The Rationale of the US and its Expectations of its Allies at the NATO Warsaw Summit

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The NATO Warsaw Summit is regarded as a significant turning point for not only NATO but also for the security policy of the US towards its European allies and Russia after the end of the Cold War. Its impact is reflected in the phrase, “deterrence is back in Europe”, now that the Russian military threat is more seriously perceived by the US and its allies after a series of assertive Russian actions including annexation of Crimea by means of hybrid warfare in May 2014 and a series of other assertive Russian actions1. In fact, an agreement was made at the Warsaw Summit to energize the Readiness Action Plan and thus reassure NATO’s Eastern members by re-establishing effective deterrence with rotation-based deployment of NATO troops in the Baltic States and Poland. As the Economist magazine predicted, the summit was dominated by the threat posed by Russia, including its mechanized brigades, tanks, long-range air-defense systems and nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, which borders Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, this threat was paramount despite the fact that another threat exists in the South from Islamic State terrorism, involving people-traffickers and illegal migrants entering Europe2. This paper will focus on the US rationale of new initiatives and its expectations of its allies at the NATO Warsaw Summit.

1. The Implications of the RAND Corporation’s Wargames

The US think tank RAND Corporation conducted a series of wargames between summer 2014 and spring 2015 concerning the posture of NATO. Their findings affected how US policy experts planned future US policy with regard to NATO’s policies and military posture. Specifically, the findings suggested that NATO’s current military posture is not sufficient for successfully defending the territory of most Baltic member states from a potential Russian invasion3.

The report stresses that the defense of the Baltic countries is an urgent strategic challenge for NATO. It believes that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, may be attempting to re-establish greater

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Russian influence over the former territory of the Soviet Union. In fact, Russia has conducted military campaigns against Georgia, and Donbass and Crimea in Ukraine, which used to be part of the territory of the Soviet Union. Three of the Baltic States were also territories of the Soviet Union. In addition, like Crimea or Donbass of Ukraine, two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations. The report concludes that the fears of the two countries with regard to Russian military action are legitimate\textsuperscript{4}.

In September 2014, US President Obama confirmed that the application of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was “crystal clear” in a speech at the Estonian capital, Tallinn. US policy experts consider it imperative to consider a contingency plan in case of a Russian invasion of NATO allies in East Europe. Thus, the RAND Corporation conducted wargames to simulate a Russian invasion into the Baltic States.

The games assumed an invasion of Russian forces from the Western MD (Military District) and Kaliningrad, in which approximately 27 maneuver battalions occupied either Estonia or Latvia or both. The strategic goal of the invasion was assumed to be to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its vulnerable members and divide the alliance of NATO members, as this would reduce the threat against Russia\textsuperscript{5}.

The result of the wargames was dramatically in Russia’s favor due to the limited presence of NATO forces, their lack of tactical mobility, and their poor equipment. As the NATO forces appear not to be sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or for restoring territorial integrity to NATO members, NATO’s current posture could fundamentally change the strategic picture from Moscow’s perspective. The RAND report urges that NATO needs to restore a more-robust deterrent by hitting the pause button on the ongoing reductions in military capability within Europe. It also suggests substantial investments to facilitate transportation infrastructure for military operations. It concludes that a deterrent posture would not be unaffordable, especially when compared with the potential costs of failure to defend NATO’s allies in the Baltic States\textsuperscript{6}.

2. The Perception of the Russian Threat According to a US Think Tank Consortium

In April 2016, a think tank consortium in Washington published a policy recommendation entitled “Alliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era” in anticipation of the Warsaw Summit in July of that year\textsuperscript{7}. It clearly reflects the wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation, as well as the anxiety of the US

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
regarding the defense of the territory of its trans-Atlantic allies. They propose ten priorities for NATO. One of them is to “move beyond the existing Readiness Action Plan to enhance defense and deterrence in NATO's east.” This suggests that their strategic thinking focuses on the power balance along with the border with Russia and beyond.

Their analysis of the potential threat from Russia not only considers the conventional military balance but also the strategic and comprehensive approach known as “hybrid warfare”. The report stresses that Russia is conducting “new generation warfare” by employing a variety of coercive and subversive tools such as informational and psychological manipulation, cyber warfare, energy blackmail, use of proxies and special forces, rapid mobilization, direct military intervention and the threat of nuclear weapons.

The “Alliance Revitalized” report realizes that NATO member countries facing the South and Southeast front have a different threat perception to their Eastern allies. Rather than being preoccupied with Russia, the NATO member countries facing the South and Southeast front have to deal with the flood of refugees escaping from the Syrian conflict. Libya remains unstable, being a safe haven for terrorists from ISIS and other groups. Many refugees are pouring into Turkey from Syria, seeking an opportunity to reach the shores of Europe. The South and Southwest allies also face the threat of potential terrorists moving into their territory.

The report points out that as the South and Southwest allies face different challenges from those in the East, fissures could arise between them. As a result, discussions between the allies are essential in order to address the potential crises on the Eastern flank facing Russia, and on the South and Southwest flanks facing the Middle East.

3. Policy Recommendations by US Think Tanks Regarding the Eastern Flank

“The Alliance Revitalized” report proposes a three-track Russia policy: “deterring Russia where necessary; continuous communication and selective engagement with the regime where useful; and proactive engagement with the broadest range of Russian societal actors as possible.”

Track one is to send a signal to Moscow to deter further intimidation and to reassure allies and partners. The report recommends the following six policies for NATO.

- Deploy multinational battalions forward to defend all of NATO’s territory.
- Reject any effort by Russia to negotiate the future of eastern European over the heads of those societies.
- Strengthen non-recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine.

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8 Ibid. p.11.
9 Ibid. p.3.
10 Ibid. p.6.
11 Ibid. p.4.
- Maintain sanctions against Russia until full implementation of the Minsk agreement on Ukraine peace. Replace six-month reviews of sanctions to open-ended sanctions until conditions warrant change or additional reviews.
- Put pressure on Moscow to let international organizations monitor the situation on the ground.

Track two is to engage in continuous communication with Russia to minimize misunderstanding with Russia on the above-mentioned strengthening of deterrence capability. First, NATO should continue to work with Russia on selected issues such as terrorism, ISIS, Syria, North Korea, Iran and climate change. Secondly, NATO should follow up on the NATO-Russia Council meeting of April 20, 2016 to reduce the risks of military incidents and escalation. Thirdly, NATO should revitalize the conventional arms control framework with Russia through the confidence-building measures described in the Vienna Document of the OSCE, which is on the verge of being de facto defunct due to the renewal of the CFE treaty and modernization of the Open Skies Agreement. Fourthly, NATO should reinforce the nuclear security mechanism through continued START Treaty implementation, examining the INF treaty system, and discussing the missile defense system, dual-use delivery system and tactical nuclear weapons.

Track three is for the Western nations and non-governmental institutions to communicate with Russian society as a whole in order to promote Russia’s return to a shared sense of purpose with the West and to reduce tensions. Although the report realizes that these remedies must be sensitive to Russian suspicions of subversion by a Western organization, they are nevertheless necessary.

The report concludes that all three tracks should be conducted via extensive trans-Atlantic consultation and be a part of the united vision of Russia as part of a new Europe. In general, these policy recommendations seem to be an attempt to balance against potential Russian aggression and intimidation and pro-active engagement, as a means to avoid endless deterioration in confrontations with Russia. Still, the measures described in Track One, such as forward deployment of multinational battalions, remain a crucial part of the balancing act. The US rationale can therefore be understood as a reaction to the results of the RAND wargames, which indicate that a deterrent against Russia must be created as a matter of some urgency.

4. Policy Recommendations by US Think Tanks Regarding the Southern Flank
Considering the complex nature of the challenges at the South and Southwest NATO borders, the “The Alliance Revitalized” report recommends a broad and flexible southern strategy of “comprehensive support”. Eight policy recommendations are given, and are apparently asymmetric to those pertaining to the Eastern flank.

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12 Ibid. p.5.
13 Ibid. p.5.
14 Ibid.p.6.
Collective defense must be applied to the south as well as to the east, and should include missile and air defenses against states like Iran as well as a new maritime approach to transform Operation Active Endeavour into a more active mission. Moreover, standing maritime forces must be increased.

NATO must continue to invest in its Readiness Action Plan, especially the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a multinational land brigade of around 5,000 troops with air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

The core task in NATO’s south is crisis management, including missions in Afghanistan and Libya.

Cooperative security such as more NATO-EU cooperation will be important for stability in the south.

Enhancing surveillance efforts, refining the role of airpower in low-intensity conflicts and strengthening intelligence sharing is important.

For the challenges of Syria and Libya, NATO should be prepared to play a constructive role including supporting discussions with Turkey in particular.

NATO should support a UN-led international effort to create stability and stand ready to help Libya’s indigenous military but should not play a direct military role since it may exacerbate tensions in the region.

Considering the increased pressure from Russia, NATO must focus on deterrence measures, particularly at the Turkish-Syrian border. Article 4 consultations will remain an important part of the strategy.

The “Alliance Revitalized” report defines how to respond to the threat from the South as well as the East. It is important to realize that at present diverse threat perceptions exist among NATO members, in contrast to the Cold War era. At the same time, the report does recognize the pressure from Russia at the Turkish-Syrian border and other areas on the southern front.

5. US Think Tanks Propose Policy Initiatives to NATO
Taking into account the above-mentioned two major concerns of the European allies and the US interests, the “Alliance Revitalized” report proposes ten priorities for NATO in order to shape an agreeable consensus among the NATO allies in Europe that would conform with the core US national interests concerning European security.

1. Build “full spectrum” deterrence and defense as the keystone of the Warsaw Summit.
2. Move beyond the Readiness Action Plan to enhance defense and deterrence in NATO’s east.
3. Be prepared for immediate deployments in extremis.
4. Meet anti-access area denial (A2/AD) challenges.
5. Refocus NATO’s maritime capabilities on collective defense and flexible deployments.
6. Maintain nuclear deterrence and continue apace with missile defenses.
7. Enhance NATO’S core task of crisis management.
8. Maximize resilience.
10. Create continuous strategic awareness and procedures for rapid decision-making.

It seems that six of these ten proposals critically influenced the decisions taken at the NATO Warsaw Summit. The first initiative, regarding construction of “full spectrum” deterrence and defense, was a key subject at the Warsaw Summit. The driving force behind this proposal was apparently the threat posed by Russia, such as invasion, annexation of territory, intimidation via energy cutoffs and nuclear saber-rattling. The report points out that NATO is simply not ready to handle those challenges due to its inadequate military structure and political disposition and because recent Russian doctrine and technology have made NATO’s challenges even larger.

In addition, deterrence in the south of NATO is more complicated than the Russian challenge. Unlike Russia, the objective of NATO is not to create one nation-state. The threat in the South could come from Iranian missiles, an attack by ISIS or other terrorist group, an assault on Turkey or a flood of refugees from Middle East.

An inconvenient fact is that the NATO member countries facing the Eastern flank and facing the Southern flank do not necessarily share the same threat perception. The report quotes NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s phrase “full spectrum deterrence” in order to dissuade and deter threats to member countries from the East, to the South, and across all domains. The report tries to emphasize Russian involvement in the Middle East and North Africa as a common denominator among the eastern and southern members. The most urgent priority is to engender a shared threat perception among the allied partners.

The second initiative, which is designed to move beyond the Readiness Action Plan, is a proposal to implement deterrence in the East. The report clearly states the importance of reassuring the eastern allies about possible threats that could be posed by Russia after its annexation of Crimea. It also states that the Obama administration’s intention to quadruple its funding for Washington’s European Reassurance Initiative is the upgrade of the US engagement in European security. The effective US message to the European allies, who felt uncomfortable with the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” initiative, could be interpreted as an attempt to distance themselves from the defense of Europe. This new initiative could be regarded as rebalancing the “Asia rebalance” act.

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15 Ibid. p. iv.
16 Ibid. p. 10.
17 Ibid. p. 11.
18 Interview with Jim Townsend, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO
The forth initiative, which is designed to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges, is a new element in the rationale concerning NATO defenses. “Anti-access” capability means the capability to limit allied use of the global commons and raise barriers to effective US and allied power projection and impose a high cost on interventions such as US reinforcement to allies in need. The capability includes modern surveillance and strike assets like satellites and cruise/ballistic missiles as well as cyber, space, and counter-space systems and proxies like terrorists and foreign para-militaries. “Area denial”(AD) capability is the capability to deny allied efforts to operate for stability and crisis management outside of NATO territory with all kinds of military means such as air defenses, precision guided missiles, rockets, and artillery, mines, weapons of mass destruction and irregular warfighting19.

This A2/AD concept has been used in mainly in the East Asian theater to defend US allies from potential Chinese attempts to deny the US access to the area20. Introduction into the European theater implies the US re-recognition of modernized Russian military capability in Kaliningrad, the Crimea and the Arctic coast. At the same time, the report states that the A2/AD challenge extends beyond Russia and applies to the South in the case of Iran’s warnings that it could close the Strait of Hormuz. It also stresses that the need to enhance Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that are ‘A2/AD proof’ and therefore depend less on space-based assets. It recommends an alternative ISR system for precision navigation and timing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and ‘aerial layer’ options for communications21.

The fifth initiative, which is designed to refocus maritime capabilities on collective defense and flexible deployment, is meant to act as reassurance to the allies facing the southern flank. NATO’s maritime flanks, from the Atlantic and High North through the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, are facing assertive action by Russia. This could be harassment of civilian ships, enhanced A2/AD capabilities and suspected submarine incursions into the territorial waters of NATO members. In addition, the Mediterranean is the main conduit for refugees fleeing to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa. The report recommends revising the Alliance Maritime Strategy, strengthening the two existing NATO Standing Maritime Groups and its two Counter-mining Groups, generating a maritime component for the Very High Readiness Task Force, creating a NATO Black Sea fleet and so on22.

The sixth initiative, which is designed to maintain nuclear deterrence and to continue apace with missile defenses, is a critical form of assurance to all the European allies, who have faced the Russian

19 Binnendijk et.al. op.cit. p.15.
21 Binnendijk et.al. op.cit. p. 16.
22 Ibid.pp.16-17
nuclear threat since the Cold War era. It is reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence as a core element of NATO. A novel factor is to deter the new Russian nuclear building programs and exercises, which have caused concern among the allies given that they illustrate Russia’s willingness to lower the nuclear threshold. Russia’s likely violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty also raises concerns as it may deconstruct the stabilizing factor of US–Russian arms control efforts.23

The tenth initiative, which proposes strategic awareness and procedures for rapid decision-making, represent an important message from the US. The report points out that SHAPE’s Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center is overwhelmed and NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Center is limited. NATO needs to build a new architecture to deliver a military strategic effect and to analyze and connect a huge amount of data. The report proposes creating a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Assessment for more rapid decision making based on multi-source intelligence.24

6. How does NATO Match Means to Missions?

The “Alliance Revitalized” report, which represents the consensus in Washington-based think tanks, presents major four paths in order to generate the appropriate capacity to fulfill NATO’s missions. The first path involves narrowing the gap between missions undertaken by NATO members and the means they give to execute them. The report recognizes that NATO members do not maintain a sufficient level of ready forces and defense investment. These defense reductions have created large capability gaps including gaps in readiness, procurement of major defense items, active duty units, particularly in ground forces, deployability and sustainment, stockpiles of ammunition and plans to reconstitute forces.

The report highlights the positive outcomes of the Wales Summit, at which NATO leaders pledged to reach defense spending of 2% of GDP within a decade, and notes that the members reaffirmed the Wales pledge. It shows that every US citizen pays almost five times the amount paid by each EU and non-US NATO citizen, given that a US citizen pays $2,051 (amounting to 3.5% of GDP when considered on a national scale) per capita on defense whereas an EU or non-US NATO citizen pays $370 (amounting to 1.56% of GDP across the relevant regions). Besides, the report states that the 20% pledge for major equipment and research will be crucial to keep up with the pace of change in major technology. It suggests that a similar pledge for the cyber domain is adopted at the Warsaw Summit. Importantly, the report warns the European allies that an imbalance in burden sharing on defense technology between the US and the rest of the NATO is not sustainable politically or militarily.25

As the second path, the report encourages development of the Smart Defense and Connected Forces Initiatives concepts adopted at the 2012 NATO Chicago summit. The concepts entail driving

24 Ibid. p.28.
efficient spending of limited defense resources among the allies and encourage countries to coordinate
to develop, acquire and maintain defense equipment in pooling and sharing arrangements, thus reducing
unnecessary duplication. The report considers that progress has been made but the concepts cannot
compensate for low European defense spending. It points out that the creation of Framework Nations to
lead a broader regional defense effort, which was agreed on at the 2014 Wales Summit, is an effective
tool that would allow the smaller nations to fill in the gaps in the capabilities of the larger nations26.

The third path involves dealing with the fact that the technological gap between NATO and its
competitors is closing. The report encourages NATO to look ahead for ways to leverage innovation in
order to maintain a technological advantage over its adversaries. One such approach is the US Defense
Department’s “Third Offset Strategies”, which would create new technologies, organizational structure,
and operational techniques to offset the advantages of an adversary. This kind of advantage offsetting
was carried out twice during the Cold War, when the US and NATO took such action against the USSR.
It suggests that offset strategies in Europe would involve encompassing high technology with innovative
whole-of-government concepts to counter ambiguous threats and danger in Crimea or Ukraine.

The forth path entails strengthening the partnership between the United Nations, European Union,
the African Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Arab League. It also stresses the importance of military
interoperability with partner organizations as well as in designated countries such as Sweden, Finland,
Australia, Georgia, and Jordan. Among them, it proposes to create a ‘true’ NATO-EU strategic
partnership in order to avoid “considerable waste in scarce resources, political disharmony, growing
areas of overlap and increased potential for confusion and rivalry”. The report stresses the importance
of keeping the door open a “whole Europe” as a main guarantor of European security. In particular, the
invitation to Montenegro to join the Alliance is an important affirmation of the open door policy.
Moreover, the conflicts that keep Macedonia out of the Alliance should be addressed as “unfinished
business” in the Balkans. The report also recommends a special additional mechanism for Sweden and
Finland. It also recommends creating partnerships with other regions such as the African Union, the
Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation as well as the US-led anti-ISIS
coalition. Japan and South Korea are listed for invitation to NATO as Enhanced Opportunities Partners27.

7. How the US Proposals were Reflected in Decisions at the Warsaw Summit

The long list of recommendations above is not just a list of unilateral demands made by the US to its
European partners and Canada. Rather, the recommendations are a reflection of an exchange of ideas in
the trans-Atlantic community of security experts. Jim Townsend, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for

27 Ibid. pp.32-37.
New American Security, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for NATO and Europe in the Obama administration, has described the communication that takes place in a small community as resembling an “echo-chamber”. As he suggests, the US recommendations listed above are apparently reflected in the results of the Warsaw Summit.

Two major ways in which the US proposals were reflected at the summit were the discussions on enhancing deterrence with forward deployment to the eastern flank of NATO and projection of stability beyond NATO toward the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. If we examine the NATO Warsaw Summit communiqué, we find the threat perception is the same as that stated in the US policy proposals.

The Alliance faces a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid attacks.

Regarding the security challenge from the east, it continues:

Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Regarding the security challenge from the south, it says the following.

Our security is also deeply affected by the security situation in the Middle East and North Africa, which has deteriorated significantly across the whole region. Terrorism, particularly as perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Da'esh, has risen to an unprecedented level of intensity, reaches into all of Allied territory, and now represents an immediate and direct threat to our nations and the international community. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa also contributes to the refugee and migrant crisis.

28 Interview with Jim Townsend by the author, November 15 2017.
29 Paul Belkin “NATO’s Warsaw Summit: In Brief” Congressional Research Service 7-5700 November 14, 2016.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
To deter the threat from the Eastern flank, NATO announced at the Warsaw Summit the new rotational deployments of four combat battalions to Poland and the Baltic states, which should be in place by early 2017. These battalions consist of about 800-1200 troops and will each be led by a framework nation with other allies in the four countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). In Estonia, the UK will lead a battalion with contributions from Denmark and France. In Latvia, Canada will lead a battalion with contributions from Albania, Italy, Poland and Slovenia. In Lithuania, Germany will lead a battalion with contributions from Belgium, Croatia, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. In Poland, the US will lead a battalion with contributions from Romania and the UK. The US contribution will comprise about 900 troops on rotation from Germany33.

In order to respond to threats from the southern flank, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), NATO announced three new missions. First, NATO would expand the training mission for the Iraqi security forces. Previously, allied military advisors trained Iraqi soldiers in Jordan. Secondly, NATO agreed to deploy NATO aerial surveillance aircraft, AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) to assist the counter-ISIS coalition.

Thirdly, in February 2016, NATO agreed to expand its naval missions in the Aegean and Central Mediterranean under a new type of operation entitled Operation Sea Guardian. Its mission is to “provide support to assist with the refugee and migrant crisis”. Three NATO vessels and two submarines would provide situational awareness and logistical support to an existing EU naval operation, Operation Sophia34. Up to this point, NATO had refrained from engaging in the refugee and migration crisis since it believed that the EU is institution that should respond. However, some humanitarian organizations criticized NATO’s inaction35.

In addition, there was dissent among the allies regarding the mission on the southern flank. France and the UK have been conducting air strikes against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, but Germany and some other allies are worried about direct military engagement in the region36. Some analysts think that the mission in MENA should be prioritized over missions to deter Russia whereas East European allies urgently wish to deter Russia37.

US analysts believe that this dilemma could be solved by presenting the issues on the eastern and southern flanks as equally urgent, and taking “a conciliatory approach”, given that countering Russian aggression in Ukraine could spur greater cooperation by Russia in Syria and the broader Middle

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33 Paul Balkin, op.cit, p.3.
34 Ibid. pp. 4-5.
37 Paul Balkin, op.cit, p.5.
East. This logic was shared with US experts and officials. The logic, which stressed equal urgency on both the eastern and southern flank and synergy on Russia’s role on Syria can be found in several US policy proposals such as the US think tanks’ report, “Alliance Revitalized”.

In addition to two major similarities, intelligence reform is a major part of the US think tank recommendation, the “Alliance Revitalized” report. As the report recommended, NATO members created the new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Assessment. In the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO has vowed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division to be led by a newly appointed Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security to “improve NATO’s ability to draw on a wide range of intelligence resources.”

In general, US policy regarding NATO has two priorities: maintaining strong leadership and encouraging allies to take more responsibility. At the Warsaw Summit, the Obama administration tried to seek a broader consensus and obtain commitment from allies - whose threat perceptions differ - by launching new missions with these allies as assurance of the US military commitment to all the members of NATO. By playing this reassurance card, the US tried to secure NATO’s commitment to the urgent US agenda, which all NATO members do not necessarily share given that it includes actions such as the anti-ISIS military operation and stability mission in Afghanistan.

The US has encouraged NATO member countries to spend 2% of GDP on defense and to make 20% of defense expenditures to be on new military equipment and related research and development. The US picked an effective time to reassure NATO, given that it was in a moment of crisis. Generally, the US sees the trend as good although they did not expect the allies would attain their goals easily. The US was optimistic as eight allies met the NATO guidelines to spend 20% of their defense budget on new equipment and 23 allies spent more on new equipment than previous year. Jim Townsend, who was in charge for NATO and European affairs in the US Department of Defense, considers the result of the Warsaw Summit satisfactory, considering that the allies were cooperative and willing to attain the common missions and goals in terms of both financing and operation. One driving force was the allies’ need to deter opponents and defend against threats. In general, the key to success in this area is thought to be coordination between the US and the allies that allows them to focus on common threats while minimizing differences in viewpoint.

8. Implication for Alliance Management at the Warsaw Summit

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38 Ibid.
39 Interview with Jim Townsend by the author, November 15 2017.
40 NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, op.cit.
41 Paul Balkin, op.cit, pp.9-10.
43 Interview with Jim Townsend by the author, November 15 2017.
A crucial element in the interaction between the US and the NATO allies at the Warsaw summit is the shared perception of a common threat. Since the NATO members are geographically and politically diverse, it has been difficult to coordinate a common threat perception since the end of the Cold War. Although deterrence may be necessary once again in Europe because of assertive and aggressive action by Russia, the situation is different to the time in which the Soviet Union posed an existential and ideological threat. Because of the lack of unity among the allies, some allies feel to the need to address migration and Syrian issues at the southern flank rather than potential problems at the Eastern flank.

The reluctance of the allies to cooperate with the US does not only come from the different threat perception but from concerns of unnecessary involvement in a US-led military campaign. At the same time, the allies would like the US and NATO to maintain their reassurance that they will deter threats and defend the allies. This is a classic security dilemma of fear of entanglement versus fear of abandonment.

In this context, the US has secured a good position from which to demand that the allied countries, which need to secure US involvement in deterrence against Russia, share a greater part of the burden. The fear of entanglement also exists among some allies such as Germany, which has shown reluctance to get involved in military missions against ISIS or stability missions in Afghanistan. However, the total sum of the fear of abandonment among the allies was stronger than the fear of entanglement. In addition, President Obama’s inclination to detach the US from its perceived status as the world’s policeman affected the allies’ mentality and calculation regarding cooperation and sharing the burden.

The implication for all the junior allied partners of the US, including Japan and the other Asian allies, is that sharing an appropriate common threat perception with the US is a crucial tool for maintaining an effective and sustainable alliance with the US. It may be necessary for the allies to make a prompt decision and take action since threats appear instantly and may not last for a long time. For the junior allied partners of the US, the existence of a stronger permanent challenger to US hegemony and the international order such as the Soviet Union is effective to assure US involvement without worry of unnecessary entanglement, since the clear existential threat of Russia would leave the US no choice but to get involved.

Putin’s Russia or rising China may serve as a good catalyst for effective alliance management unless the US is inclined to detach itself from the situation or engage in rapprochement with its adversary. President Trump’s “America First” agenda could be another test for the junior allies of the US such as the NATO members, Japan, Australia or South Korea. Even if Trump’s “America First” were regarded as the US detaching itself from the role of security guarantor, it might impel junior partners to share more of the burden rather than failing to stand up to a US adversary or seeking neutral position. However, this burden sharing will depend on the countries involved sharing a common threat perception, as the experience of the NATO Warsaw Summit has shown.