The Japan-U.S. Partnership Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons


Edited By BRYCE WAKEFIELD
The Japan-U.S. Partnership
Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Report of the
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Edited By
BRYCE WAKEFIELD

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**CONFERENCE AGENDA**
The United States and the international community stand at a crossroads in how they deal with nuclear issues.

Broadly speaking, there are two paths open to the world. The first is characterized by a general nonchalance towards nuclear weapons and proliferation. It would involve the continued deterioration, if not collapse, of the international non-proliferation regime, which is under stress from aspiring nuclear-weapons states and increasing demand for nuclear energy. It could lead us to a nuclear tipping-point, a cascade of proliferation in regions throughout the world, and arms races. More nuclear materials, particularly in countries with inadequate safeguards, would increase the risk of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear capabilities and putting them to deadly use. Under this scenario, nations would compete for nuclear advantage, and the world would become a more dangerous place.

The second path reflects more sustained engagement from the United States, other nuclear powers, and the international community. No nuclear policy is perfect, and there will be some proliferation failures. But there could also be roll back, restraint, and steps towards disarmament by nuclear-weapons states. Stronger international cooperation would reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism. And policy shifts by nuclear-weapons states could lead to the diminished relevance of these destructive weapons, as well as the allure they hold for aspiring members of the nuclear club.

There is no other issue in international relations in which the stakes are higher. Governments, scholars, and leaders of all kinds must make a serious effort to grapple with the future of nuclear weapons, which is why I am immensely pleased that last October the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars joined forces with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation to host the inaugural Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum in Tokyo on the timely subject of nuclear disarmament and the future of the U.S.-Japan partnership.
Of course, Japan, as the only nation to have suffered a nuclear attack, has a special interest in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At the same time, disarmament raises issues related to the credibility of American deterrence capabilities, an issue close to Japan’s security calculations. We should not shy away from discussing sensitive matters such as this, even if they concern the vital interests of both nations. To the contrary, it is imperative that we frankly examine such issues precisely because they do touch on matters crucial to the management of the bilateral alliance. I look forward to seeing the Wilson Center and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation promote such discussions on a continuing basis.

Lee H. Hamilton
President and Director
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

PREFACE

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation has placed importance on Japan-U.S. exchange since 2008, and since that time has launched several projects. In one of these projects, the foundation collaborates with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to implement a Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum addressing various policy issues in fields in which Japan and the US can work together to contribute to the international community. For the first year, we chose the theme, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” an issue which is fast drawing attention and gaining momentum.

At the forum, a keynote speech was given by Yukio Satoh, a former UN ambassador who is presently vice chairman of the board of trustees of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. This was followed by a memorial speech by former secretary of defense and senior fellow at Hoover Institution, William Perry. Secretary Perry wrote, together with Henry Kissinger, George Shultz and Sam Nunn, a Wall Street Journal op-ed in January 2007 and 2008 on a world free of nuclear arms and has created a current of international opinion towards a world free of nuclear weapons. He has had a large influence on the nuclear disarmament policy of the Obama administration. It was a joy and honor for us to invite him to speak at the 2009 forum.

After Mr. Satoh’s speech, Shotaro Yachi, a former vice-minister for foreign affairs, and a professor at Waseda University, engaged in dialogue with the secretary. We invited Ryuichi Teshima, a former NHK Washington bureau chief, to be a moderator of the dialogue. I would like to thank, as an organizer, all four individuals for their participation in the first day.

We also had successful two-panel discussions for the second day. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of all six panelists from Japan and the U.S., and Professor Nobumasa Akiyama, who moderated both discussions admirably.
As we know, since President Obama’s speech in Prague, international public opinion has shifted strongly towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament met in Hiroshima just before the forum, where non-first use of nuclear-weapons was strongly advocated. As this forum was held in Tokyo, the capital, the issue has now become a prominent topic of public discussion. There can be no doubt that this is a greatly welcomed trend.

If we do not see any action or achievements after the great momentum that exists today, we will be left with a huge sense of disappointment and despair. I very much hope this does not happen.

In the end of the Wall Street Journal op-ed, Secretary Perry and his group stated, “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.” As an organizer of the forum, I hope very much that our discussion at the venue will contribute to further discussion and action on this issue. I would like to express our thanks to those who have helped in organizing this forum and to the many participants.

Jiro Hanyu
Chairman
Sasakawa Peace Foundation

DISARMAMENT, DETERRENCE, AND CHALLENGES IN U.S.-JAPAN JOINT POLICY COORDINATION

Bryce Wakefield

Recent events have breathed new life into non-proliferation and disarmament discussions. A 2007 Wall Street Journal article by four of America’s most respected statesmen touched off the current debate. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn—two Republicans and two Democrats—issued a ringing call for a world free of nuclear weapons.1 A year later, they published a second article building on the arguments of the first.2

Those who believe that we live in a Hobbesian world, where the cold hard realities of state military power will always trump the aspirations of those who wish to eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation, derided this plea for global nuclear disarmament as nothing more than “a good pastime for retired men.”3

Such cynicism is perhaps understandable. After all, it is not unknown for those once in high official positions to renounce nuclear weapons after laying down the burdens of office. In early 2009, three retired British defense chiefs claimed that their nation’s nuclear submarine forces were irrelevant in the modern world.4 In 1996, two retired U.S. generals, a former commander of NATO and a former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, called for nuclear weapons to be abolished. Their statement was echoed by 60 more retired defense chiefs from 17 nations.5 In 2005, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara also famously proposed “the elimination—or near elimination—of all nuclear weapons.”6 And yet, the world’s nuclear weapon states have still to embark on a robust program of nuclear disarmament.
Moreover, in many ways the parameters of the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament have remained the same since the end of the Cold War, and many of the instruments currently proposed to achieve these goals have been with us for decades. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was reducing the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile, while urging others to do the same. Washington and Moscow concluded the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991 and a second START treaty in 1993. While any major new disarmament framework would bring other powers into the process as time progresses, the starting point—American and Russian arms control—would be the same. Similarly, the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) established the framework still favored by the United States and others to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons.

In many ways the parameters of the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament have remained the same since the end of the Cold War.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: A NEW START FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT?

However, efforts toward reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons have recently gained new impetus with U.S. President Barack Obama’s declaration of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” During the April 2009 speech in Prague where he unveiled his vision, Obama argued that this aspiration was not naïve, although he conceded that the goal of a world free of the deadly instruments of the Cold War might not be reached in his lifetime. Nevertheless, in a post-Cold War world where new threats have emerged and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction is no longer seen as a guarantee of security, Obama’s statements may represent a significant turning point on the path towards complete nuclear disarmament.

As well as encouraging the new impetus behind non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, the international community also needs to approach these issues with a sober sense of realism.

Even if a world without nuclear weapons is a goal likely to be attained only some decades in the future, Obama stressed that concrete steps are required now, and declared that his administration would pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Bill Clinton signed with other world leaders in 1996. Obama also announced his intention to negotiate a new accord to ban the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

Most in the non-proliferation camp believe that nations around the world must also work to shore up the NPT regime by committing more resources to strengthen inspections. North Korea’s provocative test launch of missiles on the very day of Obama’s Prague speech demonstrated only too well that there must be real consequences for nations that break the rules or attempt to leave the treaty. As the president noted in Prague, “Rules must be binding, violations must be punished, words must mean something.” However, noting the legitimate desire of peaceful, and especially developing, nations to have access to civilian nuclear energy, the president also advocated the establishment of a regulated fuel bank for these purposes. Understandably, the United States is committed to ensuring that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons, and, to this end, Obama has declared that his administration will work with the governments of other nations to create a system to safeguard sensitive nuclear material within four years. He has also highlighted the need to close black markets, which might facilitate the sale of nuclear weapons to terrorists, and has pledged that the United States will host a global summit on nuclear security in the coming months.

As well as encouraging the new impetus behind non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, the international community also needs to approach these issues with a sober sense of realism. As non-signatories to the NPT, India and Pakistan have shown that states still see nuclear weapons as desirable components of their arsenals. Iran continues
to test the non-proliferation framework, and North Korea is a blatant serial violator of its non-proliferation commitments. Without successful arms control negotiations among a wide range of countries, deep cuts by Russia and America could encourage attempts by competitors such as China to expand their stockpiles in order to achieve nuclear parity. Efforts to decrease the number of nuclear weapons in the world, if not implemented carefully, could actually have the opposite effect.

Washington’s non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, meanwhile, raise questions related to the extended deterrence guarantees that the United States offers its friends and allies. Obama was clear that his remarks on nuclear disarmament would not affect America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent force will remain an essential component of America’s strategic posture for many years to come. Such a deterrent may not be sufficient to prevent terrorism, but it will continue to serve a host of other essential purposes for some decades yet.

**DISARMAMENT AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN JAPAN**

The need to promote disarmament efforts and yet ensure the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence is not lost on key U.S. allies like Japan.

Indeed, Japan has long pursued a global nuclear disarmament agenda. Every year since 1994, for example, Japan has submitted a draft resolution calling for an end to nuclear weapons to the United Nations General Assembly. Obama’s commitment to nuclear disarmament has meant that, for the first time, the United States co-sponsored this resolution in 2009. Japan also co-chairs the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament with Australia. There is, moreover, strong domestic support for Japan’s calls for disarmament. Testimony by hibakusha—survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—about the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and Japan’s status as the only nation ever to have suffered such an attack, has promoted strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.

It was this anti-nuclear sentiment that prompted Japan to adopt Three Non-nuclear Principles, which state the Japanese government will not allow the possession and production of nuclear weapons, or their introduction into Japanese territory. The principles were formulated by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in 1967 and declared as official policy in 1968. While secret agreements between the United States and Japan saw Satō guarantee that nuclear-armed American ships could enter Japanese territorial waters if necessary, Japan has remained faithful to at least the first two of the three principles. Despite possessing the technological wherewithal to do so, Japan has not crossed the nuclear-weapons threshold. This has strengthened its position in multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament.

Since adopting the principles, Tokyo has nevertheless consistently maintained that as long as there are nuclear threats to Japan, the Three Non-nuclear Principles are only viable alongside U.S. guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence. Japan will work towards disarmament, foregoing a nuclear deterrent of its own, but it will not sacrifice its security to do so. For most of the time since the end of the postwar occupation of Japan, this has not presented a problem to Tokyo. Geopolitical developments meant that the Japanese government could rely on U.S. extended deterrence and American forces based in Japanese territory to provide for much of the nation’s defense. As a democratic bulwark in the Pacific containing communist forces in the Soviet Union and China, Japan was an integral part of American strategic planning throughout the Cold War.

American protection, however, meant that Japan was able to play a largely passive role in global politics while it focused on post-war economic reconstruction, and later, achieving high growth. Tokyo did move to formalize some of its domestic defense arrangements in the mid- to late-1970s after the United States made its diplomatic approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and President Richard Nixon insisted that Asian nations take on more of the burden for maintaining security in the region. Meanwhile, Japan’s financial commitments to regional security, particularly in the form of overseas aid in the 1980s, were impressive, but they were not matched with more “human” contributions. Japan also shied away from criticizing some nations in the region and beyond...
that engaged in provocative behavior or failed to live up to international standards on human rights.

At the same time opposition parties, unions, and many intellectuals in Japan struggled to come to terms with their nation’s militarism during the 1930s and 1940s, and Japan’s place within the Cold War. These groups nurtured a domestic commitment towards the principles of pacifism enshrined in the nation’s constitution, largely written shortly after the Second World War by optimistic American occupation officials. Throughout the Cold War, Washington would often attempt to coax Japan out of its passivity in foreign affairs, but at a popular level, military solutions to global problems were shunned. Japanese political elites thus avoided controversy surrounding discussions on national security by instead focusing on economic management. Defense, including extended deterrence, became an almost untouchable subject in Japanese political discourse, much to the frustration of Americans managing the U.S.-Japan mutual security arrangements.

Since the Cold War, however, Japan has been reevaluating its passive foreign policy. The poor performance of the nation’s economy in the last two decades, coupled with a cool reaction by the international community to Tokyo’s US$13 billion financial contribution to operations in the 1991 Gulf War, have compelled many Japanese to reconsider their national security strategy. Japan still maintains its strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, but it has become more active in the international arena, sending the nation’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) overseas on international reconstruction and assistance missions since 1992. Such moves have encouraged a greater willingness on the part of politicians and public commentators to broach issues once considered too controversial, and discussions on military cooperation between the United States and Japan have increased since the late 1990s.

While the vast majority of Japanese still view even discussion of an independent nuclear deterrent for their nation as highly controversial, many Japanese analysts are nevertheless increasingly willing to talk about the importance of U.S. extended deterrence. Such discussions have become more evident as the regional balance of power has grown more complex. Due to China’s military modernization and North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, U.S. security guarantees are now arguably even more important to Japan than during the Cold War, when bipolar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made Japan’s security environment somewhat more predictable. Japan now has more variables to consider in its defense calibrations.

The importance of extended deterrence has been reflected in the words and deeds of official and political actors in both the United States and Japan. In 2009 senior Japanese diplomats lobbied the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States to maintain the doctrine of extended deterrence. North Korea’s 2006 declaration that it successfully tested a nuclear weapon, and its ongoing nuclear brinkmanship, meanwhile, have prompted American officials to reassure key U.S. allies in northeast Asia that Washington remains strongly committed to such a doctrine. Nevertheless, Obama’s call for less reliance on nuclear weapons has commentators in both America and Japan speculating about what extended deterrence might imply in the future.

SETTING THE SCENE

Renewed discussion of disarmament, the scope and potential of U.S.-Japan cooperation towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and the challenges these issues pose in light of American guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence thus provide a rich topic for research and debate. On October 21–22, 2009, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation hosted a Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum in Akasaka, Tokyo to focus on these issues. On the evening of October 21, the keynote speakers at this conference, William J. Perry, the 19th U.S. secretary of defense, and Yukio Satoh, Japan’s former permanent representative to the United Nations, outlined the history and issues surrounding global nuclear disarmament, as well as American and Japanese concerns about developing such an agenda. On the second day of the forum, a number of scholars from Japan and the United States discussed the tension between the continued need for extended deterrence and moves toward disarmament, within the context of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Is the elimination of nuclear weapons an attainable, or even desirable, goal? Perry explained his own reasons for joining Kissinger, Nunn, and Shultz in penning their landmark Wall Street Journal article calling for an end to nuclear forces. As a “card-carrying cold warrior” involved in analyzing technical data during the Cuban missile crisis, and later, responsible for
There is thus emerging political space for Japan and the United States to take concrete measures to balance the goal of nuclear disarmament and the credibility of extended deterrence. In his presentation on the second day of the conference, Ken Jimbo, assistant professor of Faculty of Policy Management at Keio University, stressed that there are several “layers” of the nuclear order beyond Russian and American disarmament—including threats by other nuclear powers, rogue states, and terrorists—that any new disarmament framework would need to address. Many of these layers are closely related to Japanese security concerns. Japan’s increasing dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrence in light of North Korean brinkmanship means that any sudden moves by Washington may erode the credibility of the U.S. guarantee to Tokyo.

For example, Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists, discussed the utility or otherwise of the United States adopting a doctrine of “no first-use,” where Washington would declare that it would use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. Such a move, it is argued, would decrease the salience of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. It could also be used as a bargaining chip to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Ferguson noted that whatever the perceived benefits of a no first-use doctrine may be, in the past U.S. interests have been served by “strategic ambiguity” on this issue. Indeed, Satoh believed that a no first-use doctrine might open Japan to the threat of attack by biological and chemical weapons, and Jimbo agreed, arguing that any “negative security assurances” such as a no-first use policy must be accompanied by a framework to deal with the North’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Perry noted that there were, however, similar formulations that could...
better suit the needs of U.S. allies. A “sole purpose” doctrine—a declaration that the United States would only use nuclear weapons in response to an “existential attack” on an ally or itself—might not prove as detrimental to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Ferguson argued that at a minimum, “there is a clear need for Japanese and U.S. civilian and military planners to thoroughly explore the circumstances that may require U.S. nuclear deterrence in conventional or other non-nuclear scenarios.”

Pyongyang’s goal of acquiring nuclear capabilities, then, is obviously having a profound and immediate effect on Japan’s sense of security, and is almost certainly the primary factor in explaining why Japan reportedly has expressed concern about the retirement of American TLAM-N cruise missiles. After reviewing American nuclear capabilities, Ferguson noted that even with deep and mutually negotiated cuts to American and Russian nuclear armaments, the United States could still deter China’s smaller nuclear arsenal, let alone that of North Korea.

From the point of view of U.S. allies, however, China may not always be so easily deterred. Jimbo noted that after another decade of Chinese military modernization, the PRC may be able to respond to a nuclear strike from the United States with a robust “second strike” on an increasing number of U.S. targets. This would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrence guarantees to friends and allies in the region. Like European nations during the Cold War, some in Japan are particularly anxious about the prospect of the United States “decoupling” deterrence—that is, moving to a position where it would be less willing to respond in kind against a strike on its allies if there is the possibility of a second retaliatory attack against the American homeland. Tokyo might begin to rethink radically its own deterrence capabilities if it were unsure about American commitments to deter a foreign attack on Japan.

Indeed, as Katsuhisa Furukawa, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center at the Japan Science and Technology Agency, noted, there is a pressing need for Japan to engage in talks with the United States on Chinese military modernization. With high-end estimates from the U.S. Department of Defense placing China’s military budget at an amount several times the level of Japan’s, Russian and American moves towards disarmament may prompt the PRC to attempt to achieve nuclear parity by building up its own nuclear weapons stockpiles. Furukawa stressed that there needed to be better dialogue between Japan and its allies on the quality of deterrence and efforts to explore concrete options for deterring China and rogue states like North Korea by non-nuclear means.

How do America and Japan’s strategic considerations in northeast Asia compare to those of other regions? Robert Litwak, vice president for Programs and director of International Security at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, stressed that when examining state motivations concerning nuclear armament, it is important to distinguish between general motivations applicable to all states, and those specific to certain regimes. Iran is viewed by the United States as a more dynamic threat than North Korea; unlike the North Korean case, the Iranian nuclear program has existed across regimes.

Litwak noted that instead of decommissioning their nuclear programs or moving clearly towards nuclear weaponization, Iran and North Korea could hedge, which would cause ongoing uncertainty for U.S. allies in the Middle East and northeast Asia. Iran and North Korea could hedge, which would cause ongoing uncertainty for U.S. allies in the Middle East and northeast Asia.

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and Beijing. Satoh pointed out that although China is becoming an increasingly important nation in Asia, it is not a U.S. ally like Japan, and effort must be made to reassure the Japanese public that Tokyo is not being left behind on questions of regional security.

THE NEW JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Combined approaches to security problems, however, can go beyond discussion and consultation. Despite its passive approach to foreign policy since the 1950s, Japan has cooperated in a number of ways with the United States to maintain stability in northeast Asia. For example, Tokyo currently bears around 70 percent of the non-salary cost of the U.S. presence in Japan. Other bilateral efforts range from “intelligence and operational cooperation to standardization of weapons and equipment and logistical support,” although, according to Satoh, these are “often limited in depth and scope.” In recent years, the United States and Japan have also been cooperating on missile defense, an important means of defending Japan against North Korean missiles if deterrence were to fail.

Satoh nevertheless believes that there is ample room for more bilateral cooperation on security issues. In particular, he advocated that Japan move to recognize its own “right of collective defense,” which would allow Japan’s Self Defense Forces to come to the aid of Americans under attack. Current interpretations of Japan’s constitution forbid the SDF from taking such action, but Satoh expressed the hope that the new government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama would address this issue “without delay,” as part of its pledge to put the United States and Japan on an “equal footing.”

But is the new government in Tokyo ready to cooperate with the United States on security issues? Discussion of this issue at the Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum was informed by friction between the two nations over the relocation of U.S. bases on Japanese territory. Amid these developments, Perry engaged in a dialogue with Shōtarō Yachi, former Japanese vice minister of foreign affairs, moderated by veteran Japanese journalist Ryūichi Teshima. The Japanese participants in particular discussed the prospects for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the context of the new political climate in Tokyo.

The Hatoyama administration has announced that it would not renew legislation allowing Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force to assist in refueling coalition ships involved in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. To compensate for this move, Japan has pledged to replace the refueling mission by providing $5 billion to fund international operations in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is hard to determine how this new offer of support will affect the U.S.-Japan relationship, or Japan’s standing on the world stage, in the absence of more concrete, human commitments.

Indeed, Teshima noted concern that with the cancellation of the Indian Ocean mission, Japan might fall into old habits by simply funding international peacekeeping efforts rather than actively taking part in operations. Yachi agreed with Teshima, noting that the refueling mission constituted a low risk operation through which Japan could show the world the active contributions it could make to global security. He expressed his hope that the Hatoyama administration would, after deliberating on issues about security, “think about things more realistically.” Tokyo’s reluctance to offer a human and material commitment to support activities like the refueling operations have raised doubts over whether the United States and Japan will be able to cooperate in other areas.

There are signs, however, that the prime minister of Japan is looking at nuclear disarmament as an area where Japan can prove it is still a valuable ally to the United States. The moderator of the two panel discussions on the second day of the forum, Nobumasa Akiyama, associate professor at the Graduate School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, noted Japan’s support for Obama’s Prague speech and recent U.S. disarmament initiatives at the United Nations. Akiyama also referenced a speech given by Hatoyama at the U.N., where the prime minister mentioned Japan’s special position as the only nation to have suffered a nuclear attack. This was a clear and conscious response, Akiyama believed, to references in Obama’s Prague speech noting America’s special responsibilities as the only nation to have used nuclear weapons. Hatoyama’s speech was thus a call for the two nations to take “combined steps as allies to promote disarmament.”
CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Indeed, Japan stands in a unique position to assist the United States in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Japan possesses the advanced technological base that would enable it to offer practical solutions in the management of the global nuclear materials market. Its alliance with the United States, moreover, means that any cooperation between the two nations can be truly bilateral. Regional solutions are of course desirable, but the United States and Japan can start on building non-proliferation infrastructure even before multilateral frameworks are in place. Indeed, Furukawa stressed that Japan should aim for “a global framework where Japan and the United States can lead the world” in these areas of research.

Where can the United States and Japan best coordinate their efforts? With nations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere increasingly expressing their desire for more nuclear energy, Furukawa noted a need for nuclear weapons states to convince the international community they are serious about disarmament, so as to counter the temptation by other states to develop their own weapons. There is also a need for more robust monitoring and evaluating of civilian nuclear programs and their potential for weaponization. Furukawa singled out the Norwegian organization Vertic, which promotes disarmament verification measures and conducts simulations to improve the verification process, as an example that Japan and the United States could emulate.

However, verification measures in themselves are not sufficient to stop nuclear materials from falling into the hands of actors with nuclear ambitions, be they states or non-state actors. Regulation of the global market in nuclear materials is also necessary. Tatsujirō Suzuki, associate vice president at the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry of Japan, and visiting professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, focused on management of the nuclear fuel cycle and its relevance to the peaceful use of nuclear power and disarmament. Although there are many institutions throughout the world set up to manage the peaceful acquisition and use of nuclear fuel, the system lacks transparency, and contains an inherent double standard that gives nations with current nuclear programs priority access to nuclear fuels.

Suzuki argued that requests for nuclear fuel should be clear and specific, in order to give suppliers the latitude to avoid granting surplus uranium and plutonium to nations with existing civilian nuclear energy programs. Prioritizing the need of nations without their own nuclear supplies should prevent stockpiling. Suzuki also argued that nuclear energy companies should also be encouraged to adopt a set of compliance standards, much like other industries are controlled by, for example, environmental compliance norms. Standards should include broad principles related to the best practices in technology transfer, nuclear weapons safety, and prevention of the production of nuclear weapons. Suzuki stressed that civil society has a special role in ensuring compliance by acting as a watchdog to ensure these practices are maintained. In that regard, states can set up special funds for the activities of international non-governmental organizations in these areas.

Technical measures are one thing, but are there areas where Japan can use diplomatic leverage to ensure that other nations comply with the international non-proliferation regime? Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, thinks so. Focusing on Iran, Posen discussed traditional levers of state power at Japan’s disposal that Tokyo has in the past been reluctant to use. According to Posen, skillful diplomacy on the part of Tokyo could stop Tehran from flaunting the non-proliferation regime.

The development of an Iranian nuclear weapon would be a significant blow to the credibility of the NPT and the international nuclear safeguards that complement it. A nuclear Iran would lend weight to arguments that only a robust American nuclear deterrent can secure the United States. American support for the current non-proliferation regime would thus be seriously weakened. The development of an Iranian nuclear weapon would also cause Iran’s nearby rivals to seek their own, further eroding the viability of the NPT.

The options for dealing with Iran in this scenario, are, in Posen’s words, “not pretty,” and include the establishment of an expensive arrangement to
contain and deter Iran, and even an American attack to remove the Iranian weapons program. Obviously, as a major importer of Middle Eastern oil, such developments would have an adverse effect on the Japanese economy. However, because it is such an important trading partner with Iran, Japan is also in a position to make Iran “very uncomfortable” by coordinating sanctions through the United Nations. The question for Tokyo is whether it sees the NPT regime as more important to its national interests than good relations with a potentially rogue, but energy rich, state.

Posen’s observation was yet another expression of concern about Japanese “dollar diplomacy” of old trumping more concrete efforts to complement global security regimes. As a nation with few natural energy resources of its own, Japan’s Middle East diplomacy has been to maintain an even hand with nations in the region and steer clear of involvement in conflict. While mainstream Japanese commentators, bureaucrats, and politicians often emphasized the importance of the Middle East in Japan’s overall energy security strategy, after the Iranian revolution and U.S.-Iran hostage crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they nevertheless supported Japan’s policy of strategic “cowardice” (okubyō) as a “merchant state” (chōnin koku) when it came to political events in the region. For many years this is the line that the Japanese government adopted.

However, Japan and the world have changed, and most, if not all, of the speakers at the inaugural Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum would no longer agree with such a stance. With Japan requiring assistance to deal with threatening threats such as the weaponization of the North Korean nuclear program, the speakers at the forum outlined a number of options that would take Japan and the United States on a more robust course of bilateral and international cooperation on non-proliferation and disarmament, while still addressing concerns about extended nuclear deterrence. New governments in Tokyo and Washington may provide new impetus to deal with such issues, but many observers will still be wondering about the extent of bilateral cooperation. Whatever the result of the new political winds blowing in the United States and Japan, the often complex relationship between deterrence, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has already seen analysts from both nations engage in lively debate and discussion.

NOTES
8. Matsuoka Hideo, “’Nori-okure’ gaikō no susume” (A recommendation for a diplomacy that “misses the bus”) Chōō kōron, March 1980, 114.
Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation in the Era of Global Nuclear Disarmament

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“A world without nuclear weapons”, if attained, would only be realized in the distant future, as President Obama himself admitted. Moreover, the process of global nuclear disarmament will be long and fraught with geopolitical uncertainties and unpredictable strategic risks.

For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given the security environment surrounding the country, particularly North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile development and the growth of Chinese military power, ensuring Japan’s security during the process of advancing toward the long-term goal of a nuclear-free world is as important as the goal itself.

FROM EUROPE TO ASIA

That the focus of strategic concern about nuclear weapons has shifted from Europe to Asia is yet another feature that needs to be recognized in order to put the future endeavor for global nuclear disarmament in perspective.

Ensuring that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs are totally abolished and realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula are no doubt urgent tasks for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, let alone for the enhanced security of Northeast Asia. Iran’s nuclear program is also a serious problem for the entire world. However, it is evident that North Korea’s programs are far advanced than the Iranians’.

To engage China in the concerted efforts to reduce nuclear weapons is essential for the progress of global nuclear disarmament. However, China is increasing its military power, including its nuclear forces, without transparency, despite its leaders’ pronounced support for the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This is particularly worrying since it is taking place at the very time that the United States and Russia are engaging in reductions of their nuclear stockpiles. From a longer term perspective, there is a possibility, no matter how remote it might appear now, that a combination of reduced U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles and increased Chinese nuclear forces might change the nuclear force balance among the three countries with destabilizing impacts on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the politics of Russia and China still contain elements of uncertainty, and the possibility remains that their external posture might undergo unpredictable changes.

Accordingly, it is extremely important for the sake of security and stability in Asia that the nuclear force balance between the United States on one side, and Russia and China on the other, be kept throughout the entire process of nuclear disarmament, at a level that would be reassuring to America’s allies and friends in the region.

To bring India and Pakistan into the process of nuclear disarmament is yet another difficult issue. The question of nuclear disarmament by India and Pakistan cannot be addressed without considering India’s strategic concern with regard to China. The deteriorating situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are complicating the geopolitical background to this issue.

JAPAN’S DILEMMA

Against this backdrop, the very fact that Japan commits itself to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting entry into Japan of nuclear weapons” in spite of its capability to produce nuclear weapons is by itself a significant contribution to the cause of global nuclear disarmament, and it deserves international recognition. Nonetheless, it is also evident that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, particularly the extended deterrence the United States provides to Japan under the treaty, makes Japan’s commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles possible.
Japanese political as well as public opinion remains ambivalent with regard to the nexus between Japan's non-nuclear policy and American extended deterrence. As a matter of fact, it would be fair to say that in Japan those advocating nuclear disarmament or the elimination of nuclear weapons and those stressing the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty have been making their cases separately as if living in two different worlds.

The Japanese government, too, has been pursuing the elimination of nuclear weapons while relying on American extended deterrence in coping with possible nuclear threats. Tokyo has also been hesitant to engage in consultations with Washington on the strategic question of how to ensure the effective functioning of American extended deterrence. It had gone further in promising the Japanese people that it would strictly apply the Non-Nuclear Principles to the entry of U.S. vessels and aircraft at a time when non-strategic nuclear weapons were reportedly aboard some of them.

Such a line of policy taken by the Japanese government did not cause serious problems during the Cold War, when the U.S.-Soviet confrontation set the tone for military tensions around Japan, deterrence was assured by the concept of mutually assured destruction between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, and nuclear disarmament efforts focused on strategic arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow. Even the question of how to increase the Japanese people's confidence in American extended deterrence had remained a marginal issue for both Tokyo and Washington.

Japanese security perceptions have changed since then in favor of stronger defense and closer alliance with the United States. The changes have become conspicuous particularly since North Korea shot a Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998 and the cases of abduction by North Korean agents of Japanese citizens became public knowledge in 2002. Moreover, exposed to growing threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile development, Japanese public opinion has become increasingly sensitive to the perceived uncertainty concerning American commitment to the strategy of extended deterrence.

Yet, anti-nuclear sentiment still prevails over strategic considerations within a broad spectrum of Japanese political and public opinion. This is largely due to the fact that Japan, protected by American extended deterrence, has long been spared exposure to strategic challenges.

But, given the deterioration of the strategic environment surrounding the country, Japan must take a new comprehensive approach toward the questions regarding nuclear weapons, in which deterrence against nuclear threats and promotion of nuclear disarmament must be pursued in a mutually compatible manner rather than separately. To this end, it is necessary for Japan to be engaged more positively than ever in cooperation with the United States on deterrence strategy.

Given all these, the time has come for Tokyo and Washington to expand cooperation into the hitherto little explored dimensions of alliance cooperation; engaging in consultations on deterrence strategy, including nuclear deterrence, and strengthening defense cooperation, which will form the basis for deterrence strategy. Such consultations would hopefully help strengthen the Japanese public's confidence in American commitment to the alliance.

DIFFERENCES FROM NATO

It is indeed an epoch-making progress in alliance cooperation that the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed at a meeting held last July between the two countries' foreign policy and defense officials that Tokyo and Washington would begin discussions on extended deterrence. Whether it
would be possible to enhance the density and confidentiality of Japan-U.S. consultations to the level attained by NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group is not yet certain. However, there is no need, at least for now, to try to model Japan-U.S. strategic consultations on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Even NATO underwent a long history of trial-and-error before it reached the present level of strategic consultations.

More significantly, the security environment surrounding the Japan-U.S. alliance was different from that in Europe not only during the Cold War but also after it. The requirements for operational cooperation also vary between bilateral and multilateral alliances. It is more important for Tokyo and Washington to proceed with consultations on extended deterrence with particular focus on the geopolitical circumstances in this region. In this context it would be important to involve South Korea in a circle of consultations on American extended deterrence, if not now then in the future. Although this proposition might sound far-fetched politically as well as diplomatically, ensuring American extended deterrence is a matter of common interest between Tokyo and Seoul.

**AGENDA FOR JAPAN-U.S. STRATEGIC CONSULTATIONS**

There are many agenda items the two governments can discuss without a NATO-type agreement on secrecy. Here I will address three salient items: North Korea, the interface between the declaratory doctrine of deterrence strategy and arguments for nuclear disarmament and the role of deterrence in relations with Russia and China.

Deterring North Korean aggression while pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is the most important agenda item for consultations on American extended deterrence. In this context, it is necessary for the two countries to reaffirm that U.S. military power for deterrence should comprise both nuclear and non-nuclear forces; that is to say, the U.S. extended deterrent should not be limited to the so-called “nuclear umbrella”. Although the two governments already share this recognition, the growing role of advanced conventional weapons in American deterrence strategy is not yet well understood by the Japanese public. It is therefore important for the sake of Japanese confidence in American strategy that Washington explain its changing strategic thinking, particularly its policy of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in its overall strategy. For the Japanese side to let its views in this regard be known to Washington is equally important for the purpose of increased mutual confidence.

Secondly, the two countries need to share a common recognition of the declaratory doctrine of nuclear strategy, particularly on the two aspects that are becoming the focus of arguments for nuclear disarmament: the doctrine concerning “first use” and that related to the purpose of nuclear deterrence. I am personally of the view that both the proposed declaratory policy of “no first-use” and that of limiting the purpose of retaining nuclear weapons solely to deter nuclear threats could, at least for the present, undercut the credibility of extended deterrence, particularly in the eyes of such beneficiaries of American extended deterrence as Japan and South Korea.

The U.S. policy of not excluding the possibility of “first use” of nuclear weapons implies that Washington would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons even before an enemy does if and when the country or its allies were to be attacked. From the viewpoint of countries like Japan and South Korea, this American policy provides a basis for the credibility of American extended deterrence.

Deterring North Korean aggression while pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is the most important agenda item for consultations on American extended deterrence. The Japanese audience must be puzzled by my use of the phrase “senkō shiyō” for the translation of “first use,” instead of the term “sensei shiyō”, which is widely used in Japan. I think that “senkō shiyō”, meaning “use something (nuclear weapons in the context of today’s discussion) before others,” is a better translation of “first use” than “sensei shiyō”, the literal translation of which is “preemptive use”. “First use” does not always imply “preemptive use,” particularly in contrast to “first strike.”

Regarding the second point of limiting the purpose of retaining nuclear weapons, it is indeed questionable whether nuclear weapons are suitable to deter the threats of biological or chemical weapons. However, so long as no other assured means are available for the purpose of preventing the use of
non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is important as a last resort for deterrence to maintain such conditions that would compel countries suspected of possessing these WMD to fear the possibility of being punished with nuclear retaliation if they were to use any WMD. As North Korea is suspected of possessing both biological and chemical weapons, to declare, particularly now, that the purpose of retaining nuclear weapons be limited solely to deterring nuclear threats would send the wrong message to Pyongyang.

Thirdly, sharing a common understanding about the role of deterrence in relations with Russia and China is another important agenda item for Japan-U.S. consultations on extended deterrence. These two countries are no longer adversaries to Japan and the United States in the way the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. As pointed out earlier, though, they still retain elements of uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly as seen from the viewpoint of Tokyo's and Washington's security.

Close Japan-U.S. consultations would be most required on issues such as the nuclear force balance among the U.S., Russia and China. A nuclear force balance between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other that Washington would find acceptable for the sake of strategic balance among the three countries would not necessarily be reassuring to Tokyo.

Politically, too, U.S.-Russia negotiations on a follow-on agreement to START I and U.S.-China dialogue on strategic issues are important subjects for Japan-U.S. strategic consultations. Since it can hardly be expected that a non-nuclear state will get involved in nuclear talks between nuclear weapons countries, Japan needs to count on alliance cooperation from the United States in order to have its interests protected in such talks.

There is some concern in Japan that the country might be left out of the progress in U.S.-China strategic dialogue. Although it should be better recognized in Japan that the country is still an American ally and that China is not, no matter how important China becomes economically as well as strategically in American eyes, it would also be advisable for the sake of the Japanese people's confidence in Japan-U.S. alliance that Washington would keep Tokyo informed of the progress of U.S.-China strategic relations.

**JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION**

It goes without saying that progress in defense cooperation between the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and U.S. forces is essential to enhance the credibility of American extended deterrence. Japan providing the United States with bases indispensable for U.S. global strategy already amplifies the importance the United States attaches to the alliance with Japan. The cost-sharing arrangements, in which the Japanese government bears around 70 percent of the non-salary costs for the U.S. force presence in Japan, has also been offering great cost savings for the United States' global strategy.

Yet, most important in the strategic context is cooperation between the JSDF and U.S. forces. This cooperation has been expanded over a long time into many areas, although often limited in depth and scope, from intelligence and operational cooperation to standardization of weapons and equipment and logistical support. Increased cooperation at the command level, which will be taking place as a part of the restructuring of the U.S. force presence in and around Japan, is expected to strengthen further operational cooperation between the two forces.

To improve ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities is a growingly important aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Although BMD systems need to be much improved in order to make them fully reliable, they are designed to eventually function as a supplementary means of defending Japan against North Korea's missiles if and when deterrence were to fail. How changes in American strategy would affect Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and how the JSDF would have to adapt their posture to such changes are no doubt very important agenda items for consultations between the two countries in the coming years.

Needless to say, there are many aspects of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation that require Japanese efforts to rectify long-recognized deficiencies. To change the constitutional interpretation of the so-called “right of collective defense” is a typical case in point. It is now widely acknowledged that the hitherto held interpretation concerning the right of “collective defense” has been hampering fuller implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It is hoped that the new Japanese government led by Mr. Yukio Hatoyama will address this issue without delay as part of its pledge to place Japan-U.S. relations on a more “equal footing.”
SOUTH KOREAN CONNECTION

Finally, I would like to stress that the conventionally accepted assumptions about military crises affecting Japan need to be reviewed in a new light.

For a long time, it has been assumed that any military conflict that would affect Japan would break out either on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. On this assumption, Japan’s cooperation with the United States under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has long been aimed at supporting U.S. forces’ operations to maintain the security of the Far East and, most importantly, to defend South Korea.

However, we now have to add to these worst-case scenarios the possibility that North Korea might directly attack Japan with missiles. This makes it more important than ever to ensure that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements function in a seamless manner with the U.S.-South Korea security arrangements. If and when Japan and U.S. forces in Japan were to come under attack, U.S. forces in South Korea would be almost certainly involved, and this would affect South Korea even if the country itself were not attacked.

This underscores yet again the need mentioned earlier for including South Korea in a circle of consultations aimed at enhancing the credibility of American extended deterrence. Organizing a trilateral mechanism for strategic consultations would not be politically advisable, for it might make other countries such as China and Russia unnecessarily suspicious. Leaving aside the politically complicated relations between Japan and South Korea, the differences between the two alliance systems (Japan-U.S. and U.S.-South Korea) in operational arrangements, including command structures, might make a trilateral mechanism difficult to organize.

Still, since it is evident that Japan and South Korea see a common interest in enhancing the credibility of American extended deterrence, it would be useful for the two countries to coordinate their efforts to that end through a set of three bilateral consultations: Japan-U.S., U.S.-South Korea and Japan-South Korea. Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue, if any, remains inchoate, but it would be the responsibility of both Tokyo and Seoul to engage in such dialogue with a view to helping enhance the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

Japan’s cooperation with the United States under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has long been aimed at supporting U.S. forces’ operations to maintain the security of the Far East and, most importantly, to defend South Korea.
"AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME"

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Last April, in the beautiful old world capital of Prague, President Obama delivered a remarkable and eloquent speech in which he made a simple but dramatic statement:

“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of the world without nuclear weapons.”

Then last month he repeated that commitment in a speech to the UN General Assembly, and the next day introduced a resolution to the Security Council calling for specific steps to move towards a world without nuclear weapons. The President invited George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and myself to be part of his delegation that day, and in his talk he credited our work as influencing his views on nuclear dangers.

The President’s resolution carried by a 15 to 0 vote. Of course, the world still has a long way to go to reach the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, but we clearly have made a remarkable start this past year.

These introductory comments lead directly to the subject of my talk, which will cover three points: why the four of us took such a dramatic position on nuclear weapons, what has developed since our first article was published, and how I see the path forward. On the first point, I will not presume to speak for my three colleagues, but will tell you how my own thinking was shaped. I have come to believe that the gravest security danger the world faces today is the detonation of a nuclear bomb in Washington or Moscow or Mumbai or Tokyo, and that this danger is increasing every year. But I must also acknowledge that my views on the danger of nuclear weapons have been shaped by my experience during the Cold War. I will share with you two of those experiences.

The first occurred in 1962, when I was a scientist at a defense electronics lab in California. I received a phone call from a Stanford classmate, who was at the time the CIA’s deputy director for science and technology. He asked me to come back to Washington to consult with him on an urgent technical problem.

I said, “Sure, I will rearrange my schedule and come back to you next week.”

He replied, “You don’t understand, I need to consult with you right away.”

So I took the overnight flight to D.C. and met with him the first thing the following morning. I was stunned when he showed me pictures taken by one of our U-2s of a Soviet missile deployment underway in Cuba.

That was my first introduction to what came to be called the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the next 13 days I was part of a small technical team that worked every night studying the latest intelligence available so that President Kennedy could be briefed on our analysis the following morning. Every day that I went to our analysis center I thought it would be my last day on earth. And, as more information has come out this past decade about the Cuban Missile Crisis, I find that my fears were entirely justified.

Indeed, I believe that we avoided a nuclear catastrophe as much by good luck as by good management.

The second experience occurred 16 years later, when I was the under-secretary of defense for research and engineering. One summer night in 1978 I was awoken by a phone call at 3 a.m. I sleepily picked up the phone and found at the other end of the line the watch officer at NORAD. The general got right to the point, telling me that his computers were indicating 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles on the way from the Soviet Union to the United States.

I immediately woke up.

That computer alert, of course, was a false alarm. The general was calling me in the hopes that I could help him determine what had gone wrong so that he had some answers when he briefed the president the next morning. That call is engraved in my memory, but it is only one of three false alarms that I know occurred in the United States, and I don’t know how many more might have occurred in Soviet Union. So the risks of a nuclear catastrophe have never been theoretical to me—I experienced those dangers at first hand.”

*An idea Whose Time Has come*
Ironically, during the same period that I experienced the false warning of Soviet nuclear weapons, I was responsible for the development of America’s nuclear weapons: The B-2 bomber; the MX missile; the Trident submarine; the Trident missile; the air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles. So I have earned my credentials as a certified, card-carrying cold warrior. At the time I saw all too clearly the risks in building such deadly weapon systems, but I believed that it was necessary to take those risks, given the very real threats we faced during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War ended, I believed that it was no longer necessarily to take those terrible risks. And I believed that we should begin to dismantle the deadly nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

My first opportunity to act on that belief came in 1994 when I was asked by President Clinton to be his secretary of defense. As secretary, my first priority was working to reduce the dangers of the Cold War nuclear arsenal. Our greatest immediate danger was that the nuclear weapons in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus would fall into the hands of the Russian mafia or a terror group. When the Soviet Union collapsed, these new republics had inherited the nuclear weapons on their soil. Ukraine, for example, had more nuclear weapons than the United Kingdom, France and China combined! And that country was going through great social, economic and political turbulence. Through creative and energetic diplomacy we reached an agreement with these new republics to give up their nuclear weapons. Then using the Nunn-Lugar program, we assisted them in the dismantlement process.

I personally supervised the dismantlement process in the Ukraine, visiting the largest and most modern intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) site at Pervomaysk four different times. The first time, I observed the removal of warheads. The second time I observed the removal of missiles for dismantlement. The third time I joined the ministers of defense of the Ukraine and Russia, and together we blew up one of the silos. In the summer of 1996 I returned to Pervomaysk for the last time. I went to the site where the silos has previously been and, together with the Ukrainian and Russian ministers, planted sunflowers there.

All told, during my time in office, I oversaw the dismantlement of almost 10,000 nuclear weapons in the United States and the former Soviet Union, and helped three nations—Kazakhstan, Belarus and the Ukraine—go non-nuclear. That was the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age that nuclear proliferation had been reversed. Also in my last year in office I steered the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) through the Pentagon so that President Clinton could sign it. At the time, I believed that we were well on our way to mitigating the deadly nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

But since then the effort has stalled—even reversed. The United States Senate rejected the ratification of the CTBT. Russia and China are building a new generation of nuclear weapons. North Korea already has a small nuclear arsenal, and Iran is following in their footsteps. If we cannot contain those two nations, it is very likely that there will be widespread proliferation in the Mideast, and possibly in northeast Asia as well. Additionally, Pakistan is a growing danger. The government in Pakistan is being challenged by Al Qaeda and Taliban militias in an increasingly violent insurgency. And, to add to the danger, the government of Pakistan has recently released A.Q. Khan, the notorious peddler of nuclear technology.

So today we are at a tipping point of proliferation. If Iran and North Korea cannot be stopped from building nuclear arsenals, I believe that we will cross that tipping point, with consequences that will be dangerous beyond most people’s imagination. My colleague Sam Nunn has said that the world is in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. True enough, but, in fact, instead of racing the world has been sliding backwards in nuclear proliferation this past decade. And each year we have edged ever closer to a nuclear catastrophe.

I have gone through this background to explain my state of mind in October 2008, when George Shultz decided to hold a workshop at Stanford on the 20th anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit. At the end of that workshop we concluded that we ought to revive the idea that Reagan and Gorbachev discussed at that summit—moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. And our two op-eds, in January 2007 and January 2008, prescribed such dramatic actions.

We did not expect more from our op-eds than responsive articles from academics in the field. But we were, in fact, stunned by the global reaction. We were swamped with news articles and letters from colleagues, mostly of the view that the world was overdue for a serious reevaluation of nuclear arsenals and postures. In response to invitations, we followed up our op-eds
by meeting with senior government officials and former officials in the U.S., Russia, China, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy and Norway. In parallel with our action, groups of former officials were formed in other nations including Britain, Germany, India, and Russia, all working to move towards a world without nuclear weapons.

But such Track II, or unofficial, activities can only go so far—the actions that make a real difference must be taken by governments. So we were encouraged with the really significant actions taken by governments in the last year. At the July meeting in Moscow, President Obama and President Medvedev jointly declared their support of a world without nuclear weapons, and made a commitment to move forward on a new arms reduction treaty by the end of the year. President Obama also has announced that he would work for a new Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the ratification of the CTBT. Prime Minister Gordon Brown officially endorsed moving to a world without nuclear weapons and the U.K. is taking the lead in research on supportive verification technology. Norway and Italy each have sponsored conferences on nuclear disarmament and are funding non-proliferation projects. Japan and Australia have formed an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which just yesterday completed its fourth plenary meeting in Hiroshima.

So this past year there have been unprecedented actions taken on a global basis. Indeed, I am moved to quote Victor Hugo, who more than a century ago wrote: “More powerful than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” It does appear that moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons is an idea whose time has finally come. And it could well turn out to be more powerful than mighty armies!

But what remains to be done is much more difficult than what has been done. In the next few years, for example, the U.S. and Russia need to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and get it ratified. The U.S. needs to ratify the CTBT. The international community needs to negotiate a new FMCT. And the international community needs to find a way to stop nuclear weapon programs in North Korea and Iran.

None of this will be easy. Indeed, it will call for brilliant diplomacy sustained over many years. I know that many of you believe that moving towards a world without nuclear weapons is, in fact, Mission Impossible. And I must concede that you have recent history on your side. But in an earlier era we did demonstrate that we could succeed in such a daunting diplomatic challenge. We have as an example the remarkable international diplomacy undertaken in the decade after the ending of World War Two. At that time, leaders of the western world were motivated by two major challenges: helping the world recover from the unprecedented catastrophe of the Second World War; and preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Europe and Asia. And they succeeded brilliantly.

Today we have a challenge that is smaller in scope, but in some ways more difficult, because its importance is not yet fully appreciated, either in the U.S. or internationally. If we are to create the international political will needed to tackle such a difficult problem, there must be a recognition that the world faces a nuclear catastrophe unless we make a dramatic change of course. And as we come to recognize the grave danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, we also have to understand that the policies designed to mitigate those dangers have to be sustained over many decades.

Therefore, even as we work internationally to reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the United States and other nuclear powers will have to maintain for some years a nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. And there is an inevitable tension between these two goals. That tension is going to be demonstrated very soon in the U.S. as the debate gets underway on CTBT ratification. My own belief is that ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. is imperative in achieving that international cooperation needed to reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation. I arrived at my view only after extensive international consultation—talking with hundreds of governmental and non-governmental leaders in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, Russia, and China.

But some in the U.S. argue that ratifying the CTBT would endanger our ability to maintain a safe, secure and reliable deterrent. I disagree. I have spent hundreds of hours talking with our nuclear scientists learning the details of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), on which the U.S. depends to maintain the reliability of its nuclear stockpile without testing. The SSP has achieved remarkable successes since it was instituted a dozen
years ago. Our scientists today have a far better detailed understanding of nuclear detonations through simulations, through hydrodynamic testing, and through an extensive inspection program. They have successfully conducted life extension programs on several major weapons in our stockpile, and they have completed the construction of the National Ignition Facility, which will be a unique tool for understanding the detailed physics of nuclear explosions, as well as representing a unique scientific achievement, with potentially important applications in the energy field.

I have talked about the difficulties of CTBT ratification, but it is only one of the major challenges we will face in the next year or two. There are a host of other challenges associated with taking even the first steps on this path to a world without nuclear weapons. But I have concentrated too much, perhaps, on the difficulty of the path forward. I would like to leave you with a positive message. I know that some of you fully appreciate the great danger that nuclear proliferation poses to the world today, but fear that the problem is hopeless: In spite of the considerable efforts taken by the international community, North Korea has gone nuclear, Iran is following in its footsteps, and a dozen other nations are considering the same course.

To those of who think there is nothing constructive we can do, I would like to leave you with a benediction, by paraphrasing one of my favorite quotes from President John Kennedy:

“Too many of us think that it is impossible to contain proliferation. But that is a dangerous and defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that nuclear terrorism or nuclear war is inevitable; that we are gripped by forces that we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade; and therefore they can be solved by man.”

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CONFERENCE AGENDA

SESSION ONE: SPEECHES AND PANEL DIALOGUE

Tuesday, October 21

Opening Remarks

Jirō Hanyū, Chairman, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Keynote Speech

“Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation in the Era of Global Nuclear Disarmament”
Yukio Satoh, Japan’s former Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Memorial Speech

“An Idea Whose Time Has Come”
William J. Perry, 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense

Panel Dialogue

Discussants
William Perry
Shōtarō Yachi, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moderator
Ryūichi Teshima, former Washington Bureau Chief, NHK

Closing Remarks

Robert Hathaway, Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center
SESSION TWO: PANEL DISCUSSION

Wednesday, October 22

Opening Remarks

Junko Chano, Executive Director, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Summary of First Session

Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, Graduate School of International and Public Policy, Hitotsubashi University

Panel I: Ensuring the Credibility of Extended Deterrence in Promoting Nuclear Disarmament

Speakers:
Ken Jimbo, Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University
Robert Litwak, Vice President for Programs and Director, International Security Studies, Wilson Center
Charles Ferguson, President, Federation of American Scientists

Moderator:
Nobumasa Akiyama

Panel II: Toward Japan-U.S. Global Partnership for Nuclear Threat Reduction

Speakers:
Katsuhisa Furukawa, Fellow, Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society, Japan Science and Technology Agency

Tatsujirō Suzuki, Associate Vice President, the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry in Japan
Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Moderator:
Nobumasa Akiyama

Closing Remarks

Robert Hathaway, Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center