THE FOREIGN POLICY STUDY GROUP (FPSG)

MALAYSIA AND THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

Institutional Democracy and Active Regional Integration
Inquiry on Role of Youth, Democracy and Community Building

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Institutional Democracy and Active Regional Integration
INQUIRY ON ROLE OF YOUTH, DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

A Report written for the Foreign Policy Study Group (FPSG)

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# Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................. 4
Introduction .................................................................................. 4
Building New Core Relationships .................................................. 5
Moving Forward with ASEAN Connectivity ....................................... 9
ASEAN Community: The Way Forward ............................................. 20
Future Directions in Malaysian Foreign Policy .................................. 27
Agenda for Change ......................................................................... 37
Efforts at ASEAN Community Building .......................................... 38
Annex ............................................................................................... 44
References ..................................................................................... 48
Malaysia and the ASEAN Community
Institutional Democracy and Active Regional Integration

Inquiry on Role of Youth, Democracy and Community Building

Executive Summary

As a Community in 2015 the role of youth in ASEAN comes to the fore. Making up almost half of the active population it is important to instill in them an awareness of the challenges of building a sustainable Community in the new ASEAN very early on. A prerequisite in the process is the understanding of democratic values and institutions that necessarily must accompany all efforts at Community Building. This inquiry begins with discussing several past experiences. These are considered and evaluated for their relevance to future developments. At the same time Malaysia’s new role in this emerging scenario is considered against the background of the changing geostrategic landscape in the region and beyond. The preferred choice is for institutional democracy and active regionalism, but some countries may adopt their own norms of democracy. The paper ends with a presentation of several action possibilities on aspects of youth involvement and institution building for a sustainable democracy in the emerging ASEAN Community.

Introduction

With the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) founded in 1967, now comprising ten countries, poised to become the ASEAN Community by 2015, the first move towards regionalisation since the days of Majapahit, Srivijaya, and Melaka, the question needs to be asked, how far and how long the idea and practice of community building could be sustained.

The ASEAN like all previous regional efforts at community building before it, will be expected to show to the world and its people, that it is a viable grouping that could face up to the challenges of consolidating political, security, economic and socio-cultural strengths for the benefit of not only its peoples but more importantly the community of nations outside the region and the world.

When ASEAN was first established it was at the height of the Cold War and it brought some fresh air into an otherwise dense atmosphere of realpolitik engulfing the globe from both West and East. Backed by the major powers, the United States and the then Soviet Union and their allies, the region very nearly provided sufficient proof that the Domino Theory was working. ASEAN rose to the occasion to give a new confidence at nation-building and economic growth bringing along an extended period of peace and stability. This was made possible through the exercise of not taking sides of either party in the Cold War. What followed were a tremendous pace of institution-building, bridging peace and closing economic gaps between member countries. Today some forty years later ASEAN is ready to take on a more active role as an intra-regional player. As observed by the grouping’s former Secretary-General, H.E. Ambassador Ong Keng Yong of Singapore, ASEAN continued to notch achievements after achievements based on the four “C’s”: community, charter, connectivity and centrality.

In looking ahead we can visualise an organisation and an institution that seeks to meet all manner of demands from member countries as well as the world at large. A note on the European Union (EU) is pertinent here. It must be noted a comparison between ASEAN and the EU are usually out of place. At the point of its birth, the EU was a product of a gradual evolution...
of several efforts at regionalism over nationalism in Europe occurring soon after the end of the Second World War. From the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community it became the European Economic Community, the European Union and hence to the ‘big-bang’ in membership until what it is today, many different practices and new traditions were tried and even discarded to suit the existing development inside and outside Europe. The EU has now a ‘legal personality’ with its own Constitution with the extra powers to condemn and condone actions of members. A new code of behaviour has also been instituted to be adhered to by all members.

The growth trajectory for ASEAN however, was a little less spectacular. Born out of conflicts, politics had to replace economics (the reverse took place in the case of the EU). It came into being following a rapprochement between two kinship neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia in 1965-67 over territorial expansion started by Malaysia and sanctioned by the Cobbold Commission. Bilateral ties were soon resumed and this provided the impetus for the formation of ASEAN. But whatever has been its beginning, ASEAN was able to meet the earlier challenges to its survivability as a regional economic grouping through the use of a widely-accepted indigenous conflict resolution instrument aptly recognised as the ASEAN Way, a set of consensus-building norms of behaviour that have been practised throughout the region in the past. As it is applied today, the ASEAN Way has been successful at keeping conflicts from sliding into open wars and served as a mediating tool for other forms of regional-based disputes.

But critics have been more willing to highlight its failings rather than its effectiveness. “Cracks in the ASEAN Way” has encapsulated their thinking to the point where it has been regarded as more of a hindrance than an enabler for ASEAN unity and cooperation. There have been difficulties undeniably in the application of the ASEAN Way. But this should not detract from the belief that in the absence of other more democratic values and systems, the ASEAN Way in its application and practice has stood the test of time. What needs to be emphasised is that ASEAN is only the sum total of all its constituents as follows:

“ASEAN is only as strong as its weakest member;

ASEAN is only as big as its smallest member;

ASEAN can only move as fast as its slowest member”

ASEAN must thus be evaluated on its performance using these set of indicators within a framework of its connectivity.

BUILDING NEW CORE RELATIONSHIPS

One carry-over from the inception days of ASEAN in 1967 has been the critical place of the Malaysian-Indonesia relationship for the sustainability of the grouping. There had existed a web of kinship activities and exchanges of all kinds and at all levels of people and concerted efforts towards keeping in step with one another either regionally or internationally have always been resorted to. This however had to give way to a more flexible basis of contacts as the global environment changed from a bipolar to a multipolar world. As states began to take sides in the Cold War and even afterwards, smaller countries like Malaysia had to go in numbers with other like-minded states and more populous nations like Indonesia had to take the lead and tended at times to go their own way.

In time the core began to lose its relevance to either country as the leadership in the respective countries took on the mantle of nationalist interests as versus those that opted for the new regionalist causes. ASEAN as stated above developed at the pace of its weakest link and its slowest members. The spectre of a thick and thin ASEAN could be observed within the
relationship spectrum. Using three indicators of political behaviour and where seated in a 
PYRAMIDAL structure, namely,

PROXIMITY – degree of closeness to the situation

ACCESSION – nature of compliance to the governance structure

INVolvEMENT – intensity of commitment, we can therefore visualize two pyramidal 
structures representing a THICK and THIN ASEAN at work and what it stands for, where the 
former emphasizes involvement in ASEAN and the latter, proximity to the centre of power in 
ASEAN. The idea has been based on political culture concepts put forward by Geertz, 1973 and 
comparing political systems, understanding political behaviour and change by Lucien Pye, 1965. 
By applying these concepts we can now also see the following scenarios in the conduct of 
relations between the member-countries:

1. Thick ASEAN: exogenous, holistic, internally homogeneous, separates ‘we’ from ‘they’, stable, changes slowly (Eckstein 1988) – identified as nationalist states

2. Thin ASEAN: dynamic, constructivist, diverse (Inglehart 1988) – identified as new regionalist states

3. Phenomenon of Weak States and Strong Democracies in ASEAN – putting the inner and the outer core of ASEAN at odds with one another (Roberts, 2010, Persson, 2011).

If we were to expand the argument further we are also able to understand how the ASEAN Way 
works and what the terms ‘Thick’ and ‘Thin’ mean in the context of political development in the 
region as follows:

THICK ASEAN WAY

NATIONALISM
Another visible differentiation to be observed is the division in the organisation between two political developments: nationalism and the new regionalism. This will be explained below.

**ASEAN WAY under siege**

ASEAN Way refers to conflict avoidance and/or prevention rather than conflict resolution (Amer, 1999). The Malaysian experience has been a varied one.

Use of direct and indirect measures of diplomacy, dialogue, restraints and pressures have in the past enabled ASEAN to prevent any escalation (Acharya, 2000, 2001) for example ASEAN-Myanmar, Malaysia-Indonesia and Thailand-Kampuchea conflicts.

Time has changed however, but has ASEAN changed? In the face of the so-called ‘cracks’ stated above, can ASEAN be in the driver’s seat forever? Other questions one can ask: Is further institutionalisation the answer? What about future effectiveness, enlargement, engagement, the economy and the environment? Finally is nationalism able to resist the new regionalism?

A future scenario that can emerge, according to scholars on the subject is as follows: a THICK and a THIN ASEAN can be integrated into a community via the ASEAN Way (Mishler and Rose, 2001)

As for the NATIONALISM versus NEW REGIONALISM issue, the former which stands for self-reliance, autonomy, identity, normative framework (Acharya, 1998) can be synchronized with the latter that emphasizes multipolarity, the emergence of hegemonic actors, comprehensiveness and globalist (Rajaratnam, 1992)
On the question of the different states eco-systems that led to the division in ASEAN between the weaker economies of the CLM countries and the other stronger economies and democracies, as represented by the following diagram, this can be addressed by the appropriate Integration and Community solution.

![Integration & Community solution diagram](image)

It can be seen that in integration and community lay a long-term solution for the development of ASEAN Unity.

The focus this time is on the institutionalisation of ASEAN and how the existing networks can be transformed to better serve the future of the regional grouping. The twin topics of strengthening Integration and widening avenues for dialogues remain the areas of focus and member countries are expected to deliberate and agree on the best possible steps to be taken to achieve the goals of building “sustainable” structures for the ASEAN Community beyond 2015.

Within this there are several key areas that will require our immediate attention:

1. Gathering ‘institutional experts’ to advise on the institutionalisation process. (Role and structure of ASEAN, motivating factors, identity, resilience);

2. Training ASEAN Peace Builders (Youth Networks, Action Educators, Communication and Change Agents);

3. Setting up Capacity Centres to monitor so-called ‘weak states’ in ASEAN and assist in democratic institution-building throughout the region.
Additionally some discussion of the perception of future scenarios for the region can be introduced via topics on the evolving strategic and politico-security environment, economic architecture, foreign and defence postures of member countries, role and interest of major and regional powers and the contributions of the social media and civil society networking at regional and international levels.

Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, the core of the cores, will need to reconsider how ASEAN will feature in their foreign policies and regional networking. Both have eschewed a centrality to the regional organisation although at different times their postures internationally appeared to be at variance with the other ASEAN member-countries especially in regard to the working of the ASEAN Way and in particular concerning the issue of Myanmar.

The pioneering initiatives of the newly established Malaysian think-tank for multi-channelled dialogues and strengthening ASEAN integration, the Foreign Policy Study Group (FPSG), have paved the way towards this end. Since 2011 the FPSG had successfully held seminars and workshops with ASEAN member countries on different themes and aspects of community building.

MOVING FORWARD WITH ASEAN CONNECTIVITY

Looking back at ASEAN's achievements from 1967 till today there is much that we can be proud of. Significantly this experiment at regional integration has passed the midway point where what remains is for member countries to bring in a Community into being by 2015 covering relations and cooperation in political, economic and social activities. Along the way we must not forget that a strong and sustainable regional-based institution like the ASEAN has to rely on the support and involvement of its people. Ultimately ASEAN can only move forward if it reflects the desires and aspirations of the people and citizens of the ten member countries.

Historical Intersections

Describing the relations between the different member countries with one another requires us to look at the historical intersections of ties that seemed to bind all the countries together. If it could be determined with some certainty that where our interests have intersected in the past then it could also be assumed that our relations in the future will also take a similar course. But there are imponderables hidden in the course of history and we have to deal with these first.

Historically the region we are all in, Southeast Asia, had been home to numerous migrations and sites of riverine-located empires that flourished beyond their erstwhile borders. Records have shown that we were connected either through by way of the seas or the land mass that make up continental Southeast Asia. In modern times relations between the member countries became stabilised under the tutelage of colonial conquests and their changing administrations. Through participation and non-participation in wars and other forms of conflicts our nation-states have survived albeit in different periods, as different entities and governments. What we see today are the contrast between the old and new unity that were brought in by the so-called 'foreigners', be it Indians, Chinese, Arabs or Europeans.

However, there is one strand that continued even till today in terms of the cultural and civilisational qualities that somehow have created the distinct traits in all our nations and affected our view of the world, our ways of thinking and our ways of solving problems between us. This has to do with the maritime legacy that has befallen us for good or bad. Almost all the member countries sit astride major straits and waterways and hence had given us a maritime perspective of things we should worry about if we were to live in peace with one another. The maritime perspective has endured between us and we now look at problems over fishing, oil and gas deposits and overlapping claims with a historical background that provides a framework
Cooperation Opportunities

For true cooperation to continue and the opportunities to be maximized there are several impediments that have to be overcome. This would include the unsettled question of sovereignty over maritime spaces and the interstate distrust between us. On top of this we have to recognise the resource competition that is ongoing between all three of us either on land or in the seas. Finally for the cooperation to be moved forward, there are fiscal shortages of all kinds that are really slowing us down.

For any cooperation to be realized, a few things would need to be considered: maximize the benefits and minimise the costs. A clear respect for this point will assist ASEAN countries to cooperate at the bilateral, regional, global and networked levels more intensely (Bradford, 2005).

Challenges of Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally

In agreeing on a common agenda for moving forward ASEAN connectivity, member countries have to adhere to a normative call for thinking globally and acting regionally in the things that we work on. We examine below three areas that will decide the region’s common future. It is based on how countries are to act together by observing the global norms in place and yet not losing sight of the basic aims of forging a unity within the ASEAN Community through joint participation in regional-based projects as presented below:

1. Maritime Joint Development Zones

This was an approach adopted and later was accepted as an interim solution to the problem of the delimitation of maritime boundaries between three member countries. According to UNCLOS Article 15, for the purpose of the delimitation of maritime boundaries between countries only the median line can be applied. However in cases involving the demarcation of a country’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf no method has been satisfied other than saying that this can be settled by means of an equitable solution.

The opportunity of cooperation was thus taken by Malaysia and Thailand in 1979, in light of a stalemate over boundary delimitation on an island feature, Ko Losin, by launching a Joint Development Authority (JDA). But a Constitution was only signed between the two countries on the working of the JDA in 1990 that specified areas of cooperation in fishing, joint pipeline projects and oil prospecting.

In 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam signed between them a Joint Defined Area Agreement purportedly to assist in settling disputes over Malaysia's New Map in 1979 that claimed part of Vietnam’s considered Continental Shelf which Malaysia said it had claimed on the basis of island base-points. Vietnam had earlier in 1971 also claimed a similar area on the basis of baselines drawn from the mainland coasts. In practice generally the Agreement did bring benefits to the two countries by way of localizing hydrocarbons finds and bringing in joint exploration for oil and gas between the Malaysian oil conglomerate, PETRONAS and PETRO-VIETNAM.

In 1997, Vietnam and Thailand entered into a maritime boundary agreement that delimited the boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, bringing to a close a long-standing maritime dispute between them. According to Nguyen Hong Trao (1997) the agreement is significant as it sought to delimit both the maritime boundary of the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zones between them.
Besides becoming the first agreement on maritime delimitation agreed upon between countries in Southeast Asia since UNCLOS 1982 came into force it is also the first delimitation exercise of all maritime zones that belong to the coastal states in the region.

The three examples cited above are success stories that could be emulated by other countries in the region (Schofield, 2007) This is despite the fact that the political will came late on the Thai side in the Malaysia-Thailand Agreement and in the case of the Malaysia-Vietnam Agreement, both Governments chose instead to delegate authority of the right to activate the Agreement to the two big petroleum companies in their respective countries. The Vietnam-Thailand Agreement portends to the readiness of Vietnam to work closely with countries in Southeast Asia to settle the other remaining maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

2. Resources Conflicts and Managing Maritime Potential

Another area of concern is the building up of competition in water-based resources that include fishing, marine products and other forms of sea-water living species. Cooperation is essential in light of the ever-growing dwindling of such food sources in the region. Conflicts at sea are bound to emerge and may lead to open acts of aggression and even piracy in the guise of fishing. Crossing boundaries in pursuit of fish has certainly been on the increase.

An interesting challenge and an opportunity for cooperation are presented here. It reinforces what we have been stating earlier which has to do with understanding the problem and looking for solutions from a sea or maritime perspective. In this way we see an obvious goldmine in the way we maximize the development of our long coastlines that border our countries and ASEAN as a whole.

Countries with a long coastline have at least the potential to develop a maritime industry. Countries with limited access to the seas will find it difficult to develop fisheries, ports, shipbuilding enterprises or shipping lines. Landlocked countries have none of these opportunities though there are some odd cases like ships flying the Swiss flag or an Austrian shipping line that has no home port of its own. Coastlines should be seen in relation to the land area of a country. A huge land-based country like China could afford to neglect its long coastline during most of its history, whereas Britain consisting of a number of islands based its imperial power on the facilities its coastline offered. The coastline was, as it were, the jumping board for overseas expansion, offering vast economic opportunities, it’s relatively small land mass could not supply. All nations and regions are endowed with resources that range from minerals, oil and arable land to manpower, cultural diversity and knowledge assets. A natural endowment consisting of long coasts and access to the world oceans is another resource, however less often discussed.

Building on these basic ideas, the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS) of Universiti Sains Malaysia developed, in cooperation with the Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Germany an index to measure the relative maritime potential of nations.

The “CenPRIS Ocean Index (OI)” is a combination of a “Maritime Potential Index (MPI)”, a “Maritime Economy Index (MEI)” and a “Maritime Achievement Index (MAI)”. It is designed to be a policy instrument that will measure how much a nation has actually utilized its geographical location next to seas and oceans to develop a maritime economy.
We have constructed three indicators to measure the maritime potential and utilization of nations and regions. One index, named “Maritime Potential Index (MPI)” measures the geographical dimension of the natural resource “proximity to seas and oceans”. It shows the natural potential of a nation to make use of this resource. A landlocked state has no natural potential to use maritime resources, whereas the potential of an island state or a state with a long coast line should be very high. The “Maritime Economy Index (MEI)” combines various typically maritime industries like fisheries, shipping, ship building, harbours and other economic fields. Whether or not the potential is utilized is measured by the “Maritime Achievement Index (MAI)” or “Ocean Index (OI)”. Below we shall describe in greater detail, how the indices have been constructed.

The model, underlying the indicators, is shown in the following Figure 1. It is based on the assumption that location, i.e. access to oceans and length of coastlines are factors impacting on the maritime industry of a nation.

Figure 1: CenPRIS Ocean index
In constructing the indicators we have largely followed OECD standards (Nardo, Saisana et al. 2005). We have also adopted standard computing practices used for the Human Development Index (UNDP 2010). Furthermore, GIS mapping methods are described in our earlier paper (Evers, Genschick, Nienkemper 2010). The variables of the CenPRIS Ocean Index and the methods of standardization, scaling and weight age of variables are described in greater detail in a CenPRIS working paper (Evers 2010) and the CenPRIS-OI Manual.

Figure 2: Coastline Distance, ASEAN Countries

Measuring the Maritime Potential of ASEAN involves setting up of the Maritime Potential Index (MPI) as a composite measure of the geographical maritime potential and therefore a selected aspect of the competitive advantage of a nation (Porter 2003). We are here concerned with the issue, to what degree nations have made use of this potential and turned it into a competitive advantage. Data for 2005 indicated that ASEAN countries have indeed made different use of their maritime potential. Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam rank below the average Ocean Index, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore rank above the average (Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3)
Table 1: Maritime Indices, ASEAN 2000 and 2005 (CenPRIS Ocean Index, phase one)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>60,98</td>
<td>0,27</td>
<td>0,46</td>
<td>-0,20</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>22,68</td>
<td>0,92</td>
<td>1,75</td>
<td>40,79</td>
<td>41,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>86,54</td>
<td>83,36</td>
<td>88,59</td>
<td>60,33</td>
<td>65,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>72,39</td>
<td>38,65</td>
<td>65,74</td>
<td>28,17</td>
<td>56,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>12,36</td>
<td>14,46</td>
<td>19,22</td>
<td>65,88</td>
<td>70,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>96,96</td>
<td>33,21</td>
<td>40,23</td>
<td>-3,40</td>
<td>3,98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>100,00</td>
<td>66,75</td>
<td>90,52</td>
<td>28,69</td>
<td>53,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>22,75</td>
<td>55,87</td>
<td>57,27</td>
<td>98,53</td>
<td>100,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>54,98</td>
<td>25,83</td>
<td>36,60</td>
<td>33,00</td>
<td>44,33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: MPI=Maritime Potential Index, MEI=Maritime Economy Index, OI=Maritime Achievement Index (or Ocean Index)

Comparing the ASEAN countries, Singapore due to its big container harbour ranks highest. Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines rank below the average of the Maritime Economy Index (MEI). If we take, however, the maritime potential into account, a quite different picture emerges. Singapore and Malaysia, according to the achievement index (Ocean Index OI), have achieved less than would have been expected according to the Maritime Potential Index (MPI). Both countries rank on the Ocean Index (OI) only minimally above the ASEAN average.
As for most indices, comparing time series tends to reveal the most relevant results. Comparing the development of the Ocean Index from 2000 to 2005, our data show that the utilization of the maritime potential has increased by about 11%. Malaysia’s OI has risen by 57%, the highest next to Singapore. Likewise, higher
values are also calculated for Indonesia and Vietnam. But changes of the Ocean Index of Brunei, Myanmar, and Cambodia seem to be negligible.

Figure 3, 4, 5: MPI and MEI, ASEAN 2005
This means that Malaysia, for instance, which has not yet made full use of its maritime potential, is moving ahead and has improved its position in comparison to the other ASEAN countries.

The above discussion has pointed out the various possibilities that can be developed from an appreciation of realizing the maritime potential of our countries. The new core can surely adopt this approach in its cooperation endeavours. The biggest challenge is to get China to join in the above exercise.

3. Managing Relations with China

As a grouping that is built upon political and economic foundations, member countries of ASEAN and indeed ASEAN as a whole, has favoured accommodation rather than risk confrontation with China. This position is founded on the perception that, as echoed by the noted Sinologist, C.P. Fitzgerald, Chinese influence, culture and power, have always been moving southwards throughout history. In its choice of an appropriate position to be taken in regard to China, ASEAN has always considered China’s economic activism as acceptable but there are opinions ranging from ambivalence, opposition and indifference to military posturing. In designing a strategy to deal with China, ASEAN has opted for a regional security tack on China based on the recognition that China’s recurrent show of power is only symbolic and that ASEAN’s fear is only one predicated on whether China is prepared to behave like a normative power. Met with these preconditions, ASEAN’s long-term position is to engage China in increasing her economic stakes in the region, in jointly managing the territorial disputes between them and finally involving the Chinese in a multitude of security frameworks in the region.

However whichever way the future is going to roll out for the region vis-à-vis China there are some differences seen in the relations forged between some ASEAN member countries and China at the bilateral level. The choice as observed by experts is between engagement and hedging. In other words countries can either work to balance their relations or cooperation with China or end up bandwagoning or accommodating especially in trade and assistance to avoid the costs of alienating China itself. The former is in no way limiting the scope of activities among the said countries. In fact the idea is really to engage with the Chinese and not to keep them out. In this instance, according to Denny Roy (2005), the hedgers include Malaysia and Vietnam. Thailand appears to opt for simple hedging. What this means is to maintain a balance between a desire for a visible presence of the United States in the region and at the same time playing off China with the United States. For Vietnam in particular, as pointed out by Alexander L. Vuying (2006), her China policy in the future will be guided by a combination of strategies quite similar to the ones discussed above, namely, balancing, deference and enmeshment. Enmeshment also sums up the current ASEAN position in managing its relations with China.

In all probability too the ASEAN confidence in its relations with China will stay. Generally there will be consequently a lesser need for hedging.

As ASEAN steps into its new role of advancing the ideals and aspirations of a Community in 2015, what is needed is a set of workable ideas that can engender cooperation and transformation in an ordered manner. The above three areas identified for some core countries to take up at the appropriate times will hopefully open up new opportunities as well for the people of ASEAN as a whole.
For the record and in order to present an ASEAN perspective on things it is suggested the lessons learned by the distinguished Indonesian diplomat and the country’s most able negotiator in the international maritime sector, Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal, be preserved for posterity in this Report. In the more than twenty years that he was helming the South China Sea Workshop Process (SCSW Process) he has compiled the following lessons that can be applied to other forms of dialogues, negotiations and interventions involving the ASEAN Community:

A. **Lessons in managing conflict**
   1. Armed conflicts will not settle any disputes
   2. Political will must be present to settle disputes peacefully
   3. Parties should not legislate any territorial claims and should not involve as much public opinion as possible
   4. There must be more transparency in national policy
   5. Preventive Diplomacy must involve all parties in the dispute

B. **Basic Principles on informal initiative**
   1. Use an all-inclusive approach
   2. Start with the less sensitive issues
   3. Involve senior representatives
   4. Keep the process flexible
   5. Emphasise cooperation
   6. Follow a step by step approach
   7. Do not expect immediate concrete results
   8. Keep the objectives and develop confidence building
   9. All parties must exercise impartiality and patience

C. **Lessons for countries in the region**
   1. Bigger countries should mindful of views of smaller countries
   2. Involve participants in cooperative programmes
   3. Emphasise on regional and common interests
   4. Progress gradually from national resilience to regional resilience and regional cohesion
   5. Countries should be less sensitive to issues of national sovereignty
   6. Help a neighbor or neighbours in need
   7. Avoid an arms race and cooperate in defence
   8. Major external powers must support regional efforts for peace, stability and progress
9. Convert conflicts into actual cooperation

10. Develop various fora for dialogues

11. Pursue various avenues for the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation

12. Pursue third party mechanism for disputes settlement

13. Countries should not settle boundary problems through unilateral enactment of national legislation

14. In some disputed areas, the application of Joint Development concept should be explored

15. Track 2 activities in settling disputes need to be enhanced

16. The interests of non-regional countries should be taken into account

17. The formation of an ‘ASEAN Unity’ against China can be counter-productive and confrontational.

Innovative Moves

On another level the situation ahead of ASEAN is expected to be more robust with the recent innovative moves by two Malaysian-based companies, the CIMB Bank and Air Asia.

CIMB Bank Group, with headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, launched a rebranding exercise in 2011 of its “ASEAN FOR YOU” campaign meant to profile its regional financial and banking intentions. As stated in its Annual Report 2011, the ASEAN FOR YOU tagline is a clear declaration of the Group’s “regional capabilities and ASEAN identity”. CIMB has a presence in Singapore, Cambodia, and Thailand since 2009.

“We will draw from our regional strengths to deliver the best of ASEAN to our customers”. (CIMB Annual Report, 2011)

Following closely behind CIMB’s regional success is Air Asia, Malaysia’s and indeed Asia’s market leader in the budget-air industry today. Significantly Air Asia ASEAN was launched in Jakarta on 7 August 2010. Asked about the move, its CEO replied it was necessitated by the airline’s plan to focus its energy to grow its ASEAN presence.

“Air Asia ASEAN will help ensure that our voice, our concerns and our appeals are heard much more clearly within the corridors of power in ASEAN” (New Straits Times, 8 August 2012)

ASEAN COMMUNITY: THE WAY FORWARD

The path that ASEAN is taking in moving towards realising its aim of becoming a full-fledged ASEAN Community by 2015 is distinguished between Community Building and Building a Community. The former refers to the general aspects of the Community and includes the foundations of the institutions and the various elements that will define its character and personality. The latter consists of the specific aspects that will enable the Community to fulfill its role and functions by involving all its stakeholders. The various ways of measuring the success of the two exercises are considered for its most efficacious results for the ASEAN Community as a whole. The different challenges to be confronted and assessed together with several future directions in policy will emerge. Finally the issue of choices available to the policy planners will highlight the difficult road that lead towards the Community.
By 2015 the region of Southeast Asia will see the emergence of a Community of Nations to be known as the ASEAN Community. It is to include the founding member states, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, that formed the erstwhile Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 to be followed several years later by the membership of Brunei (1984). Over a period of years subsequently other countries, Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) joined the grouping.

Now with forty-plus years behind it ASEAN has grown and became accepted the world over as a foremost example of a regional grouping. It also means that member countries are now ready to commit themselves to the task of establishing a Community by 2015. But the order is first to enhance the institutional capabilities of ASEAN and then proceed consequently with building the Community’s constituent parts. In other words the former actually involves the laying of the foundations while the latter, the structures. In this way ASEAN had evolved gradually into what it is today as stated by Ambassador Ong Keng Yong of Singapore, through a process that started with community, then moved on to the charter, connectivity and hopefully ending with centrality when the idea of the ASEAN consciousness remains paramount in the psyches of all its members. To gauge the success of this process it is important that the Community of ASEAN must be able to sustain itself and not face the fate of institutions that usually will go through the different stages of growth, maturity and then decline. To enable it stay on course the ASEAN Community has to look back at its historical consciousness to realise the areas it had overlooked. Issues of an all-consuming worldview or worldviews and the need to acknowledge a ‘soul’ for ASEAN will become very significant here.

However in terms of Building a Community which refers to the enhancement of existing and new structures and mechanism as discussed above, Ambassador Severino of the Philippines in analysing these growing years of ASEAN and onwards to the Community, as one going through three different Ages: consolidation and stabilisation up to 1992, followed by regional economic cooperation and integration until 1998 and presently on to competitiveness. As a way to measure the success of the progress made by ASEAN throughout these years and to gauge the various possibilities Professor Simon Tay of Singapore has given us the test of the four “E’s”, namely, effectiveness, enlargement, environment and economic progress and finally, engagement. For the ASEAN Community the choice must finally be to go for a strong democratic institution and to be supported by an effective regional integration.

Community Building

Scholars have written extensively on the kind of community that ASEAN has been labelled as. But these, like the ‘imagined community’ of Ben Anderson, the ‘security community’ of Amitav Acharya and the ‘epistemic community’ of Haas, have all missed the point of the local and traditional roots of countries coming together within a grouping such as ASEAN.

In its early years ASEAN could look back at its rich traditions and cultural history, picked up a few ideas and applied them to the existing need to come together in the 60s. The values of dialogue or musyawarah and consensus or mufakat have been presented as realisable principles to attain all the objectives of the grouping and frame all future interactions within and outside the region. The ASEAN Way as this set of principles and practices came to be accepted was instrumental in guiding all ASEAN’s actions and undertaking bringing as a result an oasis of peace for all these years into the region. In practice the ASEAN Way has been proven to have worked when ASEAN had needed it most. But perhaps there is now a realisation that the traditional beliefs will have to give way to necessary and newer ones in the days of the Community.

Historically however the Community has a rich pool of local-based knowledge bases to fall back on. One is as mentioned by Leonard Andaya, a noted historian, that the whole Southeast Asian region was once a continuous landmass divided by huge rivers and lakes that
provided a sense of unity by a vast network of maritime spaces. Unity in diversity has been with us all throughout these time connected by the body of waters all around us. A new symbol for the new ASEAN can perhaps be considered which can be represented as the blue oceans surrounding the Community.

In the context of ‘resuscitating’ the ASEAN Way it could be recalled that the outgoing ASEAN Secretary General, Ambassador Surin Pitsuwan had said in Kuala Lumpur, ‘the soul of ASEAN lies in moderation’. Indeed from a quick look at the unfolding of events in the region, ASEAN has been adopting this stance in all its dealings over contentious issues that have occurred from time to time in Southeast Asia. The same can be expected in the future years of the Community.

In summary from the above, there are the bits and pieces as discussed that can make up a sustainable identity and vision for the ASEAN Community to come.

**Building a Community**

The centrepiece of ASEAN’s progress in building a community to date is the group’s regional integration process that began with the move to bring in the full benefits of economic development through a greater economic integration. This will in fact validate the rationale of bringing in the CLMV countries as members. Indeed regional economic integration alone has served as the main platform of ASEAN’s actions to meet the medium-term plan of instituting an economic community by 2015. It is envisaged that by then the region will have a single market and a production base. The completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) will also assist in preparing ASEAN to be more competitive in the region and assist in making ASEAN as a hub for regional integration in South East Asia and East Asia region.

Accordingly ASEAN has also been innovative in its approach to attain this target. Firstly in 2007 it announced its Economic Blueprint that placed specific milestones to register progress towards the inception of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. An added measure has been included in the idea of instituting a scorecard procedure to monitor the respective member’s progress annually. This was agreed upon by members in 2010.

At the same time a further impetus to integration was introduced also in 2010 that puts the focus on involving ASEAN’s citizens in the affairs of the grouping, a point that was made clear in the Bali Concord (2) Declaration agreed in Bali, Indonesia in 2003. Together with the other two Pillars, the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a third Pillar has also been recognised in the ASEAN Scio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The ASCC underlined its readiness to proceed with its work programme with the unveiling of the Connectivity Master Plan with its three main focus areas: the physical, institutional and people-to-people. While the goals of the AEC are clear that of the ASCC are vague and inconclusive. The reasons may lie in the structure and mechanism of decision-making within the ASEAN centre.

Several arguments have been offered that put the blame on the lack of movement in the socio-cultural area on the unwieldy decision-making structure. On one side it has been suggested that a top-down approach has been in place and had proven to be more effective. On the other side however a greater involvement of people-to-people in the decision-making process, the bottoms-up approach, is not possible as the respective countries are still reluctant to allow for this to happen since the respective countries are jealously guarding their autonomy in issues that affect their socio-cultural interests. Emmerson, an analyst who studied the impact of these two practices upon the efficacy of decisions in ASEAN, had stated that both have not gone far enough to leave a mark. He said of the former that it is too much of a conditioning for the members while the latter is considered as not possible since not all member countries are a full democracy to allow for all decision-making concerns to be brought to the centre willingly.
In short the process of building a community is not just one straight road for integration. It is however a long-winded path as mentioned by Dr Zainal Aznam Yusof, that requires a lot of accommodation of interests and flexibility of actions on the part of members.

**Challenges and Prospects**

Relative to the success of ASEAN as indicated above there are signs seen especially after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, that this experiment in regionalism and regionalisation (Higgott) as ASEAN has stood out to be, is already showing a state of staleness. By this it is meant that the organisation is reaching a plateau and that as noted earlier new ideas, innovative thinking and transformative agendas to propel ASEAN forward are urgently needed.

The following sections will discuss three issues that will highlight several of the critical problems faced by ASEAN and how it is going about to try and resolve them in attaining the goals of the Community.

**ASEAN and Peace**

Talking about peace we are reminded that ASEAN was founded on the need to find a lasting formula to resolve bilateral issues among ASEAN neighbours. Our leaders then, guided by their commitment to secure the future of the region as a whole and through a belief in the sense of not relying on external models, resolved to work together in the common cause of association in a regional organisation based on indigenous efforts alone. ASEAN came into being in 1967 imbued with this spirit of musyawarah and mufakat, not easily translatable but can be loosely described as dialogue and consensus. These intrinsic values now enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and practised through the ASEAN Way have stood the test of time but are already being questioned for their relevance in this age of competitiveness.

Indeed this long period of peace punctuated only by the Second Indochina War and various low-intensity conflicts arising over perception and misperception of threats to stability, will not endure unless ASEAN competes aggressively in the larger world outside. What is required is the ability and strength to organise ourselves, to network among ourselves and to monitor our progress.

**ASEAN and socio-economic progress**

While peace has come to stay in a continuous fashion, ASEAN has also been striving to steer its economic and social progress on an even keel. The problems and challenges of economic integration inside ASEAN and with the world economy will need to be urgently addressed. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) process has opened up new markets for member-countries goods and services. Movement of capital and people have not kept pace however when compared to trade with countries outside the region. ASEAN indeed was able to lock more of itself in the economic arena with the world outside rather than with itself. For a time integration was found to be slowing down somewhat. This had to give way to connectivity as the means to prepare the grouping towards Community. What are some of the impediments to a fuller economic integration and greater connectivity in ASEAN?

Despite the various approaches that have been implemented in trying to narrow the cultural, economic and political dispositions seen in ASEAN, a greater effort must be undertaken to overcome the problems of monitoring compliance with ASEAN initiatives.

The need for ensuring that ASEAN can move forward with the aims of the Community lies perhaps in an enhanced role for the centre which is rested in the ASEAN Secretariat. In the past the experience has been that all decisions were made at the centre which gives the impression that ASEAN is therefore a supranational body which it is not. As an ASEAN
Community however it is imperative that some form of legal legitimacy must be lodged with the Secretariat while the intergovernmental nature of work within ASEAN needs to be emphasised.

The Roadmap towards integration in the three pillars of the Community must resolve to build ASEAN into an organic entity with lots of room given to bring its citizens closer to the centre and in turn the centre has to react with a complete understanding of the emotional and psychological wants of its citizens in realising unity in diversity for the ASEAN Community.

Generally ASEAN will need to put its act together and attempt to achieve the following:

1. Narrow the relative economic levels between the member countries through a review of the existing economic and technical assistance programme (see Table 4)

2. Widen the base of intra-ASEAN trade to reflect the growing consumer population in the region and enhance the private-sector led initiatives (see table 5)

3. Improve the environment for democratic institutions to flourish and create decision-making processes that are democratically sustainable (see table 6).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>24,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>11,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>28,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-6 average</td>
<td><strong>13,729</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>2,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>3,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-4 average</td>
<td><strong>2,250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diverse economic development: ASEAN 6 and ASEAN 4 relative economic levels (Severino)
Table 5

Intra-ASEAN Trade, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports (US$ million)</th>
<th>Imports (US$ million)</th>
<th>Total Trade (US$ million)</th>
<th>Exports (% share of ASEAN total)</th>
<th>Imports (% share of ASEAN total)</th>
<th>Total Trade (% share of ASEAN total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1,509.5</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>12,994</td>
<td>11,686</td>
<td>24,680</td>
<td>10.82</td>
<td>11.48</td>
<td>11.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>31,742</td>
<td>26,195</td>
<td>57,937</td>
<td>26.44</td>
<td>25.73</td>
<td>26.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6,838</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>15,194</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>43,481</td>
<td>37,456</td>
<td>80,937</td>
<td>36.21</td>
<td>36.79</td>
<td>36.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>21,170</td>
<td>15,835</td>
<td>37,004.6</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>15.56</td>
<td>16.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>753.7</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,898.4</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>3,849.5</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ASEAN</td>
<td>120,069</td>
<td>101,797</td>
<td>221,865</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intra-ASEAN trade taken from ASEAN Economic Bulletin (Severino)

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom House Classification</th>
<th>Democracy Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Hybrid Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Flawed Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Flawed Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Flawed Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Hybrid Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Hybrid Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ASEAN member states and their respective freedom and democracy ratings. ("Map of Freedom" and "The Economist")

Future Directions – Choices for the ASEAN Community

Recent studies have shown that in sustaining the future for the Community ASEAN has to do much more. Coraline Goron (2011) of the European Institute for Asian Studies has argued for the following:

1. ASEAN needs to go beyond its voluntary-based integration to succeed
2. The ASEAN Way has to undergo a qualitative change to make it more effective
3. Competition has to be conducted both domestically within the region and externally outside the region
4. ASEAN has to continue to ‘lead by example’.

The choices are fewer indeed given the dynamism that the region is now going through. A strong institutional infrastructure with structures and mechanism that can bring together the centre and the periphery in a sustainable relationship is what it should go for. This can only
come about with an established network of working democracies throughout the region. As pointed out above due to various historical developments the preponderance of democratic practices vary in different countries. The oldest democracy is still alive in the Philippines while the newest is in Myanmar. Both are trying to become models for emulation. But there is no one criteria to determine which kinds of democracy will work or which will not.

The next area of concern is the speed at which integration can proceed in the ASEAN with only three years left before the Community comes in. Nevertheless proceed it must since there is already a commitment on the part of the members to continue on. On the plus side all parties have shown a penchant for innovative thinking. Coraline mentioned of the bold introduction of new concepts such as ‘blueprints’, ‘master plan’, ‘connectivity’, ‘scorecard’ and ‘roadmaps’ which has contributed to an air of confidence and heightened expectations.

In terms of reaching out to the environment outside the grouping which is characterised by Coraline as that of an ‘institutional effervescence’, ASEAN needs to prepare itself to engage more meaningfully in the dialogue process and multilateral and intra-regional structures and mechanism. It must carry-on with the position of ‘leading by example’ and to compete on the basis of equal opportunities. As illustrated in the Figure below, in the ASEAN Plus Three, APEC and the EAS, ASEAN and the Community to come, will be able to realise its initial goals of unifying the region in a political, security, economic and socio-cultural knowledge network to reckon with in Southeast Asia.

(Note: ‘Scorecard’ – an earlier reference to ‘scoreboard’ which has a similar meaning was first stated by David J. Dennis and Dr Zainal Aznam Yusof in their research report on ‘Developing Indicators of ASEAN Integration’ published in 2003)

Figure 6: Asia Regional Architecture (Coraline Goron)
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

From a Malaysian perspective and in view of Malaysia taking lead in ASEAN by 2015 when the Association becomes a Community the time has come for a relook at the future directions of Malaysian Foreign Policy. In the light of the above discussion, one has to start by first understanding what the existing scenario is at this moment.

The questions to ask in this present exercise are: Why are we doing it? How are we going about doing it? What can we expect from it? Partly the appropriate answers must lie both in the past and in the present. There are the roles of the various personalities involved in the policy-making process that shaped the policy. As foreign policy functions in a domestic and an external environment there are also factors that will bear and impact upon its effectiveness. Generally as a main objective and in defining its future, Malaysian Foreign Policy has to have a central focus, clear goals and a distinct structure.

Philosophy, Personality and National Ethos

With Independence from Great Britain in 1957, Malaya and later Malaysia aspired to seek a place in the community of nation-states. Its early leaders were confined to an inner circle consisting of school and university-colleagues and political co-workers that shared similar desires and expectations. This gave continuity and sustainability to progress and development in foreign policy. However right from the beginning a place of dominance was reserved for Royalty in keeping with the traditions inherited from past history. This special place for Royalty has become a practice till today where the position of leadership and the respect and adulation that goes with it, is placed on the shoulders of someone deemed fit to take on that role (Shome, 2002). In that instance Tunku Abdul Rahman, a scion of the Kedah Royal Family emerged as the accepted leader and came to play a decisive role in state-matters including foreign policy. In time this feature has remained when even until today the formulation of foreign policy has remained the preserve of the Prime Minister of the day as happened in the past as well. This fact alone has been regarded by scholars as being elitist (Ott, 1972, Zakaria, 1987, Saravanamuttu, 1983, 2010, Azhari, 1990). Decision-making was invariably top-down in keeping with the correct royal traditions practiced.

As governance models that could be emulated and followed the leadership tended to fall back upon the reservoir of knowledge distilled from their student-days and experiences gathered in their different adopted countries that were important influencing factors in their various leadership capacities: the Tunku, England; Tun Razak, England; Hussein, India; Mahathir, Singapore; Abdullah, Malaysia; Najib, England. This fact will have to be understood in obtaining a correct picture of the philosophical basis of Malaysian Foreign Policy as the dominant decision-maker’s early background would certainly play a significant role.

In terms of the domestic and external environment that gave shape to the country’s foreign policy, the leadership from Tunku to Najib, were conscious of the successes and achievements of the policies, historically from the British ‘divide-and-rule’, American ‘melting-pot’, Japanese ‘co-prosperity sphere’, United States (US) ‘containment’ and China’s ‘cultural revolution’. They also learned to appreciate historical precedents: Chenghe’s Voyage around the world, Jalian-walla Bargh in India, Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream speech’ in the US, Mao’s Long March and of course nearer home, were Sukarno’s Konfrantasi and Lee Kuan-Yew’s PAP and Singapore’s Economic Miracle. Alternative models of protest and dissent around the world made strong impressions on the leaders: the fall of the Berlin Wall, Islamic Revolution in Iran, break-up of Central Europe and September 11 ‘terrorists’ attacks’ in the US and most recently ‘Arab Spring’; globally, the swing from post-colonial administration to developmentalism, economic interdependence, neutralisation, nationalism, regionalism and new regionalism, globalisation and liberalisation, partnership and ideological groupings and
socioculturally, serumpun, Melayu Baru, Nusantara, ASEAN Way and Asia Pacific and East Asia.

None of the history and development listed above could escape the attention of the leaders as they grappled with the day-to-day affairs of state. Inevitably these helped to carve indelible marks in their worldviews, giving them a sense of their place and timing in the country’s history. Respectively each tried to leave an unforgettable legacy for King and country.

Added factors also included birthplaces, schools attended, parental-lineages, higher education and experiences in official and political capacities. The sources of these factors that determine their ‘weltanschauung’ are illustrated in the Table below.

Table 7 Sources/Factors of Weltanschauung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS&gt;&gt;&gt; PRIME MINISTERS</th>
<th>Birth places</th>
<th>Parental lineages</th>
<th>Schools attended</th>
<th>Higher education</th>
<th>Official/ Political Work</th>
<th>World-view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunku 1957-1970</td>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>Royalty Thai</td>
<td>Debsurin School, Bangkok Penang Free School</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UMNO</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein 1976-1981</td>
<td>Johor</td>
<td>State Official Son of UMNO founder Turkish</td>
<td>English College Dehra Dun Military Academy</td>
<td>India England</td>
<td>UMNO Legal practice</td>
<td>Islamic Unity Legalistic Unit trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahathir 1981-2003</td>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>School Master Father</td>
<td>Sultan Abdul Hamid College Raffles College (S’pore)</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Ministerial UMNO Medical practice</td>
<td>East Third World Level playing Field South-South Vision 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah 2003-2008</td>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>Religious Leader</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Govt service UMNO Ministerial</td>
<td>Progressive Islam WIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najib 2009-</td>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>St Johns Inst’tion</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Ministerial UMNO High state official</td>
<td>Transformation New Economic Model (NEM) Global Movement of Moderates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own construction
Choices, Options, Alternatives – a survey

Over the last fifty-five years Malaysian Foreign Policy has been characterised as ‘neutral’, ‘non-aligned’, ‘independent’, ‘active’, ‘Third-World’ and even ‘moderate’. It showed a penchant to remain committed to peace and stability yet when the situation favours it, to be flexible and to actively support regionalism and the ASEAN Way.

Behind all these there is evident a sensitive and dynamic mindset at work among all of them to fathom the depth and breadth of issues and the intensity to allow for all possible options to be considered when the need arises. In a way Malaysian Foreign Policy can be at times opportunistic and individualistic. In the survey that follows the choices, options and alternatives that made up the state of play of Malaysian Foreign Policy and made available to the successive Prime Ministers are considered against the background of worldviews derived from the factors listed above.

Only in one person, that of Dr Mahathir Mohamad was this ever fully realised. He was Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Finance Minister, all in one. He was on the stage of world affairs for twenty-two years, from 1981 – 2003. During those years he single-handedly managed Malaysian Foreign Policy through determination and dictates. He was the man for his times. In policy terms he had left a record difficult to match in the present time. These ranged from the ‘Look East Policy’, ‘Buy British Last’, ‘South-South Cooperation’, ‘Vision 2020’, ‘Malaysia Incorporated’, ‘Prosper Thy Neighbour’, ‘East Asia Economic Cooperation’ and ‘Smart Partnership’. The last named was also introduced to develop countries as well including Germany, the European Union (EU) biggest contributor of Foreign Direct Investment into Malaysia. His Vision 2020 a long-term vision for the development of a developed country status for Malaysia was predicated upon the country being able to sustain an annual economic growth rate of 5% to 7% and certainly FDI flow into the country played a very big role in this scheme.

For Dr Mahathir it was a personal triumph that he could stand tall among equals and in turn earned the respect and adulations from both foes and friends. In one aspect he had correctly read the signs and was able to forecast the whole globalisation and liberalisation trend that was engulfing the world then (Loong, 2004). He had thought long and deep and this came to be reflected in the wider context of foreign policy-making, that the best way forward would be to play the game on the same level-playing field. But in most instances this was not to be. Mahathir’s “Third-Worldism” and the “Mahathirian Constructivism” despite being praised and condemned all over the world have stood the test of time (Saravanamuttu, 2010). Consequently Malaysian Foreign Policy was equally subjected to intense scrutiny by other world leaders. Many serious scholars wrote on him and Dr Mahathir actually came to epitomise the best and the worst of Malaysian Foreign Policy for quite a while.

In contrast, with the Tunku, Malaysian Foreign Policy was very much a carbon-copy of what Whitehall had wanted us to do. Malaysia played key roles in the affairs of the Commonwealth. Militarily the agreements under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Arrangement (AMDA) guaranteed security and stability for the country. We fought and won the war against the ‘Communists’. Development and economic growth followed. His blood-ties with the Thais held him in good standing with Thailand. He was on first name basis with his Thai counterparts like Thanat Khoman and Thanom Kittikachorn. Security along the borders with the two countries remained calm. Malaysian Foreign Policy was domestic-centred instead of external-centred during this period.

Things changed dramatically under the Prime Ministership of Tun Razak. In the latter’s case foreign policy formulation rested heavily with the Foreign Ministry. With experts and specialists providing the necessary inputs for an expanded role in international affairs, the likes of Tun Dr Ismail and Tan Sri Zain Azraai, Malaysian Foreign Policy responded to the Cold War shocks with several bold initiatives meant to address three things that could become viable
alternatives to the mainstream ideologies: neutralism, nonalignment and regionalism. On the bilateral front the country received the full swipe of kinship diplomacy from Sukarno’s Indonesia with Konfrantasi and the slipping away of Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore from Malaysia. Wiser advice from an able inner circle of Advisers helped Tun Razak to steer the country in rough waters and brought it stability and better days ahead. Tun Razak’s close association with Indonesian leaders in Post-Sukarno such as Adam Malik and Benny Moerdani helped the way towards rapprochement between Malaysia and Indonesia. The outcome of such an understanding between them contributed to a central place of importance for the good and cordial relations between them and restored an enduring stability in ASEAN. What played a big part in the whole scheme of things was Malaysia’s ability to win friends from the policies implemented. Thus while at home the beginnings of the successful New Economic Policy (NEP) were put into gear, abroad Malaysian Foreign Policy began to attract attention: Neutralisation of Southeast Asia, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Nonaligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and a stronger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Multilaterally Malaysia started to take a leading role in the affairs and activities of the United Nations and its affiliated Agencies and Bodies.

Tun Razak’s successor Tun Hussein Onn, leveraged on this point to achieve impressive progress in relations with West Asia and Turkey. In the region, his quiet diplomacy led to visible changes in ASEAN’s ties with the Indochinese states most notably the Kuantan Declaration and the articulation of an ASEAN position on the Vietnamese Boat People. In the regional grouping Malaysia moved to successfully introduce dialogues and summity as instruments of foreign policy. These efforts culminated in a further institutionalisation of ASEAN mechanism for regional and intra-regional meetings.

On a personal side Tun Hussein distinguished himself as a man of few words but a principled one in terms of integrity and accountability. In turn Malaysian Foreign Policy came to reflect a profile of correctness and appropriateness and a rationalist and normative stance in most instances in international fora. Malaysian Foreign Policy as a consequence became more and more rules-based and regulations-centred.

The OIC became a platform for Malaysia to promote its credentials as a moderate Muslim and Islamic nation. Tun Hussein had Turkish blood in him and his stint at the military Academy in Dehra Dun in India placed him in an enviable position with Turkish and Indian counterparts resulting in a boost to the country’s image in these countries.

Tun Hussein did not continue for a full term as the Prime Minister on account of his poor health. As stated above, his successor, Dr Mahathir at the helm of the Government in 1981 instituted some bold changes both in style and focus with dramatic effects to the formulation and implementation of Malaysian Foreign Policy as a whole. This aspect has been discussed above.

The next Prime Minister after Dr Mahathir was Tun Abdullah Badawi. His experience in the country’s public service before assuming the Prime Ministership made him more accustomed to dealing with the bureaucracy rather than handling the affairs of state. Tun Abdullah had the advantage however to develop on his own volition. His family background served him well. Coming from a family upbringing of Islamic religious education and teachings by his late father fitted him for the role that he was going to play in foreign policy.

As with the case of Tun Hussein who looked to the West for inspiration Tun Abdullah also similarly followed. This time it was to introduce the concept of Islamic Hadhari (Progressive Islam) as the rationale for Malaysian Foreign Policy. The hope was to institute a world-wide movement to revive Islamic Unity as a force for progress and development. What followed was a multitude of foreign policy posturing that had a strong Islamic bent particularly towards Islamic countries. Good examples include Islamic banking and finance, Islamic education reforms, Halal
In ASEAN Tun Abdullah’s mild-mannered personality and calm openness earned him the honorific among many as “Mr. Nice”. As a result during Tun Abdullah’s term of office Malaysian Foreign Policy in execution and focus became lack-lustre and predictable.

Things began to settle back to older times once Najib took over as the country’s Prime Minister in 2008. He brought into foreign policy a freshness of vision and a solid sense of accomplishment much like his father, Tun Razak before him, who had taken over from the Tunku in 1969. There was continuity with Tun Razak’s foreign policy in that he chose to close ranks with countries that had kept their distance from Malaysia as a result of the various policies of his predecessors: the US, Australia and Great Britain in particular. The focus of his domestic policy however was on the transformation of the country into a high-income economy and to realise the Vision 2020 in full. In foreign policy terms this meant that the confidence of the world towards Malaysia must be restored very much in the a la Mahathir mode.. Likewise the support of the people for his Government and programmes must benefit the people. He thrived on a promise of shared wealth and values. Najib’s travels overseas were calculated ones geared towards building bridges of equal partnership and joint development. His exposure to the Western worldview in world affairs very early in life gave him a strong understanding of what is tolerated and frown upon by Western leaders.

In turn Najib began to espouse upon the principles of moderation as a cornerstone of his foreign policy. He announced the idea of a Global Movement of Moderates (GMM) from the seat of the United Nations in New York in 2011 that puts a high value on moderation and sensibility as opposed to the resort to extremism and violence to claim one’s rights to something or push for a cause, already rampant in some parts of the world.

In offering some possible explanations for all the ups and downs encountered in the foreign policy-making process as discussed above and also to identify future trends in the country’s foreign policy In turn, it is hoped the role of Dr Mahathir and his actions in pushing his ideas will be evaluated and the so-called Mahathir Paradigm is offered as an explanatory model for consideration.

Mahathir Paradigm in Foreign Policy – an explanatory model

It is suggested that a paradigm in Malaysian Foreign Policy can be demonstrated centred on Dr Mahathir as the prime-mover of most of the foreign policy decisions. The various elements of the Mahathir Paradigm can be presented as comprising of ‘Mahathirism’ in terms of firstly, in the pursuit of his own personal and power goals and being the Ruler and Chief Executive Officer of Malaysia; and secondly, from the national interest perspective, his achievements in raising the international standing of the country during his Prime Ministership and thirdly, in strategically ensuring the country remains secure against domestic and external threats (Camroux, 1994, Shome, 2002, Khoo Boo Teik, 2001, 2002, 2003).

Next we see the option of ‘Middlepowermanship’ (Stubbs, 1997) being applied as a personal and national plan of action. Thus we can expect Mahathir’s actions and policies to domestically serve the needs of national unity and national identity to ensure the survival of the country. In addition some freedom of action has been identified in Mahathir’s behaviour especially during the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998. As a free-agent Mahathir demonstrates the constructivist characteristic of a norm entrepreneur (Hoffmann, 1983). Likewise strategically Mahathir moves to secure the country as a Newly-Industrialising Country (NIC), (Camroux, 1994, Saravanamuttu, 1997, 2010).
Finally the third pillar of the Mahathir Paradigm is 'Multilateralism'. Here we can identify on a personal-domestic/external level, the importance placed on ASEAN and the consequent action in the EAEC as part of the multilateral stewardship of nations. On the level of national interest goal, Mahathir sought to apply economic diplomacy and to lead the international movement of the Non-aligned countries for example. Strategically of course Mahathir would like to leave a legacy behind when he exits the scene. Here it is the quest for global leadership personally and for the nation, to put Malaysia on the world map (Liow, 2001, Loong, 2004, Saravanamuttu, 2010).

The Mahathir Paradigm Explained

Mahathirism

Taking into account all of the above, it is arguable therefore that MAHATHIR, the Man; the Prime Minister and his Administration, have together left an impressive imprint on Malaysian foreign policy for the last two decades and more. It is also not a surprise that many have tried to document and evaluate his contribution. Scholars such as Khoo Boo Teik have coined the phrase, "Mahathirism" to refer to the 'distinctive ideology' that consists of five components: nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism and authoritarianism. Khoo's writing covers the essence of "Mahathir's ideas on politics, economics, religion, power and leadership". Khoo believes that there is a 'sufficiently high degree of consistency in Mahathir's main ideas'. Although there are as he suggested many paradoxes this consistency however makes this concept all-pervasive as an explanatory tool of foreign policy actions and decisions.

As to the role and influence of Mahathir as Prime Minister, Khoo pointed to the fact that "Mahathir intended to keep foreign policy under his close control" and that he (Mahathir) "himself set new terms and tones for the conduct of Malaysian foreign policy". In accepting the relevance of the concept, Milne and Mauzy said that Mahathirism "is not a guide to Mahathir's thoughts or actions" but rather "Mahathir's thoughts and actions are a guide to constructing Mahathirism", a position that supports the analytical framework chosen for this study. Likewise, both Milne and Mauzy (1999), also concluded however that Mahathir" did display activity and did effect changes". In another work on Malaysian Politics, Hilley (2001), while discussing Mahathirism indicated that the terms "populism and authoritarianism" as mentioned by Khoo, could equally apply to Mahathir's statecraft.

From the literature it can be deduced further that throughout Mahathir's period in office, he has etched for himself three major tasks: to become the head of the main political party in the country and the CEO of what Mahathir has referred to as 'Malaysia Incorporated', an oblique reference to the country. The only explanation for this behaviour is that Mahathir has been prompted by personal and power goals and in order to maximize his position and influence Mahathir is very much guided by what he has perceived as the national or national interest goals for the country. At heart is also the country's national survival and hence we observed Mahathir's assertiveness in foreign policy. This is also closely linked to Mahathir's attempts to put Malaysia in a strong position internationally by placing importance on realizing strategic goals that he has defined for the country.

Middlepowerism

The reference to statecraft brings us to the second pillar of the Mahathir Paradigm, 'Middlepowerism'. Nossal and Stubbs (1997), referred to it as describing a "distinct and identifiable type of statecraft" or more simply, "middlepower diplomacy". We can deduce from this that middlepowerism or middlepowermanship, as mentioned by Nossal and Stubbs, "is a general blueprint of the statecraft we should expect of middlepower diplomacy". The question is whether Malaysia could be considered a middlepower? Nossal and Stubbs preferred to be a bit more guarded in this regard and to refer instead to Malaysia's activist foreign policy from the
1990s onwards as qualifying Malaysia into an "emerging middlepower". This was clearly evident from the concluding paragraph of their article:

"We have attempted to show ... that when the characteristics of middle power diplomacy are applied to Malaysian foreign policy, we see some considerable similarities between recent Malaysian statecraft and the diplomacy of those states more commonly associated with this class of states in contemporary international politics. The activism of Malaysia in a range of global issues, and the leadership that Mahathir showed on important North-South issues, place the Malaysian government firmly in the ranks of those other middle-sized states...... ".

If Mahathirism depended so much on Mahathir, the Man, as discussed above, "Middlepowerism" here synonymously used with middlepowermanship, is tied closely with the role and influence of the position of the Prime Minister as well as the leadership provided by whoever holds the office of the Prime Minister. According to Nossal and Stubbs further, it was "Mahathir's strong domestic base; his advancing seniority among world leaders; and the reputation he gained for being prepared to speak out against the practices of the West. ... all contributed to the perception ... that Malaysia had come to occupy a middlepower leadership role". The idea of Mahathir mobilizing internal factors or being moved by them, thus resulting in the strengthening of the economy and by implication, Malaysian national identity, thereby contributing to the attainment of Malaysia's middlepower status, has been stressed by Camroux (1994):

"Mahathir's period in office represents a significant development in that he has sought to make the defence of Malay identity adapt to new circumstances and to foster a pan-ethnic Malaysian identity" which are to be understood here, as referring to internal factors that dictated a certain choice of behaviour on the part of the Prime Minister, and therefore" Mahathir's foreign relations initiatives have taken an important role".

Camroux's analysis has provided us with a strong case for Mahathir's middlepowerism. He said through the platforms provided by the four multilateral groupings: ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), OIC (The Organization of Islamic Conference), NAM (The Nonaligned Movement) and the Commonwealth, Mahathir was "able to consolidate Malaysia's role as a middle power and 'a good international citizen ". Coalition building has been identified as the process adopted by Mahathir in bringing Malaysia's voice to the outside world. In varying degrees Camroux believed that the four institutions have been useful for Mahathir to further Malaysia's political and social goals. The same opinions have been expressed by other scholars like Khoo (2001) and Liow (2001).

**Multilateralism**

As observed by scholars such as Amitav Acharya (2003), the multilateral institution-building that one saw in Europe before and after the Cold War, which by itself is a prerequisite for multilateralism, was not present in a big way in Asia. As explained: "the region's extreme diversity, absence of an Asian identity, no common external threats and fear of being ruled by other powers and having their interests marginalized". Things changed when in the 1980s the region was enjoying spectacular economic growth and countries began to interact more and more with one another in the economic sphere. Accordingly such an approach led to an acceptance of "international community building". In response Malaysia, as observed by Milne and Mauzy (1999), began to exploit its emerging middle power status and "started to favour multilateralism in its foreign policy dealings". The list of such dealings includes: "Malaysia's endorsement of the principle of nonalignment; promotion of the neutralization of the region; championship of the ‘South’ group of countries; and challenging the double-standards of the developed states in tolerating the conduct of others while censuring other states".
In his study on Malaysia’s foreign policy under the Mahathir administration Liow (2001) mentioned of Mahathir's all-pervasive influence in the international sphere in the following terms: Mahathir was regularly consulted by international organizations; held positions of leadership in them; the longest serving leader in ASEAN; the most sought-after keynote speaker at numerous international forums dealing with international economics and trade; viewed as leader of a model Islamic country whose advice was sought on issues of Islam and modernization.

Similarly other scholars including Khoo Boo Teik (2001) have written on Mahathir's externalization of domestic policies through the medium of multilateral forums gaining thereby some prominence on him personally as well as for the country.

In terms of keeping a track record on the above, it can be stated that right from the beginning the Mahathir Administration has been striving to put Malaysia on the world map. For Mahathir regional and international forums provided him with the platform with which to achieve this. Another agenda is of course to seek regional solutions to some of the internal problems faced by Malaysia. Malaysia's chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement beginning 2003 was much awaited by the international community as heralding a new chapter in the development of the organization. On the broader strategic level the Mahathir Administration has proven itself nimble enough to spread out in search for new markets for its goods and sponsored initiatives of an economic nature meant to ensure the country's continued prosperity. A long term vision in the Vision 2020 personifies Mahathir's wish to leave behind a memorable legacy when he exits the scene. This awaits the resolution of several questions that have surfaced in recent times as to the viability and efficacy of the country's foreign policy.

Malaysia's Prime Ministers: Linking Thoughts and Institutions

Another alternative available apart from the foreign policy dimension is to analyse the various worldviews in the context of the actions and institutions carried out and established during the terms of office of the respective Prime Ministers.

Malaysia’s Prime Ministers from Tunku Abdul Rahman, Abdul Razak, Hussein Onn, Mahathir Mohamad, and Abdullah Badawi to Najib Abdul Razak, came into high office bringing with them their worldviews said to be influenced by factors as discussed above. The exercise to connect the respective Prime Ministers’ worldviews to some of their major agendas and enduring legacies will in turn enrich our understanding of Malaysian history.

The different actions and institutions and their legacies to be analysed will include the following:

Table 8 Actions/Institutions, Worldviews and Legacies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIONS/INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>WORLDVIEWS</th>
<th>LEGACIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUNKU Stadium Merdeka</td>
<td>Love of sports, We must choose sides</td>
<td>Landmark to celebrate Nationhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAZAK Masjid Negara</td>
<td>Pioneering spirit of toil and wealth, Equal opportunities in New Economic Policy (NEP)</td>
<td>Spiritual abode for Man, Nature and the worship of the Almighty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSSEIN</td>
<td>Unity of the Ummah ASEAN Summitry</td>
<td>Malaysia as a temporary transit and safe-haven for Indochinese refugees in accordance with International Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What Ails Malaysian Foreign Policy?

In subjecting Malaysian Foreign Policy to a serious scrutiny it could be observed that after Dr Mahathir the course, conduct and the execution of the policy has been lacking in a central focus and clarity of goals and evincing a dire need of a distinctive structure. Partly this could be attributed to a less than complete understanding of the interconnectivity between domestic and external imperatives in the foreign policy environment. Secondly there is very little appreciation of the various origins and sources of the worldview of the dominant foreign policy decision-maker. Finally previous attempts at transformation of the foreign policy mechanism and institution have not met the prevailing expectations and the demands of the times. This is discussed below.

Envisioning an enhanced ASEAN Role

Following from the above an enhanced ASEAN role for Malaysia must be envisaged before 2015. One prerequisite is the evaluation of how ASEAN has resolved conflicts among member states and suggest ways of resolving conflicts within ASEAN and the region, to assess the future of the ASEAN Way in regional security to indicate the range of choices available to ASEAN. Firstly a clear understanding of the range of conflicts and the various approaches applied must be considered.

Chronology of conflicts

*Political-Security Approaches*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Parties Involved</th>
<th>Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Konfrontasi Malaysia-Indonesia: Rapprochement</td>
<td>Malaysia-Indonesia</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Corregidor Affair Malaysia-Philippines: Mediation</td>
<td>Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sabah Claim: Mediation</td>
<td>Malaysia-Philippines</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2nd Indochina War ASEAN-Vietnam: Accommodation</td>
<td>ASEAN-Vietnam</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Vietnam-Cambodia ASEAN: Good offices</td>
<td>Vietnam-Cambodia</td>
<td>Good offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Myanmar ASEAN: Non-intervention</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>East Timor ASEAN: ASEAN Way</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>ASEAN Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>South China Sea ASEAN-China: Joint action</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>Joint action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Aceh ASEAN: Observers</td>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Thailand-Cambodia ASEAN: Dialogue</td>
<td>Thailand-Cambodia</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Socio-economic Approaches

1997: Haze Malaysia-Indonesia: Consultation
1997-98: Asian Financial Crisis ASEAN: Joint action
Various Years - Maritime Space Disputes: Quiet
ASEAN member countries: Diplomacy

Various Years - Trans-border crimes:
Migrant labour: Negotiation
ASEAN member countries:

Collective Security Approaches
1965: Thailand-Malaysia GBC
1971: FPDA
1972: Indonesia-Malaysia GBC
1984: Malaysia-ROK Defence Cooperation
1992: Brunei Darussalam-Malaysia Defence Co-op
1992: Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Programme
1994: Philippines-Malaysia Defence Co-op
1994: ASEAN Regional Forum
1995: S’pore-Malaysia Defence Industries Cooperation
1996: Malaysia-NZ Defence Coordination Cooperation
2002: South China Sea Code of Conduct
2005: China-Malaysia Defence Cooperation
2006: ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
2008: Bilateral Defence Ties with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar excluding Vietnam

Distinct Structure: Capacity, Competency and Changing Mindset

The Foreign Ministry (Wisma Putra) is only as good as the people running it. Recent observations made from within and outside the Ministry have highlighted only the shortcomings. Rather such efforts should have called for open discussion of capacity building, competency enhancement and changing mindsets.

Nevertheless this at best can only be half a solution. A more realistic and long-term strategy needs to be crafted and the Ministry to be equipped to lead the country into the new era of global diplomacy.
For this it is proposed that the Ministry undertake a survey over a four months period, of the principal aspects of capacity, competency and change among the officers of the Ministry. In the process it is hoped the survey will provide information and data enabling the documentation of individual profiles of the respective officers and a comprehensive understanding of the existing foreign policy structures that will require decisions on future strategic actions to be taken.

The survey is expected to be carried out in four stages: determination of Indicators through Questionnaires, Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (In-country), finalisation of Survey on Capacity, Competency and Changing Mindset (In-country and Out-country), administration of Survey Questionnaires (In-country and Out-country) and finalisation of report of survey. To ensure a total effort and involvement spread of inputs from the various Diplomatic Missions around the world is achieved and for meeting financial requirements, it is suggested that these be categorised into the following groupings, not based on any established criteria, and possibly selecting a few missions to be represented in each category: ASEAN, Islamic Conference, Commonwealth, Asia-Pacific and Australasia, Africa, Indian Sub-Continent, Americas, Europe and Russia and Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

In the interest of saving on time, survey questionnaires can be administered via the Internet.

Throughout the four months it is expected that there will be a close coordination on the working procedures between all the entities involved. Specifically it is to ensure that the missions selected for the survey will be informed and monitored for completion of all survey forms and the results submitted in time. Coordination of the survey administration activities and the conduct of the main evaluation and compilation of the Final Survey Report will be done by a local University.

The following are the main issues to be covered by the Survey.

Table 9 Main Survey Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURVEY &gt;&gt;&gt;</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
<th>COMPETENCY</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISSUE v v v</td>
<td>ICT structures</td>
<td>ICT skills</td>
<td>Globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HR, Budget</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Systemic shifts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secrecy</td>
<td>Cultural/Scientific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Info</td>
<td>Leadership/Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher's own construction

AGENDA FOR CHANGE

The Agenda for Change in the foreign policy environment can now be suggested and presented in three ways articulating a clear focus, ensuring clarity of goals and evolving a distinct role in the foreign policy process as follows:

Table 10 Agenda for Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICULATING CLEAR FOCUS</th>
<th>ENSURING CLARITY OF GOALS</th>
<th>EVOLVING DISTINCT STRUCTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Unity</td>
<td>Enhancing Malaysia’s role in ASEAN</td>
<td>Administrative Performance Evaluation Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Core relationships</td>
<td>Reviewing Political, Collective-Security and Socio-Economic approaches</td>
<td>Greater Policy coherence and harmonisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EFFORTS AT ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

ASEAN Youth for Peace and Democracy Forum (AYPDF)

As ASEAN prepares for its evolution into a full-fledged Community by 2015 this programme is aimed at educating and raising the awareness of its youth on the shared principles and accepted practices of peace and democracy in the region and in the respective countries of the organisation. For this purpose it is proposed to gather annually various groups of youth from the ASEAN countries for a weeklong retreat in Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang for an intensive and rigorous series of workshops, focus groups and training sessions covering related themes and issues concerning the relevance of peace and democracy to the success and future achievements of the ASEAN Community.

Objectives

The ASEAN Youth for Peace and Democracy Forum is aimed at:

- Raising awareness among Youth on their roles and responsibilities in maintaining peace and democracy in ASEAN;
- Educating Youth on the established principles and practices of sustaining the growth of peace and democracy;
- Empowering Youth to lead in efforts of fostering support and efforts at building peace and democracy;
- Institutionalising structures and mechanisms for achieving the true spirit of peace and democracy at all levels of society.

Organisation

Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang has developed successful models for youth training at the regional levels from its experience in organising and conducting several such programmes in the past on behalf of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) and the Foreign Policy Study Group (FPSG). Based on this it is envisaged to offer its facilities and facilitators for such an undertaking.

Administration

A total of twenty participants with each ASEAN member-country represented will be selected on the basis of age, qualifications and interest to attend the weeklong programme. It is expected that the programme will attract university-enrolled students to participate. The participants will be in residence in a local hotel situated close to the University. This will ensure a close rapport and connectivity among programme participants as well as the facilitators and trainers.
Preceding the programme each participant will be required to prepare and submit in advance a researched essay on a topic to be determined prior to the Programme. The essays will be discussed and evaluated at the relevant sessions.

**Content and expected Outcomes**

**Themes** – Thick and Thin Democracy  
Strong and Weak States  
Nationalism versus New Regionalism  

**Issues** – Envisioning a Sustainability-led ASEAN  
Search for Identity and Values  
Ensuring Inclusive Innovation and Inclusive Management in all activities  

**Outcomes** – Strategic Action Plans on Involvement, Accession and Proximity in ASEAN, a people-centred Document (SAP-IAP: ASEAN Community), to be finalised.

**Youth and Foreign Policy**

Youth today seek engagement in all forms of discussion on matters that affect their future. While the most efficient way to raise one’s awareness of foreign policy issues, has not been found as yet, their eagerness to find out and to know more about what is going on around them need expression in forums, dialogues and seminars such as the Youth and Foreign Policy Seminar that was organized in the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) by the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS) and supported by the Foreign Policy Study Group, a Kuala Lumpur-based foreign policy think-tank from 18 – 20 December, 2011, in Penang.

**Concept**

Foreign Policy is a dynamic undertaking that portrays all the values and choices made by a decision group within a country for very definite ends. To serve the needs of youth in raising their awareness of the foreign policy decision making process and the issues within, a format by which issues are introduced following both a thematic and a functional area specific is considered appropriate. For this purpose a subject-expert with a competent practical experience of foreign policy situations has been selected to lead the discussions and moderate the sessions. To stimulate the discussions and energise the sessions participants have been asked to prepare in advance a short paper on an assigned topic for presentation.

**Objectives**

1. To raise awareness of foreign policy issues among youth;
2. To involve youth in open discussion and exchange of views on matters concerning foreign policy decision making;
3. To enable youth to become knowledgeable in all aspects of foreign policy;
4. To prepare youth to participate as Youth Ambassadors abroad.
Programme

The Programme brought together twenty-five participants from eight public universities and one private university in the country. For one and a half days the participants were given background lectures by several former Malaysian Ambassadors including FPSG’s Chairman, Tan Sri Razali Ismail. The topics ranged from ASEAN and the centrality of bilateral relations; the multilateral challenge in foreign policy, the role of public diplomacy and the problems and solutions in the ASEAN Way.

Prior to the Seminar the participants were required to submit a 500-word essay on the subject of 'What Youth can do for ASEAN". The exercise had been included to gauge their understanding of current issues in foreign policy in particular Malaysian Foreign Policy and ASEAN. The subject-matters dealt in the essays were wide-ranging and diverse. To reward the participants for their enthusiasm for their essay-writing it was decided to award three prizes for the best-written essays.

Youth Engagement

Engagement with the Youth also involved two other related activities. Firstly, a survey questionnaire was administered to the participants requiring them to respond to a set of questions specifically on Malaysian Foreign Policy. The questions covered areas of priorities, determinants, decision-making process, multilateral involvement and range of foreign policy decisions. During the presentation of the survey-analysis, it was observed that participants were able to grasp the basic approaches to foreign policy decision-making in the country.

Secondly, a structured working group session was included to allow for a more general discussion of the issues of foreign policy and the place of ASEAN and the ASEAN Way in the foreign policy milieu. Two such working groups were set up to tackle the issue of problems perceived in the ASEAN Way that has served as a conflict resolution mechanism in ASEAN since its founding. Participants warmed up to the demands of the two sessions: the working session as well as the presentation and discussion that followed. Debate and agreement resulted after the groups presented their probable solutions to the ways that ASEAN could solve the problems faced by the regional grouping. One group advocated for a thick solution of total involvement while the other opted for a combined thick and thin way, i.e., a mixture of nationalism and new regionalism pointing to the advent of the ASEAN Community of 2015.

Generally the Youth Seminar had achieved its purpose of raising awareness of foreign policy issues affecting the country and the larger ASEAN Community among the Youth. The level of participation in the open sessions and in the working groups were very active and the ideas expressed and agreement reached have been most stimulating and energising indeed. Coming from the Youth themselves they were very honest and frank in their evaluation of their future role in a more structured ASEAN.

The Youth Seminar has greatly benefited from the presence of high officials from the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs including its Secretary General and the Director General of the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR) and its officials, the Vice Chancellor of USM accompanied by its senior academics and the Academic Staff of the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS). The participants were called upon to take the lead in preparing the country to take a more active role when Malaysia assumed the Chairmanship of the ASEAN Community in 2015.

For the future the participants resolved to work towards realising the following:

1. Establish an ASEAN Youth Parliament
2. Initiate ASEAN Youth Centres in member countries
3. Organise ASEAN Youth Exchanges/Networks

4. Participate in future Dialogues and similar Forums

**Insight or Foresight – some conclusions**

Theoretically the writer takes the position that what is revealed after a comparative study is done concerning any aspect of Youth is rightfully an insightful exercise. However if the exercise is merely taken in the spirit of seeing something coming alive after the application of certain structured methods for instance as in the results achieved after an intensive working group session, the activity could well be regarded as an exercise in foresight. The difference between the two lies in the duration taken in each respective exercise. In the first case time is allowed to dictate the process. In the second case however, the results are the products really of a spontaneous flow of thoughts and ideas. Thus we may conclude that insights are more permanent in nature while foresights are just temporary. This idea stems from the fact that there is an innate human ability to think and decide on things on the spur of the moment. Foresight thinkers have quoted Slaughter’s definition of foresight as a starting point and I agree with this entirely:

“….. a universal human capacity which allows people to think ahead, consider, model, create and respond to future eventualities….” (Slaughter, 1995)

This concept comes closest to a finding by Gidley and Inayatullah (2002) that talks about youth being immature, impressionistic and cliquish. The idea therefore is to catch the attention of the Youth through a structured approach and getting them to voice their opinions freely and unimpeded by adult-interference such as verbal-prodding and expert-advice. To get an immediate response from youth it is better to catch them in their unguarded moments. What follows is a discussion on what is insight and foresight from the results of the various exercises the participants were put through in the programme.

**Questionnaire on Malaysian Foreign Policy**

Participants were requested to fill up the Questionnaire (Please see Annex) consisting of questions ranging from issues of priorities, determinants and policy decisions concerning Malaysian foreign policy. The aim of the exercise is to gauge the depth and grasp of issues concerning Malaysian Foreign Policy and its domestic and external environment. The detailed results are presented as follows:

**Question 1:** To the question of the priorities of Malaysian Foreign Policy, 9 participants chose ASEAN as the number one priority for the country. For the interested observer the choice made has been the right one since it is ASEAN indeed that has preoccupied policy-makers in the country since the inception of the Grouping in the region. ASEAN has remained the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy even till the present. This is very insightful surely as it confirmed an already established fact. However looking it as an element of foresight, 5 of the participants had selected the United Nations as their number one priority issue. The rationale is that there exists a pocket of thoughts and knowledge among the participants as to the viability of a larger grouping that citizens could have an appeal for in this context. This is a segment of views that policy-makers will need to take note of.

**Question 2:** Responses to the issue of the main determinants of Malaysian Foreign Policy however revealed a greater degree of foresight than insight. While a majority had chosen national interest as their first main determinant, others have ranked as their first-choice answers as being in the order of national interest, bilateral cooperation, assistance and bangsa serumpun. The responses could be categorized as both insightful and yet foresightful. But of interest from the foresight point of view is the second-choice answers which is a mix of foreign
direct investment, national interest and security pointing to the interesting facts that perhaps the participants have a prior knowledge of the subject and even if this were so, their choices could be an evidence that could be considered by various agencies of the Government in their efforts to see a greater move to reach out to the students in the Universities in terms of raising more awareness of Youth in policy-making. From the answers we could derived a strategic direction in terms of clarifying the sort of information that are passed on to students.

Question 3: On to a final example of an important area in foreign policy which is that of decision-making process, the participants were very much on the spot when they chose the known three main institutions involved in the foreign policy-making process in the country: Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliament. The results confirmed an already existing insight on the issue. However the foresight issue has to do with how we could square up on the role of the Parliament when it is a well-known fact that very little is public-knowledge on the role of Parliament in this very issue. In a sense more needs to be done to highlight this matter for the public interest. The participants have thus drawn attention to an existing gap in public information as a result.

What should be the focus of Malaysian Foreign Policy?

Included in the above-mentioned Questionnaire is a request to have participants list down five things they would like to see in Malaysian Foreign Policy. The purpose of the question is to get the participants to integrate their thinking on the various issues of importance to the future of the country in terms of foreign policy focus. The question this time is really one of foresight determination. In their answers it was hoped that the participants could provide a laundry list of issues that could be evaluated by the policy-makers. They have indeed all responded positively in the exercise as presented in the following Table below.

The questions posed were in two parts. In Part One, they were asked to list down five things they would like to see in the country’s foreign policy. Part Two required them to list what they would like to do for the country.

Table 11 Focus of Malaysian Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHAT YOUTH WANT IN FOREIGN POLICY – LIST A</th>
<th>WHAT YOUTH WANT TO DO FOR COUNTRY – LIST B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good country in ASEAN</td>
<td>Stop terrorism with diplomacy not war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good relationship with the world</td>
<td>Prepare good leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be more neutral</td>
<td>Prepare to face ASEAN Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More concerned with Islamic matters</td>
<td>More humanitarian assistance to the ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak louder in international forums</td>
<td>countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good relations with Japan and Korea</td>
<td>Establish ASEAN Youth Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve human rights towards environment</td>
<td>Initiate ASEAN Youth Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create peace among ASEAN countries</td>
<td>Organise ASEAN Youth Exchanges/Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate integration in OIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance integration in ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Be involved in climate change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve ASEAN Community as a stage for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balancing with hegemonic power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve defence and security in all aspects not just military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement and strengthen policy that can bring major development in economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursue our interests in the South China Sea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a movement to fight for Muslim countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate with Islamic Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take more action in humanitarian issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put more pressure on Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Be less dependent economically on the United States and China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be more democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work to gain benefits for both sides in a relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead in Palestine Issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be against extremism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have strong bonds with Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More vocal approach towards human rights violations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to champion predicament of the South countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen relations with Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In going through the two lists one can see that the selections were very wide-ranging and diverse. They covered geographical areas, issues, concepts, ideology and commitments both bilaterally and globally in foreign policy. This list is definitely a goldmine for the foresight futurist. It helps us to identify not only present concerns but also directs us to new areas and focus for foreign policy decision-making. As to knowing that they would like to do the list compiled in the column on the right provided us with a sense of the direction in the future where the youth would like to see some activities taking shape. These include four areas of focus for the future of Youth in foreign policy:

1. Greater use of diplomacy in fighting terrorism;
2. Choosing the right leaders to lead the country;
3. Facing the challenges of the ASEAN Community; and
   Establishing new avenues to tap Youth Engagement
ANNEX

1. Questionnaire on Youth and Foreign Policy
2. Analysis of results of Responses to Questions

ROUNDTABLE ON YOUTH AND FOREIGN POLICY
18 – 20 December 2011, CenPRIS, Universiti Sains Malaysia

RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS

TOPIC: WHAT YOUTH WANTS IN MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

INSTRUCTION

KINDLY COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE. YOUR RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED TO ENABLE CenPRIS TO GAUGE THE VIEWS OF MALAYSIAN YOUTH ON THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. PARTICIPANTS ARE INFORMED THAT PORTIONS OF THE RESPONSES WILL BE USED IN A FUTURE PUBLICATIONS PLANNED BY CenPRIS.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. PRIORITIES

Select five (5) of the priority areas listed below and rank your choice by numbers from 1 to 5 (e.g. 1. Islam 2. ASEAN.....)

- ASEAN
- NONALIGNED MOVEMENT
- ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
- EAST ASIA SUMMIT
- INDONESIA MALAYSIA THAILAND GROWTH TRIANGLE
- MALAYSIA-INDONESIA RELATIONS
- MALAYSIA-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS
- UNITED NATIONS
- UNESCO
- CHINA
- INDIA
- GROUP OF 20
- JAPAN
- ANTARCTICA
- CLIMATE CHANGE
- HUMAN RIGHTS
- TERRORISM
- Others

2. DETERMINANTS

Foreign Policy is a sum total of internal and external determinants. In the case of Malaysian Foreign Policy the following factors have been identified as its main determinants. Rank them in the order of importance to YOU from number 1 to 5 (e.g. 1.
3. DECISION MAKING

Who makes foreign policy decisions in Malaysia? Choose from the following list:

Prime Minister  Minister of Foreign Affairs
Parliament      Ministry of Foreign Affairs (WISMA PUTRA)
Civil Servants  Malaysian Citizens
Non-Government Organisations  Chief Ministers
United States  United Kingdom
ASEAN          Others............

4. MULTILATERAL INVOLVEMENT

In the past fifty years as part of its commitment to regional and multilateral diplomacy Malaysia has played an active role in several regional and multilateral organisations. Several Malaysians have distinguished themselves in these organisations. Please mark with a YES or NO against each of the following:

UNITED NATIONS – Mr. R. Ramani
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL ENVOY – Tan Sri Razali Ismail
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE – Tunku Abdul Rahman
ASEAN – Ambassador Ajit Singh
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION – Dato Shafie Apdal
ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL CENTRE FOR ARBITRATION – Dato P.G. Lim
5. RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

Malaysia's active foreign policy since Independence in 1957 has been able to raise its profile in the world. This could be attributed to a whole range of decisions that have been articulated by its leaders and implemented over the years. The list of policies below have each description jumbled up. Select from the list and match each of the policies against a correct description:

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) – Japan and Korea
Declaration on Conduct in South China Sea - – ANTARCTICA Treaty Members
Common Heritage of Mankind – ASEAN
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) – United Kingdom
Buy British Last – Vietnam and China
Smart Partnership – South-South Countries
Look East Policy – India
East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) – Australia and New Zealand
Commonwealth Economic Cooperation Area (CECA) – Singapore

6. COLOUR YOUR FOREIGN POLICY

A noticeable trend in internal development of several countries in the past years that carries foreign policy implications for the countries concerned has been the association of these changes with different colours. Recall how these developments have been reported in the world media. In the list mentioned which country or countries would you associate the following events:

Orange Revolution –
Black September –
Red Army –
Yellow Shirt –
Red Shirts vs. Yellow Shirts -

7. COLOURFUL PHRASES – MANY HEROES

Foreign Policy is said to involve diplomacy and intentions. Often the latter is never made public. Describe briefly what is meant in the following list of diplomatic activities:

Ping-Pong diplomacy
Shuttle diplomacy
Four-eyed meeting
8. CONGRATULATIONS. YOU HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

Finally list five things you want to see in Malaysian Foreign Policy and what you can do for the country

______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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