateral frameworks. Using Booth's definition, the Cold War era was solely about "prestige," but now it began adding the connotation of "manipulation" aimed at gradually changing the political calculus of the countries involved through the use of naval power.

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS, established 1988) provided the JMSDF with an opportunity for multilateral discussion and cooperation on maritime-related issues. Although the WPNS was founded during the Cold War era, it gradually adapted to the new post-Cold War regional security environment and expanded its multilateral activities. In the early stages of the WPNS, it was decided that political issues and measures to build trust and security at sea would not be on the agenda, but as the discussions continued, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which provides for the prevention of accidents at sea in accordance with the US-Soviet Incident at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), was adopted. And the areas of cooperation were expanded to include mine warfare exercises and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises.²⁹

Another expansion of the JMSDF's mission came in the form of the National Defense Program Guideline for Japanese FY Heisei 16 (2005) and beyond (NDPG 16), which introduced a direction to prioritize "effective response to new threats and diverse situations" as the role of defense forces. In response to this, the JMSDF placed more emphasis on peacetime initiatives, while not changing its roles of the "defense of surrounding seas" and "ensuring the safety of maritime traffic."³⁰ The direction was to be actively involved in securing regional stability on a peacetime basis through participation in maritime security such as counter-piracy and HA/DR, and to ensure the safety of maritime traffic. In other words, the JMSDF expanded from reactive contingency-centric policies to more active peacekeeping operations aimed at ensuring continued safety for regional maritime traffic.³¹

On the heels of these operational expansions came the 2009 Japanese legislation titled "The Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy," which enabled the JMSDF to not only protect its own ships and the surrounding regions, but also to participate with other nations and conduct joint anti-

piracy operations in order to protect any nation's vessels.³² The counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia was a result of this new legislation, paving the way for the JMSDF to move toward maritime security through multilateral cooperation. Counter-piracy operations perform what Booth defined as a police function in the territorial waters of another country and in international waters within the framework of multilateral cooperation. Booth defined both naval policing functions as the concept of applying border security on land to the sea, with the navy assisting civil authorities in maintaining public order primarily in territorial waters.³³ However, in general, it is uncommon for the JMSDF to conduct maritime policing operations except in special circumstances that call for such an undertaking. An example of such an extenuating case is the March 1998 incident involving a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula. According to Rowlands, the three functions of a navy are not independent, overlapping a considerable amount. And, as Grove notes, Booth's trinity of functions may have changed in overlap and contents due to changes in the post-Cold War operational environment.³⁴

More recently, the implementation of JMSDF's long-term deployment to the Indo-Pacific has led to expanded operational roles. Since FY 2017, the JMSDF has been conducting long-term training cruises in the Indo-Pacific region, mainly in the South China Sea, by forming units with helicopter destroyers (DDH) and general-purpose destroyers (DD). Whereas previously the visiting ports had been selected solely as supply purpose for anti-piracy operations, etc., the ports of call and training have been selected based on foreign policy requirements. The purpose of deployment is to promote regional peace and stability by conducting joint training with regional navies and other naval forces to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation.³⁵ In FY 2019, these deployments gained a sharper political edge as they involved cruising disputed South China Sea areas alongside other navies whose nations were politically active in the area. And in addition to the navies of the region, this dispatched unit actively conducted joint training with the US, Indian, French, Australian, and Canadian navies,³⁶ the presence of the dispatched unit was seen by the countries in the region as the embodiment of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) vision. The presence of the dispatched unit was surely a strong diplomatic message.³⁷

Trends in Maritime Security and Prospects for Future Defense Diplomacy

If the U.S. national power continues to recede in this new era of great powers competition, it may alter the role of the U.S. as the sole superpower. Tomohiko Satake notes that although "Japan will complement the U.S. role through cooperation with various actors in the broader region as the U.S. unipolar system shakes out," "if the relative power of the U.S. continues to shrink, Japan, along with other democracies, will need to 'replace' some of the roles that the U.S. has played in the past."³⁸

The JMSDF has expanded its presence in the Indo-Pacific region as a means of implementing the FOIP vision, but the severe constraints on the JMSDF's human and material resources make it difficult to further replace the US Navy. In the future, more efforts will be needed to prioritize and optimize

domestic and international activities, as well as to expand joint opportunities with countries that share similar interests.

As Grove predicted in 1990, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994, greatly narrowed the scope of freedom of the seas and instead broadened the scope of coastal state jurisdiction, resulting in states becoming more aware of their rights and obligations in various maritime areas, which has affected the contents of naval diplomacy.³⁹

Japan, along with many other countries, has taken the position that traditional rights such as naval innocent passage are not bound by UNCLOS. On the other hand, if neighboring countries were to follow China's unilateral interpretation of the law to restrict the innocent passage of other countries' warships within their own territorial waters, or if the award of South China Sea Arbitration Court (July 2016), which is legally binding, did not change the existing situation in the South China Sea, the freedom of the sea on which naval diplomacy is based would be further narrowed.

In addition, as Katsuya Yamamoto of the National Institute for Defense Studies points out, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), under the command of China's Central Military Commission, is in process of being restructured as a military force.⁴⁰ Under the Chinese Coast Guard Law, which came into effect in February 2021, the CCG will be able to take necessary warning and control measures to stop foreign military ships and foreign government ships used for non-commercial purposes in the waters under China's jurisdiction, and to order them to leave immediately. For those who refuse to leave and pose a credible threat, the CCG will have the right to take measures such as forced eviction and forced towing.⁴¹ As a result, a time may come when the defense diplomacy deployed by the JMSDF in the South China Sea and East China Sea may also have to consider the possibility that diplomatic considerations and restrictions may need to be adjusted in reaction to this new CCG Law.

For Japan, a country surrounded by the sea on all sides, the JMSDF's defense diplomacy will never lose its significance. Just as the JMSDF quickly adapted to changes in the international environment after the Cold War and changed the content of its defense diplomacy accordingly, there is no doubt that the JMSDF will be called upon to continuously adapt to the uncertain international environment of this post-Cold War era.

(END)

¹ The U.S. Coast Guard is constituted as a part of the Armed Forces in accordance with the Act of January 28, 1915 (38 Statute 800, 14 U.S.C.), which provides that in peace time it operates under the Department of the Treasury (moved under the Department of Homeland Security in 2003) and in time of war or when ordered by the President, it operates as a part of the U.S. Navy. For a history of the Coast Guard, see the Coast Guard website (<https://www.history.uscg.mil/Complete-Time-Line/Time-Line-1900-2000/>). For the founding act to establish the Coast Guard, see, Act Creating the Coast Guard, 38 Stat. 800-802 28 January, 1915, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Mar/04/2002258693/-1/-1/0/1915-ACT_CREATING_USCG_38_STAT_800.PDF.

² James E. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*, Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1973, pp. 56-57.

³ NHK Hōdōkyoku “Jieitai” Shuzaihan [NHK News Bureau “Self-Defense Forces” Reporting Team], *Kaijōjieitai wa kōshite Umareta- “Y bunsho” ga akasu sōsetsu no himitsu [This is how the Maritime Self-Defense Force was born: ‘Y-document’ reveals secrets of its founding]*, NHK Shuppan, 2003, pp. pp. 260-261. In addition, the aforementioned work by James E. Auer details how the Kaijōkeibitai [Coastal Security Force] was born under the concept of rebuilding the Japanese Navy.

⁴ Ibid, pp.201-205.

⁵ For example, at the 119th Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, during the explanation of the purpose of the Kokusairengō Heiwa Kyōryoku Hōan [United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill] (submitted by the Cabinet) and questioning, then Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama stated, “The Self-Defense Forces are not a military in the normal sense of the term, but they are treated as a military under international law. The Self-Defense Forces personnel are considered to be members of armed forces. Shūgiin [House of Representatives] “Dai 119 kai Kokkai Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 4 gō [119th Plenary Session of the Diet, House of Representatives, No. 4]” (October 18, 2020), 033 Taro Nakayama, “Kaigiroku Jōhō [Meeting Minutes Information],”

<https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=111905254X00419901018&spkNum=33&single>.

⁶ In an interview with NHK, former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Hajime Sakuma, said, “Right now, the Maritime Self-Defense Force is not a navy, at least not in name. However, from an international perspective, I think it is a navy from any point of view...It is essentially a navy and a military.” NHK Hōdōkyoku “Jieitai” Shuzaihan, pp. 286-287.

⁷ Yasunobu Somura, *Perii wa naze nihon ni kitaka [Why Perry Came to Japan]*, Shinchosha, 1987, pp. 34-37.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 42-46.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 52-54.

¹⁰ Yasunobu Somura, *Kaiyō to Kokusaiseiji [Ocean and International Politics]*, Komine Shoten, 1970, p. 177.

¹¹ Somura, *Perii wa naze nihon ni kitaka*, pp. 148-152.

¹² Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, (published by Croom Helm Ltd. in 1977), Routledge, 2014, pp. 15-19.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 18-20.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁵ Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, Naval Institute Press, 1990, pp. 232-233.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 157-158.

¹⁷ Ibid, p195.

¹⁸ Sir James Cable, “Showing the flag: past and present,” *Naval Forces*, No. 3, 1987, p. 38.

¹⁹ Sir James Cable, “Gunboat Diplomacy's Future,” *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 112, No. 8, August 1986, p. 38.

²⁰ Kevin Rowlands, *Naval Diplomacy in the 21st Century, A Model for the Post-Cold War Global Order*, Routledge, 2019, p. 95.

²¹ Cable, “Gunboat Diplomacy's Future,” p. 38.

²² Rowlands, *Naval Diplomacy in the 21st Century, A Model for the Post-Cold War Global Order*, p. 95.

²³ Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, pp. 235-236.

²⁴ Kaijō Jieitai Renshū Kantai [Maritime Self-Defense Force Training Squadron], “Hōmonkoku Kikōchi Ichiranhyō [List of Countries Visited and Ports of Call],” *Enkō 40 nen [40 Years of Overseas Training Cruise]*, Enkō 40 nen Hensan iinkai, 1997, pp. 296-311.

²⁵ Yoshikawa, Eiji, “Enkō 50 nen ni yosete [A foreword of 50 years history of Overseas Training Cruise],” *Enkō 50 nen shi [50 years history of Maritime Self-Defense Force Overseas Training Cruise]*, Kaijō Jieitai Renshūkantai Shireibu, 2007.

²⁶ Yukio Sato, “Renshū Kantai wo mukaete – Yoki Dentō wo kizuku tameni [Welcoming the Training Fleet: Building a Better Tradition],” *Enkou 40 nen*, Enkou 40 nen Editorial Committee, 2007.

²⁷ Makoto Sakuma, *Sakuma Makoto Ōraru Hisutorī [Makoto Sakuma Oral History]*, vol. 1, Bōeishō Bōei Kenkūsho [The National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense], 2007, p. 51.

²⁸ Kaijō Jieitai Renshū Kantai, *Enkō 40 nen*, pp. 274-283.

²⁹ “The Western Pacific Naval Symposium”, *SEMAPHORE*, Sea Power Centre-Australia, Department of Defence, 14 July 2006, https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Semaphore_2006_14.pdf.

³⁰ Tomohisa Takei, “Kaiyō Shijidai ni okeru Kaijō Jieitai [The Maritime Self-Defense Force in the New Era],” *Hatō*, No. 199, 2008, p. 8.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 11-12.

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- ³² *Outline of the draft Anti-Piracy Measures Law*, Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/JPN_anti_piracy.pdf.
- ³³ Booth, *Navy and Foreign Policy*, pp. 17-18.
- ³⁴ Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, pp. 235-236.
- ³⁵ "Heisei 30 nendo Indo Taiheiyō Hōmen Haken Kunren [Indo Southeast Asia Deployment 2018] (ISEAD 18)," Maritime Self-Defense Force, <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/operation/cooperate/kaga-inazuma-suzutsuki/>.
- ³⁶ "Heisei 31 nendo Indo Taiheiyō Hōmen Haken Kunren [Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019] (IPD 19), FY 1991," Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/operation/cooperate/IPD19/>. The JMSDF's activities in the Indo-Pacific region under the FOIP concept are described in detail by Tomohiko Satake of the National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tomohiko Satake, "Chapter 7: Nihon 'Jiyū de Hirakareta Indotaiheiyō' ni muketa torikumi [Japan, working for 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific']," *East Asian Strategic Review 2020*, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2020, pp. 197-206)
- ³⁷ A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson reacted to the 2016 cruise of the destroyer Ise into the South China Sea prior to its Indo-Pacific deployment exercise as "an attempt by Japan to return to the South China Sea by military means." Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan Sends Helicopter Destroyer to South China Sea," *The Diplomat*, April 12, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japan-sends-helicopter-destroyer-to-south-china-sea/>.
- ³⁸ Tomohiko Satake, "Chapter 7: Nihon 'Jiyū de Hirakareta Indotaiheiyō' ni muketa torikumi," p. 196.
- ³⁹ Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, p. 187.
- ⁴⁰ Katsuya Yamamoto, "Chūgoku Kaikei mo Chūgoku Kyōsantō no Guntai de aru [The Chinese Coast Guard is also the Chinese Communist Party's military]," International Information Network Analysis IINA, November 17, 2020, https://www.spf.org/iina/articles/yamamoto_05.html.
- ⁴¹ "海警法 (草案) 征求意见[Call for Public Comment on the Draft Marine Police Law]," 中国人大网 gaikou, November 5, 2020.

About This Report

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About the Defense Diplomacy Project (FY 2019-21)

Building on the knowledge amassed through private-sector programs for defense exchange among Japan-China and Japan-Vietnam field officers and Japan-South Korea retired generals, SPF launched a research project in fiscal 2018 to study the policy implications of Japan's defense diplomacy, which has seen a dramatic expansion in terms of both quantity and quality. Reports published under the project include an outline of the aims and activities of defense diplomacy and case studies of initiatives being undertaken by six countries (Australia, Britain, China, France, South Korea, and United States) that are actively promoting defense diplomacy.

Report/Case Studies (in Japanese) <https://www.spf.org/security/programs/V20190143.html>

The project also published a policy proposal “Strengthening Japan's Defense Diplomacy” in 2021.

Policy proposal (in English) <https://www.spf.org/en/security/publications/20220322.html>



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